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ABSTRACT

The Psychological Allure of Alford: Why Innocents Plead Guilty
by
Johanna Hellgren
Advisor: Saul Kassin
The Alford plea allows defendants to maintain their innocence while accepting a plea.
Although this plea is more prevalent than jury trials, it is largely unknown to both lay people and
researchers (Redlich & Özdoğru, 2009). Legal scholars have argued that the Alford plea may
present an undue influence on innocent defendants who may not otherwise accept a plea, while
other assert that the Alford plea is a beneficial alternative for defendants who want to preserve
their reputation (Ronis, 2009; Ward, 2004). However, no research to date has explored either of
these assumptions.
The goals of the current research were to fill this gap and explore two important aspects
of the Alford plea: (1) whether the opportunity to maintain innocence through an Alford plea
increases the rate of innocent defendants pleading guilty, and (2) how Alford defendants are
perceived by observers. To accomplish these goals, I conducted five studies. In the first two
studies, actors were either asked to imagine being accused of cheating on an experimental task or
being accused of involuntary manslaughter. Participants were then randomly assigned to be
either guilty or innocent of the wrongdoing and were subsequently offered either a traditional
plea that required them to admit guilt, or an Alford plea that enabled them to proclaim innocence
in a written statement. They were then asked to provide their plea decision along with their
reasons for accepting or rejecting. In three subsequent studies, I explored how observers viewed
Alford defendants and their decision. Participants read about an individual being accused of
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cheating or involuntary manslaughter, and then offered a traditional plea or an Alford plea. The
individual then presented his plea decision and participants provided their perceptions of the
individuals’ guilt, as well as his decision and character.
In the actor studies, I found that guilty participants were significantly more likely to
accept a plea compared to innocent participants. In contrast with predictions, Study 1 revealed
that innocent Alford defendants were less likely to plea than other participants. However, a large
part of innocent defendants who accepted cited the opportunity to maintain innocence as a reason
for their plea decision. While the observer studies revealed little to no effect of the Alford plea
on participants’ guilt perceptions, I found that participants consistently viewed the Alford
defendant in a more negative light, rating him as less remorseful than other defendants. The
implications of the results are discussed, particularly in the light of legal scholars’ stance on the
Alford plea as an advantageous alternative for defendants.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD

vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I have to thank my advisor, Saul Kassin, for your support and invaluable
advice on my journey through graduate school. Your knowledge, enthusiasm, and outrage with
the justice system is inspiring and has driven my research, now and beyond. Your zeal
encourages me to always press on. I am lucky to have met you.

To Emily Haney-Caron, thank you for your unwavering support, both academic and personal.
Although you came into my academic journey on the later side, you have given me so much. I
wouldn’t be where I am today without you.

To my committee—Steven Penrod, Allison Redlich, and Tina Zottoli. Thank you all for being
brilliant, for conducting research that inspire me, and for supporting me and my research
throughout this process. I am forever grateful for you all.

Furthermore, I would like to thank AP-LS, the Forensic Psychology Research Institute, and the
Early Research Initiative for funding this project and making it possible. A big thank you to my
wonderful research assistant Sarah Lynch for your flexibility and positivity.
To my friends and colleagues, past and current. Thank you for making the Ph.D. journey about
more than just work. I couldn’t have done without your encouragement, sage advice, and endless
support. A special thanks to Dr. Timothy Luke, for always being there to answer any questions.
You are truly the best.

To my partner, Ryan, thank you for always believing in me, even when I don’t. This long and
winding road hasn’t been easy, but it would have been impossible without you. I love you.
Finally, I want to thank my family. Mamma, du har alltid trott på mig och min förmåga utan
minsta tvekan. Ingenting av det här skulle vara möjligt utan dig. Till resten av familjen Hellgren,
ni har gjort mig till den jag är idag, jag älskar er alla.

Thank you

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL PAGE……………………………………………………………………………....iii
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………………...iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………………………..vi
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………………………...viii
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………………………ix
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………...1
OVERVIEW OF THE PLEA-BARGAINING SYSTEM..……………………………….5
HISTORY OF ALFORD PLEAS……………………….…………………….…………..6
THE INNOCENCE PROBLEM IN PLEA BARGAINING...……………………...…….8
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF ALFORD PLEAS…………………….….…….…….19
OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH……..……………………………………………………………25
STUDY 1………………………………………………………………….……………………..27
METHOD………………………………………………………….…………………….27
RESULTS………………………………………………………….…………………….35
STUDY 2…………………………………………………………………….…………………..43
METHOD…………………………………………………………….………………….43
RESULTS…………………………………………………………….………………….47
STUDY 3………………………………………………………………………………………...54
METHOD………………………………………………………………………………..54

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD

viii

RESULTS………………………………………………………………………………..58
STUDY 4………………………………………………………………………………………...62
METHOD………………………………………………………………………………..62
RESULTS………………………………………………………………………………..64
STUDY 5………………………………………………………………………………………...68
METHOD……………………………………………………………………………..…68
RESULTS………………………………………………………………………………..71
GENERAL DISCUSSION………………………………………………………………………74
TABLES……………………………………………………………………………………........89
FIGURES……………………………………………………………………………………….135
APPENDICES……………………………………………………………………………….....140
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………………...….154

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD

ix

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1. Demographics (counts and percentages) across conditions (Study 1)
TABLE 2. Percentage of participants accepting a plea by type of plea and guilt status (Study 1).
TABLE 3. Categories for plea decision reasoning (Study 1 and 2).
TABLE 4. Examples of reasons for plea decision (Study 1 and 2).
TABLE 5. Participants’ reasoning behind plea decision broken down by plea decision, guilt
status, and type of plea (Study 1 and 2).
TABLE 6. Means and ANOVA statistics for effects of type of plea and guilt status on confidence
in plea decision ratings (Study 1 and 2).
TABLE 7. Percentage of participants’ anticipated guilt (vs. innocence) perceptions by observers
by type of plea and guilt status (Study 1).
TABLE 8. Means and ANOVA statistics for anticipated guilt perceptions by observers by type
of plea and guilt status, split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who
rejected a plea (Study 1).
TABLE 9. Means (and standard deviations) for post-plea state of mind measures (Study 1).
TABLE 10. Means and ANOVA statistics for decision difficulty by type of plea and guilt status,
split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 1).
TABLE 11. Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects of type of plea and guilt
status on satisfaction ratings (Study 1).
TABLE 12. Means and ANOVA statistics for decision satisfaction by type of plea and guilt
status, split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study
1).
TABLE 13. Means and ANOVA statistics for decision pressure by type of plea and guilt status,
split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 1).
TABLE 14. Means and ANOVA statistics for effects on case evaluation measures (Study 1).
TABLE 15. Means and ANOVA statistics for consequences of plea decision (Study 1).
TABLE 16. Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 1).
TABLE 17. Percentages of participants accepting a plea by type of plea and guilt status (Study
2).
TABLE 18. Percentage of participants’ anticipated guilt perceptions by observers by type of plea
and guilt status (Study 2).

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD

x

TABLE 19. Means and ANOVA statistics for anticipated guilt perceptions by observers by type
of plea and guilt status, split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who
rejected a plea (Study 2).
TABLE 20. Means (and standard deviations) for post-plea state of mind measures (Study 2).
TABLE 21. Means and ANOVA statistics for decision difficulty by type of plea and guilt status,
split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 2).
TABLE 22. Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects of type of plea and guilt
status on satisfaction ratings (Study 2).
TABLE 23. Means and ANOVA statistics for decision satisfaction by type of plea and guilt
status, split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study
2).
TABLE 24. Means and ANOVA statistics for decision pressure by type of plea and guilt status,
split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 2).
TABLE 25. Means and ANOVA statistics for case evaluation measures (Study 2).
TABLE 26. Means and ANOVA statistics for consequences of plea decision (Study 2).
TABLE 27. Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 2).
TABLE 28. Percentage of participants believing defendant was guilty by type of plea and plea
decision (Study 3).
TABLE 29. Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects of confidence in guilt
perception ratings (Study 3 and 4).
TABLE 30. Means and ANOVA statistics for plea decision perception measures (Study 3).
TABLE 31. Percentage of participants reporting they would personally reject (vs. accept) by type
of plea and plea decision (Study 3).
TABLE 32. Means and ANOVA statistics for perceptions of defendant ratings (Study 3).
TABLE 33. Means and ANOVA statistics for measures of student defendant remorsefulness and
blameworthiness (Study 3).
TABLE 34. Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 3).
TABLE 35. Percentage of participants believing defendant was guilty by type of plea and plea
decision (Study 4).
TABLE 36. Means and ANOVA statistics for plea decision perception ratings (Study 4).
TABLE 37. Percentage of participants reporting they would personally accept (vs. reject) by type
of plea and plea decision (Study 4).

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD

xi

TABLE 38. Means and ANOVA statistics for perceptions of defendant ratings (Study 4).
TABLE 39. Means and ANOVA statistics for defendant remorsefulness and blameworthiness
(Study 4).
TABLE 40. Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 4).
TABLE 41. Percentage of participants believing defendant was guilty by plea condition (Study
5).
TABLE 42. Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects on plea decision perception
ratings (Study 5).
TABLE 43. Counts and percentage of participants who would personally accept a plea, by plea
condition (Study 5).
TABLE 44. Means and ANOVA statistics for effects on perceptions of defendant ratings (Study
5).
TABLE 45. Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 5).

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1. Interaction effect of type of plea and guilt status on percentages of accepted plea
(Study 1).
FIGURE 2. Interaction effect of type of plea and guilt status on participants’ rating of the
difficulty to make a plea decision (Study 1).
FIGURE 3. Interaction effect of type of plea and guilt status on the degree to which
consequences of rejecting the plea influenced participants’ plea decision (Study 1).
FIGURE 4. Interaction effect of type of plea and plea decision on defendant honesty ratings
(Study 3)
FIGURE 5. Percentages of guilty perceptions by plea condition (smaller sample) (Study 5).

xii

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
1
The Psychological Allure of Alford: Why Innocents Plead Guilty

Alford pleas are awful. There could hardly be a clearer violation of due process
than sending someone to prison who has neither been found guilty nor admitted
his guilt. If anything short of torture can shock your conscience, Alford pleas
should. (Alschuler, 2003; p.1412).
In 2001 in West Virginia, 19-year-old Joseph Buffey was arrested for a burglary and
sexual assault of an elderly woman (Buffey v. Ballard, 2012). During a late-night interrogation,
he confessed to the crimes but recanted just moments later. Despite maintaining his innocence
since and throughout the investigation, Buffey was persuaded by his attorney to accept a plea
deal to avoid up to 300 years in prison. After his conviction, The Innocence Project discovered
that the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory DNA evidence, which excluded Buffey and
identified the perpetrator, a serial offender. Buffey sought relief after 15 years in prison. In 2015
the West Virginia Supreme Court accepted the withdrawal of his guilty plea (Eckholm, 2015).
Despite the court’s order, the prosecutor decided to retry Buffey in October of 2016 for
the home invasion part of the crime for which he withdrew his plea. He also threatened to charge
Buffey with statutory rape stemming from his relationship with a 13-year-old girlfriend when he
was 15 years old. In exchange for dismissing all charges, Buffey was offered an Alford plea,
allowing him to maintain his innocence in the burglary and sexual assault case but also requiring
him to admit that there was enough evidence to convict him. Buffey, who was now out of prison,
accepted the plea out of fear of going back (White, 2016).
Unfortunately, the case of Joseph Buffey—and the many issues of plea bargaining which
it exemplifies—is not unique: of the National Registry of Exonerations’ (2020) 2665 exonerees,
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almost 20% had pled guilty to crimes they did not commit. Since the mid-1920s, plea bargaining
has been the standard method through which criminal cases in the US are resolved (Dervan &
Edkins, 2015). Because of the often substantial reduction in sentences offered to defendants
through a plea deal, both legal scholars and social science researchers have explored the potential
involuntary nature of the practice of plea bargaining (Bibas, 2003; Redlich et al., 2017). Legal
scholars and psychologists have given significant attention to the issue of plea bargaining’s
“innocence problem” (Redlich, Bibas et al. 2017). The motivating force behind the innocence
problem derives from prosecutors overcharging defendants and then offering a plea with such a
discounted charge and/or sentence that the defendant’s innocence or guilt is no longer the
primary consideration (Podgor, 2010). Thus, most legal scholars and psychologists argue that the
incentive to plead and the risk of going to trial exert undue pressure for both innocent and guilty
defendants to plead guilty (Covey, 2011: Redlich, Bibas et al., 2017).
In addition to initially accepting a plea despite being innocent, Joseph Buffey ultimately
accepted an Alford plea to avoid further prison time (White, 2016). Though largely unknown to
the public (Hellgren & Kassin, 2018), the Alford plea is more prevalent than jury trials with 6%
of cases being resolved through an Alford plea, in contrast to only 3% of cases leading to trial
(Redlich & Özdoğru, 2009; United States Sentencing Commission, 2017). The Alford plea and
the traditional guilty plea are legally identical; that is, both result in the same direct and collateral
consequences (Bibas, 2003). However, Alford defendants can be subject to additional negative
consequences, such as more severe sentences and revocation of parole and probation, because of
the perceived absence of expressed remorse (Ward, 2003).
Some legal scholars contend that the Alford plea can be beneficial for defendants—
particularly to innocent defendants who may wish to avoid the stigma that accompanies taking
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responsibility for a crime while avoiding the uncertainty of trial (Ronis, 2009). They argue that if
defendants are advised of the consequences and make an informed decision, an Alford plea is the
perfect solution for risk-averse, innocent defendants (Conklin, 2020; Ronis, 2009). However, I
propose that these arguments rely on two assumptions: (1) innocent defendants will see the
ability to publicly proclaim their innocence as appealing enough to overlook the additional
negative collateral consequences to which an Alford plea can lead, and (2) defendants who accept
an Alford plea will minimize the stigma of accepting responsibility for a violent crime and elicit
fewer negative judgments from the public due to their assertion of innocence. Although these
arguments are ubiquitous in the legal literature, they have not been subject to empirical research
(Diehm, 2015).
Researchers have historically applied the shadow-of-the-trial model to understand plea
bargain decision making (Redlich et al. 2017). The shadow model posits that defendants base
their decision to accept or reject a plea deal on the probable verdict and consequent sentencing
outcome of a trial (Bibas, 2004). Because the Alford plea is in theory—though not in practice—
legally identical to a traditional plea, the shadow model predicts that defendants will judge an
Alford in a similar manner (Ronis, 2009). This prediction contradicts the argument that innocent
defendants would be particularly enticed by the Alford plea. Nevertheless, there are basic social
psychology theories that may provide a framework that helps illuminate the potential appeal of
Alford pleas.
Plea bargaining literature has shown that defendants are likely to accept plea deals not
only due to a substantial plea discount but also due to pressure to comply with authority figures,
such as lawyers, prosecutors, and judges (Bordens & Bassett, 1985; Malloy et al. 2014). Yet
innocent defendants who feel compelled to admit guilt to accept a traditional plea deal behave
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contrary to their beliefs, which may well elicit negative stress, or cognitive dissonance (Festinger,
1957). The literature on dissonance reduction, in particular the self-affirmation theory posited by
Claude Steele (1988), offers a framework through which to view the allure of the Alford plea.
Self-affirmation suggests that the ability to assert one’s moral and positive self-concept is highly
psychologically appealing and leads to a decrease in tension and anxiety (Steele & Lieu, 1983).
Thus, the psychological benefits stemming from affirming one’s innocence may explain why a
defendant would choose an Alford plea, seemingly against their own self-interest.
Theories of self-presentation—and self-verification in particular—further suggest that
individuals are highly motivated to self-present in a way that accurately conveys their self-view
and have others confirm this view (Swann, 2012). This suggests that innocent defendants could
be drawn to Alford pleas for the opportunity to publicly self-present as innocent, while still
benefitting from the less risky choice of pleading instead of going to trial.
The concepts of compliance, cognitive dissonance, and self-presentation could lend
support to Alford supporters’ assertion that the Alford plea is a superior option for innocent
defendants facing a decision in the shadow of trial. Alternatively, the behavior predicted by these
psychological theories could contradict the previously mentioned assumptions. With a theoretical
framework drawn from classic social psychology literature, the current studies explored these
ideas and bridged the gap in the empirical literature by examining the allure of the Alford plea, as
well as the public’s perception of defendants who take Alford pleas. The specific research
questions the present project aimed to answer are as follows:
1. Could the psychological benefits stemming from maintaining innocence be sufficient
for innocent defendants—who may otherwise reject a plea deal—to act against their
self-interest and accept an Alford plea?
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2. Do observers perceive defendants who accept Alford pleas as less guilty and thus less
subject to negative judgement compared to those who accept traditional pleas?
Overview of the Plea-Bargaining System
The general public views the jury trial as the normative means of resolving criminal
charges; however, trials are increasingly rare (Galanter, 2004), and are generally reserved for the
most serious cases (Abrams, 2011; Kutateladze, & Lawson, 2018). It is estimated that about 97%
of both state and federal cases are now resolved through plea agreements (including Alford and no
contest pleas), not trials (United States Sentencing Commission, 2017).
The legal system has long benefitted from plea bargaining and the practice has been
touted as an effective tool to dispose of cases quickly and efficiently (Alschuler, 1979).
Defendants get the chance to serve a lesser sentence for their crimes, and the criminal justice
system avoids being overburdened by the number of cases (Levenson, 2012). Although the
United States Supreme Court initially disfavored the plea-bargaining practice, deeming it
coercive and corrupt, it quickly rose in popularity when the Civil War brought with it rapidly
rising crime rates (Dervan & Edkins, 2015). In 1967, the American Bar Association gave its
blessing to plea bargaining in the Standards for Criminal Justice (American Bar Association,
1999), and in 1970 the U.S Supreme Court agreed and established that plea bargaining was
constitutional (Brady v. United States, 1970). Today, plea bargaining is a standard part of the
legal system in the United States, accounting for the majority of all criminal convictions (Bibas,
2003; United State Sentencing Commission, 2017).
In general, a plea deal is an agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant in which
the defendant is offered leniency in exchange for admitting guilt (Alschuler, 1979). This leniency
generally takes the form of either charge bargaining—in which the initial charges are reduced or
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even dropped, or sentence bargaining—in which the sentence gets reduced in exchange for a
guilty plea and a trial waiver (Saltzburg & Capra, 2004). However, defendants can also enter
open pleas. This refers to when the defendant pled guilty without an agreement of charge or
sentence bargaining, and the eventual sentence is solely determined by the judge (Ellis &
Allenbaugh, 2017). Regardless of the type of plea, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states
that it is ultimately the judge’s choice to accept or reject a defendant’s plea.
History of Alford Pleas
Alongside the Brady (1970) case that legitimized traditional plea bargaining, the Alford
plea became an accepted practice through the court’s decision in the case North Carolina v.
Alford in 1970. In 1963 in North Carolina, Henry C. Alford was accused of first-degree murder.
Alford had reportedly gotten into an altercation with the victim, Nathanial Young, at a bar earlier
that night. Later, Young was shot, killed, and Alford was promptly arrested. There were no
witnesses to the actual crime, but Alford’s neighbor claimed that Alford had returned home right
before the murder to retrieve his gun, stated his intention to murder Young, and later returned and
asserted that he had committed the murder. This witness’s testimony provided strong evidence of
Alford’s guilt and, as Alford was a Black man with a criminal record in the South in the 1960s,
his conviction was almost guaranteed (Redlich & Özdoğru, 2009). But at Alford’s arraignment,
he claimed he was innocent of the crime but was pleading guilty in fear of the death penalty
(North Carolina v. Alford, 1970). Despite Alford’s persistence in claiming his innocence, the
judge overseeing the case allowed him to enter a plea of guilty and Alford was sentenced to the
maximum 30 years in prison for second degree murder. Following the conviction Alford
repeatedly sought relief, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals eventually reversed his
conviction. In 1970, the Supreme Court re-affirmed Alford’s conviction in a six-to-three decision
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which declared that, of the two conditions to pleading guilty—waiving one’s right to trial and
admission of guilt—it is only the first condition that constitutes a “constitutional requisite to
imposing a criminal sanction” (North Carolina v. Alford, 1970).
Following this landmark decision, the Alford plea was established. Defendants can now
legally plead guilty and receive leniency without the requirement of admitting guilt (Redlich &
Özdoğru, 2009). As with traditional guilty pleas, however, the defendant is still required to waive
several rights, including the right to trial, the right to appeal, and the opportunity to engage in
civil litigation against the state (Schneider, 2013). Unlike the no contest (or nolo contendere)
plea, defendants who accept Alford pleas are still subject to future civil litigation against them
(Shipley, 1987).
The Alford plea is legally the same as a traditional plea, with the only difference being the
opportunity to maintain innocence. Zottoli et al. (2019) reported that while the Alford plea is only
explicitly allowed in six states, it is used in 47 states today. Anecdotal data from a former federal
prosecutor suggests that the Alford plea is the most common method of resolving pleas in
Connecticut (Potts, 2009), and defense attorneys in North Carolina suggest that Alford pleas are
commonplace in state courts in that state (Welty, 2010). Using the Survey of Inmates in State and
Federal Correctional Facilities, Wolf Harlow (2000) reported an estimated 6% of state inmates
and 3% of federal inmates in 1997 entered Alford pleas. Similar numbers were found by Redlich
and Özdoğru, (2009) who examined the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Survey of Inmates in State
Correctional Facilities (SISCF) from 2004 and found that 6.5% of state inmates had entered an
Alford plea. Given that merely 3% of criminal cases go to trial (United States Sentencing
Commission, 2017), the data suggests that Alford pleas are in fact more common than a trial by
jury. Legal scholars argue that an Alford plea may be particularly appealing to innocent
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defendants and may therefore be exacerbating the innocence problem (Bibas, 2003). The
following section examines the causes and consequences of this issue.
The Innocence Problem in Plea Bargaining
As plea bargaining grew in popularity and the majority of cases were being resolved
outside the court room, a concern quickly arose regarding the risk of innocent defendants
choosing to plead guilty to a crime to receive reduced charges, rather than facing the risk of going
to trial where they may be subject to far harsher punishments (Bibas, 2004). In the pleabargaining literature, this has been dubbed “the innocence problem”. Redlich, Bibas et al., (2017)
argue that the plea-bargaining process incentivizes defendants to accept plea deals, even if they
are innocent. Studies have shown that the “plea discount”—the degree to which a defendant’s
sentence gets decreased if they accept a plea rather than go to trial – can be as large as 96%
(Dezember & Redlich, 2019; see Zottoli et al., 2016 for juveniles). In addition, legal scholars
have identified a trial penalty such that defendants who reject a plea and choose to go to trial are
generally subject to more severe sentences than defendants who were offered no plea and went to
trial (Grossman, 2018). As such, legal scholars and psychologists argue that any rational, riskaverse defendant would thus be better off with a plea.
Although an extensive body of research has established that false confessions occur with
regularity in the criminal justice system (Kassin et al., 2010)—and that these confessions
increased the tendency to plead guilty (Kassin et al., 2012; Redlich et al., 2018), researchers have
only recently started discussing the innocence problem within plea bargaining. Experimental
studies have shown that innocent participants will agree to a plea deal—admitting guilt in
exchange for a lesser charge – at rates as high as 56% (Dervan & Edkins, 2013). Of course, it is
difficult to know the rate of false guilty pleas outside the laboratory; however, records from

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
9
National Registry of Exonerations (2020) reveal that about 20% of wrongfully convicted
individuals in the United States chose to falsely plead guilty rather than face the uncertainty and
risk of a trial.
Gross et al., (2005) argue that false guilty pleas may be more prevalent than false
confessions because defendants in plea bargain proceedings have fewer safeguards allotted to
them compared to defendants who go to trial and are therefore more vulnerable to wrongful
convictions that are never exposed. Indeed, the previously mentioned records from The National
Registry of Exonerations (2020) shows that among exonerated individuals, the prevalence of
false guilty pleas is higher (20%) than that of false confessions (12%). Additionally, many plea
deals include waivers of the right to appeal, which means very few defendants who have given a
false guilty plea even have the opportunity to challenge their conviction (Redlich & Bonventre,
2015). This suggests that the National Registry of Exoneration statistic of false guilty pleas is
likely an underestimate and that it is all but impossible to know the true number (Redlich, Bibas,
et al., 2017). Despite this, some researchers believe that the innocence problem is of limited
magnitude and thus does not warrant further examination or reform of the system (Tor, GazalAyal, & Garcia, 2010; Gazal-Ayal & Tor, 2011).
The Alford Plea and False Admissions
Like a false traditional guilty plea, an innocent person’s Alford plea is a false admission
that leads to a conviction, a criminal record, and potential liability in civil cases (Redlich &
Özdoğru, 2009; Ward, 2003). The prevalence of innocent defendants accepting Alford pleas is
even more difficult to surmise compared to traditional guilty pleas, as organizations like The
Innocence Project and the National Registry of Exonerations do not distinguish Alford pleas from
traditional pleas or no contest pleas in their records of exonerees. However, legal scholars fear
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that the innocence problem might be especially common among defendants who enter Alford
pleas, as they are able to assert their innocence (Bibas, 2003). Some legal scholars argue that in
the original Alford decision the court condoned or even encouraged other courts to accept pleas
from defendants who may be innocent (Diehm, 2015).
For an Alford plea to be allowed, the court must find a sufficient factual basis of guilt;
however, judges have broad discretion to accept or reject an Alford plea (Redlich & Özdoğru,
2009). Nonetheless, it has never been established what “sufficient” entails and, consequently,
judges have accepted or rejected Alford pleas for a variety of reasons with various standards
underlying their decisions (Shipley, 1987). Although it may be argued that the original Alford
case contained strong evidence, thus fulfilling the criteria of a sufficient factual basis of guilt,
there are many examples of cases resolved through Alford pleas in which this was not the case.
The West Memphis Three is an example of this. Damien Echols, Jessie Misskelley, and
Jason Baldwin were tried and convicted for the murders of three young boys in 1994 based solely
on a confession provided by Misskelley (Schneider, 2013). Due to the many inconsistencies in
Miskelley’s statement and the lack of any corroborating evidence, it became evident to the public
that the three defendants were innocent, and that the confession was false. After seeking relief for
many years with the support of numerous celebrities, the three men were advised by their lawyers
to accept Alford pleas and, in 2011, the West Memphis Three were released from prison (Vota,
2011). Consistent with research showing that confessions are seen as highly incriminating
evidence (Kassin, 2012), this case provides a clear example of when a single piece of evidence—
a false confession—was enough for the judge to accept the entered Alford pleas.
The West Memphis Three and the case of Joseph Buffey mentioned earlier are just two of
several cases in which defendants have been granted retrials due to uncertainties regarding the
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validity of the initial trial, only to then be offered an Alford plea with the benefit of getting or
staying out of prison as a result of time already served (see for example the cases of Leroy Harris
[innocenceproject.org] and Michael Peterson [Walton, 2019]). It is important to note that by
accepting Alford pleas, these defendants are still considered guilty and are not eligible for relief
from the state (Schneider, 2013).
Additionally, the majority of the Innocence Project’s first 200 exonerees involved
seemingly strong evidence that later turned out to be erroneous (innocenceproject.org). Most of
the defendants in these wrongful conviction cases went to trial, where they had the chance to
contest the evidence against them through the safeguard of the adversarial trial process. Yet, they
were all convicted. Redlich and Özdoğru (2009) argue that if these cases had been put in front of
a judge to determine the sufficient factual basis of guilt for an Alford plea, the standard would
most likely have been met and these defendants would have been allowed to enter an Alford plea,
despite their actual innocence. Using Wolf Harlow’s (2000) estimation of 6% of inmates entering
Alford pleas, even if only 1% of these defendants were innocent, that would still amount to
double the number of Innocence Project exonerations to date (380; Redlich and Özdoğru, 2009).
Considering this data, legal scholars’ concerns regarding the risk of innocent defendants being
convicted through Alford pleas are indeed valid and in need of further examination and empirical
research.
Disadvantages of the Alford Plea
Beyond the potential increased risk of innocent defendants pleading guilty through an
Alford plea that legal scholars express (Diehm, 2015; Ward, 2003), there are other issues with
this alternative plea that can affect innocent and guilty defendants alike. Importantly, the primary
benefits that Alford plea advocates put forth are similar to the benefits of a traditional plea
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(Schneider, 2013). The defendant receives the advantage of a reduced sentence and avoids the
risk of trial, without having to claim responsibility for the crime (Ronis, 2009; Walburn, 1998).
The actual practice of using the Alford plea suggests that these previously mentioned
benefits are not sufficient to induce the acceptance of the plea offer (Ward, 2003). First and
foremost, the benefits of avoiding risk and uncertainty are only an illusion when it comes to
Alford pleas, as there is both risk and uncertainty present in the subsequent sentencing phase
(Bibas, 2003). Many courts view the defendant’s expression of remorse as an important aspect of
the sentencing phase (Ward, 2003). This is of course most relevant in cases of open pleas, where
a set sentence has not yet been decided (Ellis & Allenbaugh, 2017). Remorse is often used as a
proxy for potential future risk of re-offending (Schneider, 2013), and studies have shown that a
defendant showing a lack of remorse is more likely to receive a harsher sentence (Harrel, 1981).
Some states view an expression of remorse as a mitigating factor and may, as a
consequence, reduce the defendant’s sentence. Yet other states view the lack of remorse as an
aggravating factor, enhancing the severity of a defendant’s sentence if he or she does not express
sincere remorse (Ward, 2003). In a study aimed at examining judges’ perceptions of remorse,
Wood and McMartin (2007) found that judges deemed a plea of guilty as comparable to an
expression of remorse, whereas denial of guilt was the same as a lack of remorse. The issue of
remorse is self-evident for Alford defendants as they—by their insistence of innocence—do not
take responsibility for the crime and thus do not meet the standard of remorse. Hence, the
Supreme Court stated in the original Alford case (North Carolina v. Alford, 1970) that the
decision does not require the court to treat a defendant who has entered an Alford plea as
innocent for purposes of sentencing.
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But the issue of not expressing remorse or taking responsibility goes beyond sentencing.
Probation often includes conditions such as counseling, anger management, and sex offender
treatment (Ward, 2003). An important part of many of these programs is the acceptance of
responsibility. Alford pleaders who maintain their innocence risk getting their probation revoked,
especially if they are charged with sex offenses. For example, in 2004, the Connecticut Supreme
Court revoked a defendant’s probation for failure to admit responsibility in a mandated sex
offender treatment program (State v. Faraday, 2004). The defendant had accepted an Alford plea
and argued that he had not been informed that refusing to take responsibility could lead to the
revocation of his probation, since the Alford doctrine had allowed him to maintain innocence.
The court disagreed and concluded that they were not required to inform the defendant of this
requirement.
In a similar case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin revoked a defendant’s probation for
failure to admit guilt in sex offender treatment, stating that his Alford plea did not “entitle him to
special treatment” (State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 1998). Likewise, an incarcerated defendant
who is up for parole is often expected to express remorse to show the parole board that he or she
has a low risk of committing any future criminal wrongdoing; however, because Alford pleaders
maintain their innocence, they risk being denied parole due to this stance (Medwed, 2008).
Molesworth (2008) argued that a defendant who refuses to accept responsibility may also
harm the victim, as acknowledgements of guilt and remorse are crucial to a victim’s recovery. As
such, there are significant negative consequences of the Alford plea resulting from innocent and
guilty defendants alike. Defendants who use the Alford plea may thus be mistreated both in the
criminal justice system, where their refusal to admit guilt may lead to revoked probation or
denied parole (Ward, 2003), and in the community, where the public may view an Alford plea as
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a defendant refusing to admit his guilt and, consequently, denying victims the recovery that
comes with closure (Schneider, 2013).
Additionally, there is the issue of wrongfully convicted defendants coaxed into accepting
an Alford plea by prosecutors as a way to avoid a re-trial, as in the case of Joe Buffey and the
West Memphis Three described earlier. While an Alford plea enables these defendants to claim
innocence, it is not an exoneration and as such, these wrongfully convicted defendants still have
criminal records and are not entitled to compensation from the state (Schneider, 2013).
Reasoning Behind False Pleas
With so many negative effects stemming from making a false admission in the form of a
false guilty plea, why would any defendant choose this course of action? In trying to understand
the decision-making process in a plea bargain context, legal scholars and social science
researchers have traditionally used the shadow-of-the-trial model (Bibas, 2004). Psychologists
argue that a plea deal will almost always be more appealing to most defendants, not only due to a
reduced sentence (Zottoli et al., 2016) but also in contrast to the uncertainty that accompanies the
choice of going to trial (Bushway, Redlich, & Norris, 2014). But the shadow-of-the-trial model
has been subject to little empirical testing, and critics argue the model is much too simplistic,
failing to take factors such as innocence vs. guilt and the influence of counsel into account
(Bibas, 2004). Bibas further discusses how defendants can be persuaded into accepting a plea due
to anchoring effects produced by multiple offers. As a part of the bargaining process, prosecutors
often present an initial offer with a severe sentence, with subsequent offers being more and more
lenient (Miller, 2013). Thus, the later offers will be more appealing to defendants who compare it
to the initial, often unreasonable offer.
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Another obvious factor that can influence plea-bargaining which is not taken into account
in the shadow-of-the-trial model is the race of the defendant (Bibas, 2004). Research has shown
that Black defendants are more likely to be offered pleas to their top charges and that lead to
incarceration compared to White defendants (Kutateladze, Andiloro & Johnson, 2014). Studies
have shown that Black defendants are also more likely to take their cases to trial compared to
White defendants, as a consequence of less appealing plea offers and a general distrust in the
system (Lee & Richardson, 2020). As such, race can be viewed as an additional risk factor that
needs to be taken into account when making a plea decision (Redlich, Bibas, et al., 2017).
Moreover, recent research has shown that the defendant’s access to information about
collateral consequences can also influence the decision-making process (Gordon & Hellgren,
2020). The Supreme Court has stated that defendants are legally required to be advised about
potential direct consequences (e.g., jail time, fines) to make a fully informed choice (Brady v.
United States, 1970), but defendants are not required to be informed about the several rights and
benefits they may lose as a result of a criminal conviction. The Brady decision’s exclusion of any
requirement to make defendants aware of collateral consequences (e.g., government benefits,
housing, voting rights) implies that they are perceived to be less influential on a defendant’s plea
decisions compared to direct consequences. However, Gordon & Hellgren (2020) found that
defendants who were informed about collateral consequences—particularly consequences that
were personally relevant to them—were significantly less likely to accept a plea deal than
participants who were unaware of any collateral consequences.
Examining individual differences that influence the decision making of defendants in plea
bargaining, Redlich et al. (2010) found that 36% of their sample (mentally ill defendants) selfreported that they had accepted a plea despite being innocent. Of these respondents, 29% further
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reported that they did so because the risk of being convicted and getting a harsher sentence at trial
was too high. Similarly, Malloy et al. (2014) found that 18% of their sample of adolescent
defendants self-reported having pled guilty despite being innocent. The primary reason for
choosing to falsely plead guilty was to reduce their sentences, something more than half of the
respondents stated as their reason. This reasoning lends some credence to the shadow-of-the-trial
model, however, both Redlich and Malloy’s respondents reported that in addition to wanting to
reduce their sentences, they were also heavily influenced by pressure from their lawyers to falsely
plead guilty.
In the only empirical study of this topic, Redlich and Özdoğru (2009) examined the
characteristics of defendants accepting Alford pleas. Using the Department of Justice’s 2004
State Survey of Inmates in Correctional Facilities, the authors aimed to describe and compare
these inmates to inmates who had taken other types of pleas, such as no contest pleas, traditional
guilty pleas, and not guilty pleas. They found that 6.5% of state inmates had accepted Alford
pleas, and within the three types of guilty pleas described above, Alford pleas accounted for
8.5%. They found few differences between characteristics and legal factors of defendants
entering an Alford plea compared to a conventional type of plea. Redlich and Özdoğru (2009)
further found that 50% of defendants who had chosen an Alford plea were charged with violent
crimes, such as murder and sexual assault. The Alford defendants were two times more likely
than the average defendant to be charged with murder. Schneider (2013) argues that it is
important to look at this breakdown of charges as defendants charged with serious, violent crimes
are more likely to enter Alford pleas compared to average defendants, for two reasons. First,
violent crimes like murder and sexual assault come with longer, harsher sentences, which may
make a defendant more willing to opt for a plea compared to other defendants. Second, because
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crimes of this nature are associated with strong negative reactions from the public, a defendant
who has committed such a crime might be less likely to want to admit guilt, both for reasons of
self-preservation and fear of the public’s judgement.
The Stigma of False Admissions
Defendants who make false admissions, be it a confession to police or a guilty plea in
court, are often stigmatized by the public (Kukucka & Evolo, 2018). False admissions are
counterintuitive and difficult for the general public to understand (Kassin, 2017; White, 2003),
and many people claim they would never admit to something they did not do (Henkel et al.,
2008; Kassin, 2012). Researchers have shown that people tend to commit the fundamental
attribution error (FAE) when assessing false confessions as they make dispositional attributions
to others’ words and actions and fail to take external situational factors into account (Kassin,
1997; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; for overviews of basic research on the FAE, see Gilbert & Malone,
1995; Ross, 1977). In addition, actor-observer effect (Jones & Nisbett, 1972) supports the idea of
observers making internal attributions to others’ behaviors, and further adds the notion that actors
tend to attribute their own thoughts and actions to external factors and situations.
As a consequence of these biases, the public (and some courts) disregard the impact of
external factors when wrongfully convicted individuals are exonerated and believe that if that
individual gave a false confession, it was their choice, and they are responsible for their own
wrongful conviction (Kukucka & Evelo, 2019). They are therefore seen as less deserving of
assistance to reintegrate into society (Scherr et al., 2018) and financial compensation (Kukucka &
Evelo, 2019). Studies have also shown that the public is more likely to make dispositional
judgements about false confessors compared to other exonerees, judging them to be less
intelligent and discounting the effect of coercive interrogation techniques (Henkel et al., 2008;
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Scherr et al., 2018). Moreover, the public is likely to believe that exonerated defendants are still
guilty if they gave a false confession, even if they later recanted (Clow & Leach, 2015).
Recent research has suggested that these stigmatizing effects also apply to individuals
who have provided false admissions in the forms of false guilty pleas (Scherr et al., 2020).
Although legal scholars argue that Alford defendants preserve their reputation by maintaining
innocence, the question remains whether they would in fact be perceived differently than
defendants accepting traditional guilty pleas. In a recent study, participants were presented with a
description of a criminal case, based on the case of Joseph Buffey, in which a defendant was
accused of burglary and sexual assault but insisted on his innocence (Hellgren & Kassin, 2018).
The defendant then either accepted a traditional plea, an Alford plea, or chose to go to trial. The
results suggested that Alford pleaders are perceived as less guilty than traditional guilty pleaders,
but more guilty than defendants who choose to go to trial. In sum, individuals make false
admissions for several reasons, including wanting reduced sentences and succumbing to pressure
from attorneys. In contrast, research on Alford pleas suggests that the reason behind the decision
may lay in wanting to preserve one’s reputation by proclaiming innocence (Redlich and Özdoğru,
2009; Schneider, 2013).
Given the research reviewed above, it may be the case that an Alford plea offers a
compromise for innocent defendants who may not accept a traditional plea that requires them to
admit guilt and thus face stigma. In the following section, I will explore and lay a foundation for
how social psychology theories can shed more light on the decision-making process in an Alford
plea context.
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Psychological Bases of Alford Pleas
The sole difference between an Alford plea and a traditional guilty plea is the ability for
defendants to maintain innocence, the perceived benefits of which could appeal to innocent and
guilty defendants alike (Ronis, 2009). Although this has not been empirically tested, classic social
psychology literature lends some support for this notion by asserting humans’ dual needs for
positive self-regard and positive regard by others (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007).
Compliance and The Need to Belong
Research on both confessions and plea bargaining has shown than compliance to an
authority figure is a strong motivating factor for innocent defendants to falsely admit guilt to police,
attorneys, and judges (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Redlich, Bibas et al. 2017). The need to belong and
to be liked by others is one of the most fundamental tenets of social psychology (Baumeister &
Leary, 1995). Humans are social animals and are highly driven by the desire to be accepted by
others and included in social groups. The need to belong is an important basis for our sense of selfworth and self-esteem (Leary et al., 1995). Conversely, people fear being neglected, rejected, and
ostracized (Williams et al., 2000).
These desires can influence people to conform and comply with others in order to not stand
out (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). The classic Milgram studies (1974) illustrated how nearly twothirds of people complied with a request to administer an ostensibly harmful electric shock to
another, merely because an authority figure told them to do so. More recent replication studies have
shown similar rates of compliance (Burger, 2009). Social pressure to comply with authority figures
is highly relevant in a plea-bargaining context. Defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges are all
authority figures who defendants perceive to have more knowledge and power than them (Redlich
et al., 2017). The principle of authority along with the need to belong, which creates a natural
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tendency to conform and comply, makes the probability of a defendant accepting a plea offer high
(Bordens & Basset, 1985; Redlich, Bibas et al., 2017).
Research has further shown that committing transgressions that induce feelings of guilt
leads to a higher probability of compliance due to the desire to repair the perceived harm done
(Boster et al., 2016). Interestingly, Cardenas and colleagues (2020) found that participants who had
committed a transgression and were then accused of a transgression they had not committed felt
similar feelings of guilt and pled guilty at similar rates as completely guilty participants, but not as
innocent participants. This result implies that if an individual is induced to feel guilty, even for
actions they did not commit, they are more likely to comply with others’ requests.
Dissonance Reduction Through Self-Affirmation
Even if the need to belong drives an innocent defendant to accept a plea, the requirement
to admit guilt may lead them to experience cognitive dissonance—a negative state of arousal
stemming from behaving counter to one’s beliefs (Festinger, 1957).
In a classic experiment, Festinger & Carlsmith (1959) found that participants who were
asked to lie and tell another participant that a tedious task they just took part in was entertaining
were motivated to change their belief and later report the task as actually enjoyable. However,
participants who were paid to lie were offered enough justification to not warrant an attitude
change. Later research on dissonance reduction suggested that it was not the psychological
inconsistency per se that motivated an attitude change or justification, but the effect the
inconsistency had on the individual’s self-view (Aronson, 1999: Steele & Liu, 1983). Aronson
(1990) asserts that our thoughts and actions are driven by the need to view ourselves as moral, good
people and any threat to that self-concept leads to psychological tension and a motivation to either
change our attitudes or to justify and rationalize our behavior (Aronson et al., 2019).
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Following upon self-based theories of cognitive dissonance, Steele (1988) found that
allowing someone to self-affirm values that were consistent with their self-concept after a
dissonance-activating act reduced the dissonance and the motivation to change their attitude. In
essence, the premise of self-affirmation theory is that that dissonance can threaten a person’s selfintegrity and their view of themselves as a good and moral person (Steele & Liu, 1983). By
enhancing one’s positive self-regard through self-affirmation, the individual’s focus will be on
factors that enhance their self-concept rather than the threat to their self-integrity, which reduces
their psychological discomfort.
Applied to the Alford plea, defendants may experience cognitive dissonance because of the
threat to self that is elicited through an accusation followed by a plea offer that requires the
admission of guilt. By self-affirming one’s innocence through accepting an Alford plea, innocent
defendants may experience a dissonance reduction. Findings by Landau and Greenberg (2006)
support this idea. By combining theories of self-affirmation and terror management—the theory
that self-esteem protects people from the anxiety aroused by ones’ own mortality (Greenberg et al.,
1992)—they found that participants who were able to self-affirm were less likely to partake in risky
decision making. This may explain why a defendant would be more likely to accept an Alford plea
which enables them to self-affirm innocence and then choose the less risky option of accepting a
deal, compared to a traditional guilty plea that gives no chance for self-affirmation, or a trial that
is too risky.
Self-Presentation and the Alford Plea
In addition to the motivation to self-affirm to protect one’s self-concept, psychologists
have found that people are motivated to self-present in ways that protect their self-view and selfesteem (Vohs et al., 2005). Because humans have a basic need for acceptance and social
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approval, they are generally motivated to present themselves in positive ways to other people
(Schlenker, 1975). There are two types of self-presentation: strategic self-presentation and selfverification (Vohs et al., 2005). Strategic self-presentation refers to when an individual is
motivated to self-present in a positive, socially desirable manner to fit in and gain social
acceptance, even if that self-presentation does not reflect the individual’s self-concept (Jones &
Pittman, 1982). Individuals who employ strategic self-presentation flexibly adapt to different
social situations and enhance whichever part of them that is most likely to lead to social
acceptance in each separate context (Goffman, 1959).
Alternatively, people also self-present through self-verification, which occurs when an
individual is highly motivated to present in a way that is consistent with their self-view, and have
others verify this view (Swann et al., 1987). Swann and colleagues have consistently found that
individuals prefer others whose perceptions of them are consistent with their own selfperceptions (Swann et al., 1987; Swann, 2012) Self-verification by others has been found to
enhance the quality of relationships, reduce anxiety and psychological discomfort, and improve
physical health (Shimizu & Pelham, 2004; Swann, 2012). Research has further shown that if an
individual is perceived by others in a way that is inconsistent with their self-concept, they will
fervently exaggerate their self-presentation to change that perception (Swann & Hill, 1982).
In the false confession literature, laboratory research suggests that guilty participants
generally use strategic self-presentation to avoid suspicion by police (Kassin & Norwick, 2004).
Kassin and Norwick found that guilty participants fearing suspicion overwhelmingly reported
self-presentational reasons behind the decision to waive rather than invoke their Miranda rights.
In addition, several studies comparing guilty and innocent suspects in an interrogation setting
have found support for the idea that guilty suspects use strategic self-presentational tactics to
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appear innocent to the police (Clemens & Grolig, 2019; Hines et al., 2009). In terms of Alford
defendants, guilty defendants may similarly use strategic self-presentation to appear innocent and
preserve their reputation, which some legal scholars argue is one of the primary benefits of the
Alford plea (Ronis, 2009; Schneider, 2013).
For innocent defendants, self-verification may help explain why innocent defendants who
would not accept a traditional plea potentially find an Alford plea appealing: by maintaining their
innocence, they are self-presenting in a manner consistent with their self-concept, while at the
same time reaping the benefits of a plea discount and avoiding the risk of trial.
For innocent suspects, an Alford plea could offer a compromise: accepting a deal to benefit
from the discount and avoiding the risk and potentially harsh consequences of trial, and at the same
time enhancing self-affirmation and positive self-presentation by maintaining innocence. As such,
an Alford plea allows a defendant, in theory, to both comply with an authority figure and to
maintain a positive self-concept through self-affirmation and self-verification. The current program
of research examined these ideas by drawing from basic social psychology literature to demonstrate
how theories of self-affirmation and self-presentation could explain the appeal of Alford pleas,
especially for innocent defendants who might not accept a traditional plea.
False Admissions Research Methodology
Studying false admissions and plea bargaining is complicated because field studies often
lack ground truth, and laboratory studies necessarily lack some realism (Redlich et al. 2017).
The earliest studies on plea bargaining utilized hypothetical vignettes, asking participants
to imagine themselves in a situation and to report what their behavior would be (Bordens, 1984;
Gregory et al. 1978). For example, Gregory and colleagues asked male college students to
imagine they were either guilty or innocent of an armed robbery. They were then presented with
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written details about the crime, the evidence and charges against them, and a plea offer.
Similarly, Bordens (1984) presented participants with a crime vignette and asked participants to
imagine being guilty or innocent of a crime and presented them with evidence and conviction
likelihood ratings. Researchers today also use the hypothetical vignette methodology, and despite
allegedly lacking in realism, find rates of false guilty pleas similar to those in the field (20%;
Redlich et al. 2017; Tor et al. 2010).
It is widely known that there are differences between what people self-report they would
do and how they would feel and what actually occurs (Poon, Koehler, & Buehler, 2014; Wilson
& Gilbert, 2003). Hence, Russano et al. (2005) set out to develop a novel cheating paradigm that
increased the stakes for participants. This paradigm has enabled researchers to ethically explore
processes of decision making by manipulating participants to morally transgress by cheating on
an experimental task. In this paradigm, a participant is invited into the lab under the pretense of
taking part in a study on problem solving. The participant collaborates with a second student who
is in fact a confederate working with the experimenter. The confederate induces the participant to
cheat by asking for help on the tasks, which violates clearly stated rules not to collaborate. The
participant is then accused of cheating. The original paradigm explored how interrogation
techniques influenced participants willingness to confess. More recent studies have used
somewhat altered versions of this paradigm to examine other problematic issues in the criminal
justice system such as the bluff tactic of interrogation (Perillo & Kassin, 2011; Wilford & Wells,
2018), pre-interrogation decision making and Miranda waivers (Scherr et al. 2016) and plea
bargaining (Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Wilford, Wells, & Frazier, 2020).
One common critique of the cheating paradigm is that the stakes of facing the academic
integrity board and community service is not equivalent to the risk of facing trial and prison time
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(Redlich et al., 2017; Wilford & Wells, 2018). Although hypothetical vignette studies add higher
stakes, this is done at the expense of mundane realism; the extent to which the experiment
mimics the real-world situation (Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 1982). Some researchers thus suggest
using elements from both types of methodologies (Redlich et al., 2017).
The original plan for the current project was to employ the cheating paradigm, but as the
COVID-19 pandemic began, changes had to be made. Instead of simply moving to an online
crime vignette, I decided to use both a vignette version of the cheating paradigm as well as a
crime vignette. In addition to exploring the Alford plea with these methods, this approach also
enabled me to compare how the different stakes of a cheating accusation and a crime accusation
influence the results. Furthermore, research on vignette methodology suggests that making
vignettes relevant to participants improve results (Hughes, 1998). To maximize relevance for
participants, therefore, students were recruited for the studies employing the cheating vignette
and nonstudent adults were recruited to imagine themselves in the crime vignette.
Overview of Research
The present research consisted of five studies aimed at filling a crucial gap in the
empirical literature by examining two important questions pertaining to the understudied Alford
plea: (1) Will defendants who may not otherwise accept a conventional plea be persuaded to
accept an Alford plea? (2) How are Alford pleaders perceived by observers? Does maintaining
innocence allow them to avoid lasting negative judgment from the public, or does not taking
responsibility for the crime make them seem more reprehensible?
Study 1 utilized a vignette, role-playing variation of the laboratory cheating paradigm to
examine whether participants’ plea decisions were influenced by the Alford plea option. In Study
1, a 2 (Guilt status: guilt vs innocence) x 2 (Type of Plea: traditional plea vs Alford plea) design
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was employed. Student participants were recruited from SONA and Prolific and directed to a
Qualtrics survey. They were asked to imagine that they were taking part of a psychology study at
their university in which they were to complete a series of problem-solving tasks, both
individually and in pairs with another participant. Participants read about how a second student
induced them to cheat by asking for help on an individual task, a clear violation of the
experimenter’s rules. By random assignment, participants were then told that they either cheated
by helping the other student or did not cheat by refusing her request. The experimenter then
accused all participants of cheating after completion of the tasks. At that point, the participant
was offered either a traditional plea deal (which involved 40 hours of community service) or an
Alford plea (the same community service with the added benefit of being able to maintain
innocence). Finally, participants were asked to provide their reasoning behind their decisionmaking process.
Study 2 sought to replicate and extend the first study by using the same role-playing
vignette procedure and design. In this study, however, participants were asked to imagine being
accused of a crime (involuntary manslaughter) and then offered either a traditional plea (six
months in jail) or Alford plea (six months in jail and the ability to maintain innocence). The same
questions regarding participants’ decision-making process were asked.
Consistent with past research, I hypothesized that guilty participants would be more likely
to accept a plea compared to innocent participants overall. In addition, however, I predicted that
this difference would diminish in the Alford condition because of an increase in innocents who
were willing to accept that plea. I further predicted that these participants would later cite social
and self-presentation concerns and the belief that maintaining innocence despite accepting the
plea would make them seem more innocent to others as the reasons for accepting an Alford plea.
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In Studies 3 and 4, my aim was to examine observers’ perceptions of the Alford plea. In
Study 3, Prolific participants in a 2 (Type of plea: traditional vs Alford) x 2 (Plea decision: accept
vs reject) between subjects design read about a male student going through the cheating paradigm
procedure described in Study 1, in which the student either accepted or rejected the deal offered
by the experimenter. Participants then provided their guilt perceptions of the student they read
about along with their perceptions of his decision and character. This was done with the purpose
of exploring how Alford pleaders and their decisions were perceived by observers.
Similarly, Study 4 sought to replicate Study 3, using the same procedure and design. In
Study 3 participants read a vignette based on the scenario used in Study 2, describing a man
being accused of a crime, being offered a plea deal (traditional vs Alford), and then giving a plea
decision (accept vs reject). Participants’ perceptions of the man and his plea decision were then
explored.
Study 5 used a similar design to Study 4 but further explored how a defendant who
initiated an Alford plea by their own request was perceived differently from defendants to whom
it was offered without request. I hypothesized that participants would rate the defendant more
favorably (and perceive him as less guilty) when he chose to reject the plea and when he initiated
an Alford plea via a request to the prosecutor compared to if he accepted a traditional plea.
Study 1
Method
Participants
Because the majority of analyses conducted were factorial ANOVAs, I conducted an a
priori power analysis for a factorial ANOVA and found that a minimum of 351 participants
should be adequate to detect a medium to small effect size (f = 0.15, α = 0.80, p = 0.05; Faul et
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al., 2007). The chosen effect size was a compromise between previous plea-bargaining research
(Henderson & Levett, 2018) and what was feasible for the current project. Participants were
oversampled by 10% to account for participant loss due to failed manipulation or attention
checks. Students were used as participants to enhance the probability that they could immerse
themselves in the study’s vignette.
Initially, student participants were recruited through the SONA Research Experience
system (hereafter SONA). But as recruitment was slow and the data of low quality, I collected the
rest of the data from Prolific. Prolific is a crowdsourcing platform aimed primarily at academic
research and has been found to have a more attentive and diverse participant pool compared to
other online research platforms, such as Mechanical Turk (Peer et al., 2017). Prolific participants
were screened to ensure that they were college students to match the SONA sample.
Data were collected from a total of 460 participants: 117 from SONA and 332 from
Prolific. 52 participants were removed from the SONA sample for failing more than two attention
and/or manipulation checks (these checks will be discussed later). In the Prolific sample, 10
participants were removed for failing two or more attention and/or manipulation checks. Thus,
the final sample consisted of 391 participants, 82.4% from Prolific and the remaining 17.6% from
SONA.
Participants were adult US citizens and ranged in age from 18 to 71, with a mean age of
22.5 (SD = 5.83). Overall, 217 were female, 155 male, 16 non-binary, and 3 preferred not to
report their gender. The racial/ethnic breakdown of the participants was as follows:
White/European American (46.3%), Asian/Asian American/Pacific Islander (20.7%),
Latinx/Hispanic/heritage from Latin American Country (16.4%), African American/Black (11%),
Biracial/Multiracial (3.8%), Middle Eastern/Arab/Turkish/Iranian (1%), Native
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American/American Indian/Indigenous (n = 2, .5%) and Other (specified as West Indian, n = 1,
.3%). The sample consisted of 22.8% Freshman, 21.3% Sophomores, 29.3% Juniors, and 26.7%
Seniors, and participants represented 45 states. Only 8.5% reported having been arrested, and
26.1% reported having a family member who had been arrested (8.7% said they did not know).
No participants reported working in a legal profession, but 14.8% had family members who did
(lawyers, police officers, and correction officers). Demographic variables were evenly dispersed
across conditions (see Table 1).1
Prolific participants were compensated with $1.78 for their time; the SONA sample
received class credit for their participation.
Design
Participants were randomly assigned into one of four conditions produced by a 2 (Guilt
Status: guilty vs. innocent) x 2 (Type of Plea: traditional vs. Alford) between-subjects design.
Guilt status was manipulated by asking them to imagine having assisted in cheating, or not. Type
of plea was manipulated by which plea was offered to them by the experimenter in the vignette.
Study Materials and Procedure
Both SONA and Prolific participants were directed to an online Qualtrics survey. After
completing informed consent, participants were asked to read the following verbatim vignette2:
The Set Up and the Crime. You attend a public university and you’ve signed up for a
study, for course credit, titled “Individual and Group Problem Solving.”
You schedule an appointment and when you arrive at the waiting area of a psychology
laboratory, you are met by a female experimenter and a fellow student, someone you don’t know.
The two of you are taken to a room inside, furnished with two tables and two chairs, and the
1
2

Though not presented in tables, this was also true for the four subsequent studies.
All vignettes were at a 6th grade reading level, according to the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level test.
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experimenter explains that you will be asked to complete a series of questions modeled after the
TV show Family Feud. You’ll be asked to answer some questions individually, some as a team.
For the joint task, you are told to work together and discuss the categories; for the individual part,
you are told to not talk to the other participants and solve the task on your own.
The study seems straightforward. The experimenter hands you each an “individual”
question for Round 1, leaves the room, then returns when the time is up. Then she hands you
each the “group” question for Round 2, and leaves. This time you discuss with the other student
and you work together to come up with answers. The experimenter then returns when the time is
up. These first couple of rounds pass uneventfully.
During ROUND 3, the other student asks you for help on an individual task. “I’m
blanking out,” she says. “Can you help me?”
Guilty Condition. If participants were assigned to the guilty condition, they read the
following: Imagine yourself in that situation. You know it’s against the experimenter’s protocol
to collaborate on an individual problem. But your fellow student asked. It’s a tough spot. In this
case, you decide to “cheat” by helping the other student with answers in violation of the
experimenter’s protocol.
Innocent Condition. If participants were assigned to the innocent condition, they instead
read the following: Imagine yourself in that situation. You know it’s against the experimenter’s
protocol to collaborate on an individual problem. But your fellow student asked. It’s a tough spot.
You are tempted to help but, in this case, you respect the experimenter’s rule and you keep your
answers to yourself.
The Problem. The experimenter collects Round 3, hands you both Round 4, and leaves.
One minute later, she returns and says to you both: “We have a problem. It looks like you cheated
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by working together on an individual problem set.” At that point, the Experimenter removes the
other student from the room and says, “I need to talk to both of you and then I need to check with
my supervisor.”
The Accusation. You wait alone in the room for fifteen minutes. At that point, the
experimenter returns and says: “It’s clear to me now that you cheated, that you helped each other
on an individual problem. I knew I heard voices during Round 3. Plus, the odds of two people
independently coming up with exactly the same unlikely answers is like less than one percent.
I talked to my supervisor, the principal investigator of this research. He is very upset. This
is just the kind of thing that can invalidate the study and make it difficult to get funding in the
future.
As far as he is concerned, this act of cheating violates the university’s honor code. He
wants to take you to the Academic Integrity Board (AIB) for a hearing. It’s like a trial. We will
present our evidence, you’ll have an opportunity to state your case, and the Board will render a
verdict (historically they convict about half the students who appear). I’ll be honest: This is
serious stuff.”
Then the experimenter says: “I think I talked my supervisor down. If you are willing to
plead guilty by signing and dating this short form I wrote up, you won’t have to appear for a trial
before the AIB.”
Guilty Plea. Participants in the guilty plea condition then read the following: “If you
plead guilty, it means you admit to cheating and agree to perform forty hours of community
service at the university. You will take full responsibility for the cheating and the data loss it
caused. In exchange, he won’t file charges against you. The plea will go on the university’s
internal record. Once you’ve served the time, you’re done. If you do not accept the plea offer, you
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will be scheduled for a hearing at the university within the next few weeks. The AIB will then
render a verdict. If they find you guilty, they will determine what larger punishment is
appropriate.”
Alford Plea. Participants in the Alford plea condition instead read the following: “If you
plead guilty, it means you agree to perform forty hours of community service at the university. In
exchange, he won’t file charges against you. The plea will go on the university’s internal record.
Once you’ve served the time, you’re done.” Then the experimenter adds: “If you want, you can
also handwrite a personal statement on the agreement that while you accept the plea and its terms,
you are, in fact, innocent and did not cheat. That statement would become part of the file. This
means that you would not have to take responsibility or admit guilt for cheating. If you do not
accept the plea offer, you will be scheduled for a hearing at the university within the next few
weeks. The AIB will then render a verdict. If they find you guilty, they will determine what
larger punishment is appropriate.”
Once participants had read through the scenario, they were presented with a series of
questions aimed at examining their decision-making process. They were as follows:
Dependent Measures
Plea Decision. The primary dependent variable was the final dichotomous plea decision
(accept or reject) that the participant made. Participants were also asked to provide their level of
confidence in this decision, where 1 was Not at all, and 10 was Very.
Reasoning Behind Plea Decision. Across conditions, participants were prompted to
provide their reasoning behind the final plea decision they made. This was an open-ended
question and participants’ responses were coded. The coding had two aims: (1) to look
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specifically for mentions of the ability to maintain innocence and concerns about other’s
perceptions of their guilt, and (2) explore other common themes more broadly.
Anticipated Guilt Perceptions. To further evaluate how the predicted perception of the
participants influenced their plea decision, they were asked to estimate how many out of 100
observers watching them make their decision would believe they cheated.
Post-Plea State of Mind. To explore how the plea decision affected their state of mind,
participants were asked to rate how confident they are that they made the right decision (1 = Very
confident to 10 = Not at all confident); how difficult the decision was to make (1 = Very difficult
to 7 = Not at all difficult); and how satisfied they are with their decision (1 = Not at all satisfied
to 10 = Very satisfied), and how much pressure they felt when they were offered a deal (1 = None
to 10 = A great deal).
Case Evaluation. Participants then evaluated a number of aspects of the case.
Specifically, they were asked to rate the seriousness of the wrongdoing (the cheating) they were
accused of (1 = Not at all to 10 = Very), how strong the evidence of them cheating was (1 = Not
at all to 10 = Very), and how likely they were to be convicted by the Academic Integrity Board (1
-100).
Consequences of Decision. Next, to explore how the potential consequences of the plea
influenced their decision making, participants were asked to rate to what extent their plea
decision was influenced by the consequences of rejecting the deal (facing the AIB; 1 = Very
much to 10 = Not at all); and the consequences of accepting the deal (community service; 1 =
Very much to 10 = Not at all). For the Alford plea condition, participants were asked how
influenced they were by the opportunity to maintain their innocence (1 = Very much to 10 = Not
at all; see Appendix A for full questionnaire).
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Attention and Manipulation Checks. Participants received several questions throughout
the survey with the purpose to examine whether they were paying attention and understanding the
manipulation.
Instructional Manipulation Check. Participants completed an instruction manipulation
check, meant to ensure participants were paying attention to instructions (IMC; Oppenheimer,
Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). This type of attention check is used regularly in online research
(Peer et al., 2014). The exact question read as follows:
“Given that this study is examining your decision-making process, it is important to us
that you pay attention to each instruction. In order to show us that you are, please choose
"Somewhat agree" below, and then move on to the next question.”
Manipulation Check. To ensure that participants noticed and appreciated that an Alford
plea enabled them to maintain innocence, they were asked to respond to the following True or
False question: “The plea I was offered required me to admit guilt and accept responsibility for
the cheating.”3
Participants were also asked whether they cheated or not to ensure they were aware of
their own guilt status. Finally, as a combined attention and manipulation check, they were asked
to provide the final “sentence” they were offered (40 community service hours). Participants who
failed two or more checks were ultimately removed from analyses.
Hypotheses

3

Ultimately, this manipulation check was not used as the majority of participants across the five studies failed it,
particularly in Alford conditions. I conducted a follow-up study to compare this manipulation check to one that was
more specifically worded (“The plea Michael was offered enabled him to claim innocence while accepting the
plea”). I found that while 59% of participants in this additional sample failed the original manipulation check, only
10.3% failed the second one. This suggest that the original manipulation check was perhaps too poorly worded to
capture participants’ understanding of the Alford manipulation.
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H1. Based on previous research, I hypothesized a main effect of guilt status such that
guilty participants would be more likely to plead guilty compared to innocent participants.
H2. Considering theories of self-presentation, I hypothesized a main effect of type of plea
such that participants across conditions would be more likely to accept an Alford plea compared
to a traditional guilty plea.
H3. Furthermore, I hypothesized an interaction of guilt status and type of plea. In the
Alford plea condition, the difference between guilty and innocent participants would be reduced
such that innocent participants are more likely than guilty suspects to accept an Alford plea
compared to a traditional plea.
H4. I finally hypothesized that innocent participants who chose to accept an Alford plea
would be more likely to cite the opportunity to maintain innocence and the opportunity to appear
less guilty to others as the primary reason for their plea decision, compared to other conditions.
Results
Plea Decision. Overall, 51.2% participants accepted a plea, and 48.8% rejected. Table 2
shows the percentages of participants who reported they would accept the plea across conditions.
To investigate how guilt status (guilty vs innocent) and type of plea (traditional plea deal vs
Alford plea deal) influences participants’ plea decisions, the dichotomous variable plea decision
was submitted to a binary logistic regression with guilt status and type of plea as the predictors.
In the guilt status group, guilty was the reference category; in the type of plea group, traditional
was the reference category.
The model was significant, Χ2(3) = 132, p < .001, and explained 38.2% of the variance in
plea decisions (Nagelkerke’s R2). As one would expect, guilty participants were significantly
more likely to accept a plea (78.4%) compared to innocent participants (22.9%), b = 2.043, 95%
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CI [1.421, 2.665], OR = 7.715, p < .001. The type of plea did not significantly predict plea
decisions, b = -.575, 95% CI [-1.268, .119], OR = .563, p = .104.
However, these effects were qualified by a significant interaction effect, b = 1.037, 95%
CI [ .061, 2.013], OR = 2.821, p = .037. While guilty participants were more likely to accept an
Alford plea than a traditional plea (83.3% vs. 78.2%), the opposite was true for innocent
participants (16.7% vs. 26.7%). Innocent participants offered an Alford plea were the least likely
to accept a plea, compared to other participants (Figure 1).
Reasoning behind Plea Decision. In an open-ended question, participants were asked to
state their reasons for accepting or rejecting the offered deal. A research assistant blind to
condition and I separately reviewed all responses and came up with 15 categories, including the
two predetermined Alford related categories (Opportunity to maintain innocence and Opportunity
to appear innocent to others) and one category for Other; responses that did not fit into any
category, see Table 3 for all categories). We then coded for whether participants’ responses fit
into the categories or not (several responses fit into more than one category). Examples of the
most frequently mentioned reasons can be found in Table 4.
Cohen’s κ for each category was calculated to assess the interrater reliability. The
coefficients ranged from .4814 (“It was too extreme/It was just a study”) to .860 (“I was guilty”),
with an average κ of .669 which represents a substantial degree of agreement between the raters.
Among participants who accepted (n = 200), the most frequently stated reason was to
avoid more severe consequences and/or uncertainty (72.5%). Among those who rejected a plea (n
= 191), the most common cited reason for their plea decision was their innocence/that they were

4

Cohen’s kappa for the category “Other” was not included in this average as it was predictably much lower (κ of

.283) due to the category containing anything that would not fit into any of the other 14 categories.
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not at fault (66%). Table 5 shows the percentages of the most common reasons broken down by
plea decision, guilt status, and type of plea.
One of the primary aims of this measure was to explore how often the ability to maintain
innocence was mentioned, in particular by participants who accepted an Alford plea. Overall, I
found that only 3% of participants mentioned this as a reason. As expected, this rationale was
most frequently cited by innocent participants who accepted an Alford plea (35.5%) and was not
cited by anyone who was offered a traditional plea (regardless of guilt status and plea decision).
Only one participant cited the opportunity to appear innocent to others as a reason for accepting
an Alford plea.
Confidence in Plea Decision. Participants then rated how confident they were in their
plea decision on a 10-point scale. Overall, participants were highly confident in their decisions,
M = 7.29, SD = 2.23. I submitted confidence ratings to a two-way ANOVA with guilt status and
type of plea as the independent variables and found no significant effects (see Table 6).
Anticipated Guilt Perceptions. Participants were asked, “Out of 100 outside observers
who watch the police and prosecutor’s accusation and your decision to accept or reject the plea
offer, how many would believe that you were guilty?” Across conditions, participants believed
about half of observers would perceive them as guilty (M = 56.9, SD = 28.3; see Table 7 for
means and standard deviations by condition).
A two-way ANOVA indicated a main effect of guilt status, F(1, 387) = 172.40, p < .001,
η2p = .308. Consistent with research on the illusion of transparency (Gilovitch & Savitsky, 1999),
guilty participants were significantly more likely to believe that others would perceive them as
guilty, (72.3% SD = 23.4), compared to innocent participants, (41% SD = 23.8). Although Alford
participants tended to believe that they were more likely to be perceived as guilty compared to
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those offered a traditional plea, this difference did not reach significance, F(1, 387) = 1.18, p =
.277, η2p = .003. There was also no interaction, F(1, 329) = 1.28, p = .259, η2p = .003.
To examine the effects of plea decision on anticipated guilt perceptions, I split the data
between participants who accepted and those who rejected a plea, and then I conducted the same
two-way ANOVA again (see Table 8).
For participants who accepted the plea, guilty participants were more likely to believe that
others would find them guilty (M = 76.41, SD = 20.82), compared to innocent participants, (M =
53.86, SD = 23.35), F(1, 196) = 34.807, p < .001, η2p = .151. There was no effect of type of plea,
F(1, 196) = 1.232, p = .268, η2p = .006, and no interaction, F(1, 196) = .001, p = .977, η2p < .001.
The results for participants who rejected a plea were similar. Guilty participants were
once again significantly more likely to anticipate that others would view them as guilty (M =
57.21, SD = 26.13), compared to innocent participants (M = 37.23, SD = 22.58), F(1, 187) =
23.199, p < .001, η2p = .110. Again, there was no effect of type of plea, F(1, 187) = .050, p =
.824, η2p < .001, and no interaction, F(1, 187) = .016, p = .900, η2p < .001.
Post-Plea State of Mind.
Means and standard deviations for these measures across conditions can be found in
Table 9.
Difficulty in Decision Making. To explore how guilt status and type of plea influenced
participants’ post-plea state of mind, all were asked to rate how difficult it was to make the plea
decision on a 10-point scale. Overall, they reported that the decision was moderately difficult to
make (M = 5.18, SD = 2.71). These ratings were submitted to a two-way ANOVA and no
significant main effects were found, F(1, 387) = 3.02, p = .083, η2p = .008, and F(1, 387) = .734,
p = .392, η2p = .002 for type of plea and guilt status, respectively. However, a significant
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interaction effect was found, F(1, 387) = 3.902, p = .049, η2p = .010. Participants were more
likely to report that the plea decision was difficult to make if they had been offered an Alford
plea compared to if they had been offered a traditional plea—but only if they were innocent
(Figure 2).
Once again, I compared participants who accepted vs. rejected a plea offer to explore the
possible association between the decision they made and self-reported decision difficulty. Among
those who accepted a plea, a significant main effect of guilt status showed that innocent
participants found the decision more difficult to make (M = 6.61, SD = 2.19) compared to those
in the guilty condition (M = 4.95, SD = 2.48), F(1, 196) = 17.340, p < .001, η2p = .081. There was
no effect of type of plea, F(1, 196) = .731, p = .394, η2p = .004, and no interaction, F(1, 196) =
1.192, p = .276, η2p = .006. Among participants who rejected a plea, no significant effects were
found (see Table 10). This result further indicates that innocent participants who accepted a plea
primarily drove these results.
Satisfaction with Plea Decision. Participants also rated how satisfied they were with
their decision on a 10-point scale. Overall, they reported being moderately satisfied (M = 6.19,
SD = 2.63). These ratings were submitted to a two-way ANOVA with guilt status and type of
plea as the independent variables. Although the pattern of ratings suggested guilty Alford
participants were the least satisfied with their plea decision, the differences were not significant
(see Table 11).
The data were then split between those who accepted versus rejected a plea offer. Among
those who accepted the plea, guilty participants reported higher levels of satisfaction with their
decision, (M = 5.88, SD = 2.40), compared to innocent participants, (M = 4.91, SD = 2.77), F(1,
196) = 5.157, p = .024, η2p = .026. There was no effect of type of plea, F(1, 196) = .781, p = .378,
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η2p = .004, and no interaction, F(1, 196) = 1.01, p = .316, η2p = .005. Among participants who
rejected a plea, I found no significant effects (see Table 12).
Pressure to Make Decision. Participants rated how much pressure they were under when
making their plea decision (1-10). Across conditions, participants reported a high degree of
pressure (M = 7.27, SD = 2.72). A two-way ANOVA showed that those in the Alford condition
felt more pressure, (M = 7.64, SD = 2.46) compared to those presented with a traditional plea (M
= 6.93, SD = 2.89). This effect was significant, F(1, 387) = 6.768, p = .010, η2p = .017.
There was also a significant main effect of guilt status, F(1, 387) = 4.249, p = .0840, η2p =
.011, such that guilty participants reported being more pressured into making a decision (M =
7.55, SD = 2.55) compared to innocent participants, (M = 6.97, SD = 2.86). There was no
interaction between guilt status and type of plea, F(1, 387) = .330, p = .566, η2p = .001.
Next, I separated participants who accepted vs. those who rejected a plea and conducted
the same two-way ANOVAs. Among participants who accepted the plea, no significant effects
were found (see Table 13). Among those who rejected a plea, however, Alford participants
reported feeling more pressure (M = 7.36, SD = 2.62), compared to traditional plea participants
(M = 6.50, SD = 2.99), F(1, 187) = 3.839, p = .051, η2p = .020. There was no effect of guilt status,
F(1, 187) = .517, p = .473, η2p = .003, and no interaction, F(1, 187) = .146, p = .703, η2p = .001.
Case Evaluation.
Participants were asked to rate how serious they found the “crime” (i.e., cheating) they
were accused of on a 10-point scale. Across conditions, participants rated the cheating as just
above the midpoint, (M = 5.18, SD = 2.95). A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect of guilt status, F(1, 387) = 8.164, p = .005, η2p = .021, such that innocent participants rated
the crime (cheating) as more severe (M = 5.60, SD = 2.97) compared to guilty participants (M =
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4.76, SD = 2.89). There was no significant main effect of type of plea, F(1, 387) = .475, p = .491,
η2p = .001, and no interaction, F(1, 387) = .258, p = .612, η2p = .001.
Means and ANOVA statistics for subsequent case evaluation measures, strength of
evidence and likelihood of conviction, can be found in Table 14.
Consequences of Decision
Consequences of Rejecting Plea. Participants rated to what degree (1-10) their decision
was influenced by the consequences of rejecting the plea (i.e., being tried by the AIB). Overall,
participants reported being moderately influenced by these consequences, (M = 6.66, SD = 2.91;
see Table 15 for means and statistics). A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of
guilt status, F(1, 387) = 58.364, p < .001, η2p = .131, such that guilty participants reported that
they were more influenced by the consequences of rejecting the plea (M = 7.70, SD = 2.48) than
were innocent participants (M = 5.58, SD = 2.93). There was no significant main effect of type of
plea, F(1, 387) = .685, p = .408, η2p = .002. However, a significant interaction was observed, F(1,
387) = 5.667, p = .018, η2p = .014, such that guilty participants presented with a traditional plea
reported feeling the most influenced by the consequences of rejecting the plea (Figure 3).
Consequences of Accepting Plea. Next, participants rated to what degree their decision
was influenced by the consequences of accepting the plea (i.e., 40 hours of community service).
Across conditions, participants were moderately influenced by this, (M = 6.06, SD = 2.69). A
two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of guilt status, F(1, 387) = 11.454, p < .001,
η2p = .029, such that guilty participants were more influenced by the consequences of accepting
the plea (M = 6.51, SD = 2.58) than innocent participants (M = 5.59, SD = 2.73). There was also a
significant main effect of type of plea, F(1, 387) = 4.473, p = .035, η2p = .011, as participants
presented with an Alford plea reported being more influenced by the consequences of accepting,
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(M = 6.36, SD = 2.59), than those presented with a traditional plea (M = 5.78, SD = 2.76). There
was no interaction, F(1, 387) = .007, p = .934, η2p < .001.
The Innocence Aspect of Alford. To examine how guilt status influence whether Alford
participants were influenced by the ability to maintain innocence, I conducted an independent
sample t-test and found a significant difference, t(185) = -4.19, p < .001, 95% CI [-2.56, -.921], d
= - .613. As expected, innocent participants presented with an Alford plea reported being more
influenced by the ability to maintain innocent than guilty participants, M = 7.02, SD = 2.80 vs. M
= 5.28, SD = 2.88, respectively.
To explore how plea decisions influenced this variable, participants who accepted vs.
rejected the plea offer were separated for analysis. Among those who accepted a plea deal,
innocents were significantly more influenced by the ability to maintain innocence (M = 8.00, SD
= 2.21), compared to guilty participants (M = 5.16, SD = 2.83), t(28.424) = -4.562, p < .001, 95%
CI [-4.111, -1.564], d = 1.12. Among participants who rejected the plea offer, however, this
difference was not found, t(88) = -1.143, p = .256, 95% CI [-2.256, .681], d = .305. This result is
not unsurprising since participants who rejected the plea would not benefit from being able to
maintain innocence.
Correlations. To explore the relationship among the dependent measures for possible
mediations, correlations were calculated and presented in Table 16. Predictably, many of the
dependent variables were significantly correlated. When participants rejected the offered plea,
they were less likely to report that they would be perceived as guilty by others, that there was
strong evidence against them, that they were likely to be convicted, and that they were influenced
by consequences of either accepting or rejecting the plea. In contrast, when participants believed

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
43
others would perceive them as guilty, they were more likely to view the case against them as
strong and reported being more concerned with consequences of accepting and rejecting the plea.
Summary
Contrary to predictions, innocent defendants who were offered an Alford plea were the
least likely to accept the plea. These participants also reported having the hardest time making
their decision. However, in line with my hypothesis, guilty participants were seven times more
likely to accept a plea compared to innocent participants. As expected, innocent participants
presented with an Alford plea reported being influenced by the ability to maintain innocence to a
higher degree than guilty participants.
Study 2
Several studies using the cheating paradigm have found strong effects similar to those in
the field (Dervan & Edkins, 2012; Perillo & Kassin, 2011). Still, the argument is sometimes made
that this low-stakes cheating paradigm is limited in its generalizability (see Redlich et al., 2017 for
a discussion). To extend these results, therefore, Study 2 aimed to test the same hypotheses using
an actual crime vignette. Study 2 also serves as a replication of Study 1. The long-term goal is to
compare the results of this project to future in-person laboratory studies.
Method
Participants
For Study 2, the same a priori power analysis used in Study 1 indicated that a minimum
of 351 participants would provide an adequate sample to detect a medium to small effect size.
After oversampling to account for participant loss due to failed attention and/or manipulation
check, 408 participants were recruited. Only two were removed for failing more than two checks,
resulting in a final sample size of 406. Participants were all adult US citizens, recruited from
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Prolific, and paid $1.78 for their time. Through Prolific’s screening tool, any participants who
had participated in Study 1 were excluded from signing up.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 77, with a mean age of 31.2 (SD = 11.2). There were
217 females, 177 males, 9 non-binary, and 3 participants who preferred not to report their gender.
The racial/ethnic breakdown of the participants was as follows: White/European American
(62.6%), Asian/Asian American/Pacific Islander (14%), Latinx/Hispanic/heritage from Latin
American Country (9.9%), African American/Black (7.4%), Biracial/Multiracial (5.4%), Middle
Eastern/Arab/Turkish/Iranian (n = 1, .2%), and Other (specified as African, and American, (n = 2,
.5%). The sample represented 47 states. When asked about education, most participants reported
having some level of higher education; 28.6% reported having “some college” experience, 8.4%
had an associate degree, 28.8% had a college degree, 3% had some graduate school experience,
13.1% had a master’s degree, and 3.4% had a doctoral degree.
Only 13.6% of participants reported having ever been arrested; 46.6% reported that they
had a family member who had been arrested (4.2% reported they did not know). Six participants
(1.5%) worked in legal professions (paralegal or legal assistant), and 74 (18.2%) had family or
friends working in legal professions (police officers, lawyers, and probation officers).
Design
The design was identical to that of Study 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
four cells produced by a 2 (Guilt Status: guilty vs. innocent) x 2 (Type of Plea: traditional vs.
Alford) between-subjects design.
Study Materials and Procedure
Participants were recruited through Prolific and directed to a Qualtrics survey. The
procedure was similar to that of Study 1 except for the following aspects: Instead of imagining
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being part of a psychology study, induced or not to cheat, and then accused of cheating,
participants were asked to imagine driving home from a friend’s house and hitting a pedestrian.
They were then asked to imagine they were either guilty (they were speeding and thus criminally
responsible for hitting the pedestrian) or innocent (they did not speed and thus it was just an
accident) of the crime. Regardless of guilt status, they were told they had not been drinking any
alcohol and they made a point to drive home while it was still light out. The crime vignette was
loosely based on that used by Tor et al., (2010) and Gordon & Hellgren (2020). Participants were
accused of involuntary manslaughter and offered either a traditional plea (six months in jail
instead of a possible five years in prison if convicted at trial) or an Alford plea (the same deal
with the added opportunity to proclaim innocence; see Appendix B for the full vignette)5. After
reading the scenario, participants answered a series of questions aimed at examining their
decision-making process.
Dependent Measures
Plea Decisions. As in Study 1, the primary dependent variable was the final decision to
accept or reject the plea deal that was offered and then to explain the reasoning behind the
decision. These latter responses were then coded with two aims: (1) to look specifically for
mentions of the ability to maintain innocence and concerns about others’ perceptions of their
guilt, and (2) explore other common themes more broadly.
Anticipated Guilt Perceptions. As in Study 1, participants were asked to estimate how
many out of 100 observers watching them make their decision would believe they were guilty of
the crime.

5

The vignette in Study 2 is slightly different as it was run first of the five studies and then some changes were made.
The main difference is that Study 2 included an initial offer that was then followed by either the traditional or the
Alford plea. For subsequent studies, the initial offer was removed to avoid confusion among participants.
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Post-Plea State of Mind. On 1–10-point scales, participants rated how confident they
were that they made the right decision; how difficult the decision was to make; how satisfied they
were with their decision; and how much pressure they felt when they were offered a deal.
Case Evaluation. Participant evaluated a number of aspects of the case. Specifically, they
rated how serious the wrongdoing (the involuntary manslaughter) they were accused of was (1 =
Not at all to 10 = Very), how strong the evidence of them committing the crime was (1 = Not at
all to 10 = Very), and how likely they were to be convicted if they were to go to trial (1 -100).
Consequences of Decision. Next, participants rated on 10-point scales to what extent
their plea decision was influenced by the consequences of rejecting the deal (i.e., going to trial
and risking up to 5 years in prison) and the consequences of accepting the deal (i.e., six months in
prison and avoiding trial). In the Alford plea condition, participants also rated whether they were
influenced by the opportunity to maintain their innocence.
Attention and Manipulation Checks. Participants were asked the same questions aimed
at evaluating their attention level and understanding of the manipulation used in Study 2.6
Participants who failed two or more of the following checks were removed:
Instructional Manipulation Check. “Given that this study is examining your decisionmaking process, it is important to us that you pay attention to each instruction. In order to show
us that you are, please choose "Somewhat agree" below, and then move on to the next question.”
Manipulation Checks. Participants were also asked whether they were speeding or not to
ensure they were aware of their own guilt status. Finally, as a combined attention and

6

The manipulation check aimed at ensuring participants understanding and appreciation of the ability to maintain
innocence in Alford conditions was not used in this study as it was the first one that I ran. The manipulation check
was subsequently added to the other studies.
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manipulation check, participants were asked to provide the final sentence they were offered by
the prosecutor (6 months prison time).
Hypotheses
H1-H4 were identical to the hypotheses of Study 1.
H5. Based on previous research showing strong effects even in a “low stakes” cheating
paradigm, I predicted no differences in results from Study 1 to Study 2.
Results
Plea Decision. Overall, 51.2% participants accepted a plea, and 48.8% rejected it. Table
17 shows the acceptance percentages across conditions. A binomial logistic regression was
conducted on the dichotomous plea decision. In the guilt status group, Guilty was the reference
category, and in the type of plea group, Traditional was the reference category. The model was
significant, Χ2(3) = 122, p < .001, and explained 34.5% of the variance in plea decisions
(Nagelkerke’s R2).
The main effect of guilt status was significant, b = 2.413, 95% CI [1.761, 3.064], OR =
11.163, p < .001. Guilty participants were significantly more likely to accept a plea (77.8%)
compared to innocent participants (24.6%). The main effect of type of plea was not significant, b
= -.134, 95% CI [-.797, .530], OR = .875, p = .693. Likewise, there was no significant interaction
effect, b = -.066, 95% CI [ -.988, .856], OR = .936, p = .888.
Reasoning behind Plea Decision. As in Study 1, participants stated the reasons for
making their plea decision. The same two coders from Study 1 reviewed all the open-ended
responses and coded for whether or not they fit into one or several of the 15 categories
determined in Study 1 (see Table 3). Cohen’s κ for each category was calculated to assess the

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
48
interrater reliability. The coefficients ranged from .3557 (“Consequences were not too bad”) to
.852 (“To avoid harsher consequences”), with an average κ of .625 which represent a substantial
degree of agreement between raters. Examples of the most frequently mentioned reasons are
shown in Table 4. The coders’ codes were averaged to provide percentages.
As in Study 1, the most frequent reason for participants who accepted a plea (n = 208)
was to avoid harsher consequences and the uncertainty of trial (68%). Also as in Study 1, the
most common reason cited by those who rejected a plea (n = 198) was their innocence/that they
were not at fault (62.1%). Table 5 shows the percentages of the most frequently mentioned
reasons broken down by plea decision, guilt status, and type of plea. Once again, I sought to
explore how often the ability to maintain innocence was mentioned, in particular by participants
who accepted an Alford plea. Overall, only 3.7% of participants reported that maintaining
innocence was a reason for their decision. In line with Study 1, and as predicted, this reason was
most frequently mentioned by innocent participants accepting an Alford plea (33.3%). Once
again, no participants who accepted a traditional plea, regardless of their guilt status or plea
decision, cited the opportunity to maintain innocence as a reason for their plea decision. The
opportunity to appear innocent to others was cited as the reason for accepting an Alford plea by
only one participant.
Confidence in Plea Decision. Participants rated how confident they were in their
decision (see Table 17 for means and ANOVA statistics across conditions). Overall, these ratings
hovered above the midpoint, (M = 6.66, SD = 2.48). A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of type of plea, F(1, 402) = 4.389, p = .037, η2p = .011, such that participants
presented with a traditional plea offer were more confident (M= 6.91. SD = 2.43) compared to
As in Study 1, the category “Other” was not included in the calculation of the average Cohen’s kappa as the rating
was much lower than the rest (.258), which was to be expected due to the nature of the category.
7
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those offered an Alford plea (M = 6.40, SD = 2.50). The main effect of guilt status was not
significant, F(1, 402) = .888, p = .346, η2p = .002, nor was the interaction, F(1, 402) = .426, p =
.792, η2p < .001.
Anticipated Guilt Perceptions. Participants were asked “Out of 100 outside observers
who watch the police and prosecutor’s accusation and your decision to accept or reject the plea
offer, how many would believe that you were guilty?” (See Table 18 for results on this measure).
Compared to Study 1, participants’ overall ratings were slightly higher: they reported that 59.5%
of observers would perceive them as guilty (SD = 26.5). A two-way ANOVA revealed a main
effect of guilt status, F(1, 402) = 125.341, p < .001, η2p = .238. Guilty participants were
significantly more likely to believe others would perceive them as guilty, (72.4% SD = 21.9),
compared to innocent participants, (46.6% SD = 24.4). There was no significant effect of plea
type, F(1, 402) = 1.591, p = .208, η2p = .004, and no interaction, F(1, 329) = .112, p = .738, η2p <
.001.
As in Study 1, I separated for analysis participants who accepted vs. rejected the plea
offer to explore the influence of that decision on anticipated guilt perceptions (see Table 19 for
means and statistics). Among participants who accepted a plea, those who were guilty believed
others were more likely to view them as guilty (M = 79.24, SD = 16.39) compared to innocent
participants, (M = 67.40, SD = 20.98), F(1, 204) = 17.531, p < .001, η2p = .151. There was no
effect of type of plea, F(1, 204) = 2.078, p = .151, η2p = .010, and no interaction, F(1, 204) =
1.349, p = .247, η2p = .007. Among those who rejected a plea, guilty participants were more
likely to anticipate that others would view them as guilty (M = 48.22, SD = 22.98), compared to
innocent participants, (M = 39.74, SD = 21.46), F(1, 194) = 5.667, p = .018, η2p = .028. There
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was no effect of type of plea, F(1, 198) = .080, p = .777, η2p < .001, and no interaction, F(1, 198)
= 1.842, p = .176, η2p = .009.
Post-Plea State of Mind
Overall means and standard deviations for these measures can be found in Table 20.
Difficulty in Decision Making. Participants gave an overall difficulty rating of 6.82 (SD
= 2.96). A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of guilt status, F(1, 402) = 3.963,
p = .047, η2p = .010, such that innocent participants found the decision significantly more difficult
to make, (M = 7.11, SD = 2.88) compared to guilty participants (M = 6.53, SD = 3.03). There
were no significant effect of type or plea, F(1, 402) = .130, p = .719, η2p < .001 for type of plea
and no interaction, F(1, 402) = .956, p = .741, η2p < .001.
Among participants who accepted a plea, a significant main effect of guilt status showed
that innocent participants found the decision more difficult to make (M = 7.78, SD = 2.58)
compared to guilty participants (M = 6.30, SD = 3.05), F(1, 204) = 10.215, p = .002, η2p = .048.
There was no effect of type of plea, F(1, 204) = 1.126, p = .290, η2p = .005, and no interaction,
F(1, 204) = 2.702, p = .102, η2p = .013. Among participants who rejected a plea, the pattern was
different as no significant effects were found (see Table 21).
Satisfaction with Plea Decision. Participants also rated their level of satisfaction with
their decision. Across conditions, they were moderately satisfied (M = 5.75, SD = 2.69). A twoway ANOVA revealed no significant differences across conditions (see Table 22). Then I
separated for analysis participants who accepted vs. rejected a plea (see Table 23 for means and
statistics).
Among those who accepted the plea, guilty participants were more likely to report
satisfaction with the decision, (M = 6.03, SD = 2.59), compared to innocent participants, (M =
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3.44, SD = 2.18), F(1, 204) = 40.179, p < .001, η2p = .165. There was no effect of type of plea,
F(1, 204) = .511, p = .476, η2p = .002, and no interaction, F(1, 204) = .118, p = .734, η2p = .001.
Among participants who rejected a plea, guilt status was significant, F(1, 204) = 40.179, p <
.001, η2p = .165. However, in contrast to the pattern for participants who accepted a plea,
innocent participants were significantly more likely to be satisfied with their decision (M = 6.31,
SD = 2.63), compared to guilty participants (M = 5.40, SD = 2.73). There was no effect of type of
plea, F(1, 204) = .511, p = .476, η2p = .002, and no interaction, F(1, 204) = .000, p = .732, η2p =
.001. These patterns suggest that guilty participants felt more satisfied when they accepted a plea,
and innocents were more satisfied when they rejected a plea.
Pressure to Make Decision. Overall, participants reported feeling highly pressured to
make a plea decision (M = 7.74, SD = 2.55). A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect of type of plea, F(1, 329) = 4.184, p = .042, η2p = .013, such that participants presented
with an Alford plea reported being under more pressure, (M = 7.53, SD = 2.55) compared to
those presented with a traditional plea (M = 6.93, SD = 2.83). There was no significant main
effect of guilt status, F(1, 329) = 3.094, p = .080, η2p = .009, and no interaction, F(1, 329) = .093,
p = .761, η2p < .001.
Once again, I separated for analysis participants who accepted vs. rejected the plea offer
(see Table 24 for means and statistics). For those who accepted the plea, innocent participants
reported more pressure to make a decision, (M = 8.80, SD = 1.70), compared to those who were
guilty, (M = 7.49, SD = 2.77), F(1, 204) = 9.825, p =.002, η2p = .046. There was no effect of type
of plea, F(1, 204) = .127, p = .722, η2p = .001, and no interaction, F(1, 204) = 1.031, p = .311, η2p
= .005. Looking at participants who rejected a plea, no significant effects were found.
Case Evaluation
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Crime Severity. In contrast to Study 1, participants rated the severity of the crime as very
high, (M = 8.59, SD = 1.84). A two-way ANOVA revealed no significant effects, potentially due
to this seeming ceiling effect. Means and ANOVA statistics for the remaining case evaluations
measures, strength of evidence and likelihood of conviction, can be found in Table 25.
Consequences of Plea Decision
Consequences of Rejecting Plea. Participants reported being highly influenced by the
consequences of rejecting the plea, (M = 7.61, SD = 2.56; see Table 26 for means and ANOVA
statistics across conditions). A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of guilt
status, F (1, 402) = 9.06, p = .006, η2p = .022. Guilty participants were more influenced by the
consequences of rejecting the plea (M = 7.99, SD = 2.39) than innocent participants were (M =
7.23, SD = 2.67). There was no significant main effect of type of plea, F(1, 402) = .029, p = .865,
η2p < .001, and no interaction, F(1, 402) = .048, p = .827, η2p < .001.
Consequences of Accepting Plea. Participants also reported being highly influenced by
the consequences of accepting a plea, (M = 7.40, SD = 2.48). A two-way ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect of guilt status, F(1, 402) = 17.561, p < .001, η2p = .042, such that guilty
participants said they were more influenced by the consequences of accepting the plea (M = 7.91,
SD = 2.22) than innocent participants (M = 6.89, SD = 2.59). There was no significant main effect
of type of plea, F(1, 402) = .093, p = .890, η2p < .001, and no interaction, F(1, 402) = .125, p =
.724, η2p < .001.
The Innocence Aspect of Alford. Participants in the Alford condition rated the extent to
which their decision was influenced by the opportunity to maintain innocence (1-10). Overall,
their ratings were just above the midpoint, 5.93, (SD = 3.10). I conducted an independent samples
t-test to explore if guilt status would influence this rating and found no significant difference,
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t(200) = -.798, p = .426, 95% CI [-1.21, .512], d = - .112. Innocent participants said they were
slightly more influenced by the ability to maintain innocence (M = 6.10, SD = 3.05) compared to
guilty participants (M = 5.75, SD = 3.14), but this difference did not reach significance.
To examine whether participants’ plea decisions influenced their view of the opportunity
to maintain innocence, I separated for analysis participants who accepted vs. rejected a plea.
Among participants who accepted a plea, innocent participants reported being influenced more by
the ability to maintain innocence (M = 7.44, SD = 2.56), compared to guilty participants (M =
5.95, SD = 3.19), t(55.646) = -2.451, p = .017, 95% CI [-2.717, -.273], d = .515. Among
participants who rejected a plea, no significant effect was found, t(94) = -.851, p = .417, 95% CI
[-2.108, .881], d = .203.
Correlations. As in Study 1, correlations among all dependent variables are presented
(see Table 27), and similar patterns were found. Participants who rejected a plea also reported
perceiving the case against them as weak and were less likely to be influenced by consequences
of accepting or rejecting the offered plea. Predictably, many of the case evaluation variables were
associated with each other.
Summary
Overall, guilty participants were 11 times more likely to accept a plea compared to
innocent participants, with a plea acceptance rate identical to that of Study 1 (51.2%). Contrary to
predictions, the results differed between the cheating vignette of Study 1 compared to the crime
vignette in Study 2. Specifically, the crime was rated as far more severe, so a ceiling effect may
have contributed to the overall fewer effects of plea type in Study 2. An alternative explanation
for the differences could be that participants in Study 1 were students who were asked to imagine
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taking part in a study at their university. This scenario may have been easier for participants to
immerse themselves in, compared to being accused of voluntary manslaughter.
Study 3
A second goal of the present research was to assess observers’ perceptions of Alford
defendants. Advocates for the Alford plea have suggested it offers a beneficial alternative for
innocent defendants who do not want to risk a trial (Ronis, 2009; Ward, 2003). Others have
argued that defendants who want to preserve their positive self-perception and avoid public
judgement may benefit specifically from asserting their innocence through an Alford plea
(Schneider, 2013). However, the notion that observers may view Alford pleaders in more positive
terms has not been empirically tested. Studies 3 through 5 aimed to explore lay perceptions of
Alford pleaders by exposing them to defendants accused of different types of wrongdoing and
offered either a traditional plea or an Alford plea that the defendant either accepted or rejected. I
then asked them to provide their overall perception of the defendant and his plea decision.
Method
Participants and Design
Because the design and planned analyses were similar to those of Study 1 and 2, the same
a priori power analyses and minimum sample size of 351 participants was used.
Paralleling Study 1, participants had to be students in order to participate. Initially, data
collection was done through the City University’s SONA system but because recruitment was
slow and the data quality low, I completed data collection by recruiting college students through
Prolific. After oversampling to account for participation loss, a total of 437 participants were
recruited, 352 from Prolific and 85 from SONA. Participants who failed two or more
manipulation checks were removed, yielding a final sample of 411 participants, 342 from
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Prolific, and 69 from SONA. Individuals who had taken part in a previous Alford study were
excluded.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 74, with the mean age of 30.4, (SD = 10.8), 240
were female, 160 male, 6 non-binary, and 4 preferred not to report their gender. The racial/ethnic
breakdown of the participants was as follows: White/European American (60.8%),
Latinx/Hispanic/heritage from Latin American Country (14.4%), Asian/Asian American/Pacific
Islander (9.5%), African American/Black (9.2%), Biracial/Multiracial (3.6%), Middle
Eastern/Arab/Turkish/Iranian (n = 5, 1.2%), and Native American/American Indian/Indigenous
(n = 5, 1.2%). The sample consisted of 18% of Freshmen, 10.9% of Sophomores, 10.9% Juniors,
and 60.1% Seniors, and represented 42 states. 13% reported having been arrested, and 31.8%
reported having a family member who had been arrested (5.6% said they did not know). No
participants reported working in a legal profession, but 14.4% had family members who did
(lawyers, police officers, and court reporters).
Prolific participants were compensated with $1.78 for their time, and the SONA sample
received class credit for their participation. They were randomly assigned into one of four cells
produced by a 2 (Type of Plea: traditional vs Alford) x 2 (Decision: reject vs accept) betweensubjects design.
Study Materials and Procedure
An online Qualtrics survey opened with an informed consent page. Afterward,
participants read a vignette describing a male student, Michael Anderson, who took part in the
same procedure described in Study 1 (see Appendix C for full vignette). After reading the
vignette, participants were presented with a questionnaire to assess their perceptions of the
student and his decision. They were then debriefed and compensated.
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Dependent Measures
Guilt Perception and Confidence. The main dependent measure was whether
participants believed the student they read about, Michael, was guilty or innocent of cheating.
This variable was measured in two ways: a dichotomous guilty vs. innocent verdict and a
continuous rating of confidence in that perception, rated from 1 (Not at all) to 10 (Very).
Plea Decision Perceptions. To evaluate how participants perceived the plea and decision,
I asked participants to rate (1) to what degree Michael made the right decision (1 = Not at all to
10 = A lot), (2) how likely it is they would make the same decision in that situation (1 = Not at all
to 10 = Very), (3) what decision they would make (accept or reject), and (4) how fair they
thought the plea offer was (1 = Not at all fair to 10 = Very fair).
Perceptions of the Defendant. To examine observers’ perceptions of the defendant, I
used measures from previous research on stigma of false confessors (Clow & Leach, 2005;
Scherr et al., 2018). First, participants rated their agreement with statements positing that Michael
Anderson was intelligent, competent, and confident (these ratings were made on a 5-point scale).
Following Scherr et al., a composite perception score was then calculated by summing the ratings
from these questions. Scherr et al. (2018) found this composite score has high reliability (α =
.875). These ratings all related to the defendants’ competence, in accordance the competence
dimension identified in stereotype research (Fiske et al., 2002).
Participants also rated their agreement with statements stating that Michael Anderson was
friendly and honest. These ratings were in part taken from Clow and Leach (2015) and inspired
by the “warmth” dimension form Fiske’s research (2002). Finally, participants rated whether they
agreed with the suggestion that Michael Anderson was remorseful (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 =
Strongly Disagree) and blameworthy for his situation (1 = not at all to 10 = fully to blame).
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These final ratings were taken from previous research (Hellgren & Kassin, 2018). Together, these
measures aimed to test the hypothesis that Alford defendants maintain a positive reputation by
maintaining innocence.
Attention and Manipulation Checks. To ensure participants paid attention and
understood the stimulus material, a series of attention and manipulation check questions were
asked. The questions were as follows:
Instructional Manipulation Check. “Given that this study is examining your decisionmaking process, it is important to us that you pay attention to each instruction. In order to show
us that you are, please choose "Somewhat agree" below, and then move on to the next question.”
Manipulation Checks. Participants were asked to respond True or False to the following
question: “The plea Michael was offered required him to admit guilt and accept responsibility for
the cheating.”8 As a combined attention and manipulation check, participants were asked to
provide the final sentence Michael was offered as part of the plea (40 hours of community
service). Participants who failed two or more checks were ultimately removed.
Hypotheses
H1. In line with previous research by Hellgren and Kassin (2018), I hypothesized a main
effect of plea decision, such that when Michael rejected an offer he would be seen as less guilty
than when he accepted an offer, regardless of type of plea.
H2. I further predicted that Michael would be perceived as less guilty if he accepted an
Alford plea compared to when he accepted a traditional guilty plea, based on him maintaining his
innocence.

8

See 1 for an explanation as to why this manipulation check was not used to exclude participants.
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H3. Finally, I hypothesized that Michael would receive more positive perception ratings
when he accepted an Alford plea compared to when he accepted a traditional plea.
Results
Guilt Perceptions
Overall, 28% participants believed that the student was guilty, and 72% believed he was
innocent (see Table 28 for overall percentages). A binomial logistic regression was conducted on
the dichotomous guilt perception variable with type of plea and plea decision as the predictors. In
the guilt status group, guilty was the reference category, and in the type of plea group, traditional
was the reference category. The model was significant, Χ2(3) = 46, p < .001, and explained 15.2
% of the variance in participants’ guilt perceptions (Nagelkerke’s R2).
The main effect of plea decision was significant, b = 1.709, 95% CI [1.003, 2.414], OR =
5.522, p < .001. The student who accepted a plea was more likely to be seen as guilty (42.9%)
compared to the student who rejected a plea (13.5%). Type of plea was not a significant
predictor, b = .0345, 95% CI [-.522, .591], OR = 1.035, p = .903, and there was no interaction, b
= -.2.667, 95% CI [ -1.240, .706], OR = .766, p = .591.
Participants also rated how confident they were in their guilt perceptions. Overall levels
of confidence were high (M = 6.95, SD = 1.97). A two-way ANOVA with plea decision and type
of plea as the independent variables and found no significant effects (see Table 29).
Plea Decision Perceptions
Right Plea Decision
Participants rated their belief that the student had made the right plea decision (overall M
= 6.29, SD = 2.64; means and ANOVA statistics can be found in Table 30). A two-way ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of plea decision, F(1, 407) = 56.549, p < .001, η2p = .122.
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Participants who read that the student rejected the plea offer were more likely to believe he made
the right decision, (M = 7.20, SD = 2.15), compared to those who read that he accepted the offer,
(M = 5.36, SD = 2.77). There was no significant effect of plea type, F(1, 407) = .034, p = .854,
η2p < .001, and no interaction, F(1, 407) = 1.80, p = .180, η2p = .004.
Personal Plea Decision
Participants were asked to indicate the plea decision they would have made in the same
situation. Overall, 69.8% of participants predicted that they would reject the deal; only 30.2%
thought they would accept it. Percentages across conditions can be found in Table 31.
A binomial logistic regression with Traditional and Accept as the reference categories
revealed a significant model, Χ2(3) = 12.9, p = .005, which explained 4.4% of the variance in
participants’ responses (Nagelkerke’s R2). Plea decision was a significant predictor of
participant’s plea decision, b = 0.633, 95% CI [.009, 1.257], OR = 1.883, p = .047. Overall,
participants were more likely to reject than accept the plea and this was particularly true when
they read about a student who also rejected it. Type of plea was not a significant predictor, b = .319, 95% CI [-.890, .251], OR = .727, p = .273, and there was no interaction, b = .190, 95% CI
[-.675, 1.055, OR = 1.209, p = .667.
Participants were also asked how likely it was that they were to make the same decision
as the student in his situation. Overall, they tended to report they would have made the same
decision (M = 6.42, SD = 2.88). A two-way ANOVA revealed that participants in the plea
rejection condition were more likely to report they would make the same decision, (M = 7.57, SD
= 2.34), compared to those in the plea acceptance condition, (M = 5.24, SD = 2.92), F(1, 407) =
80.48, p < .001, η2p = .165. There was no significant effect of plea type, F(1, 407) = .024, p =
.876, η2p < .001, and no interaction, F(1, 407) = 2.51, p = .114, η2p = .006.
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See Table 30 for means and ANOVA statistics for fairness of plea measure.
Perceptions of the Defendant
On 1–5-point scales, participants rated the student defendant on several characteristics of
relevance to stigma (the higher the score, the more positive the impression; see Table 31 for
overall means and ANOVA statistics).
Composite Score. The three measures pertaining to the competence dimension (Fiske et
al., 2002) taken from Scherr et al. (2018) (competence, intelligence, confidence) were summed to
create a total sigma measure (ranging from 1 to 15, with a high score indicating a more positive
impression). Overall, participants gave Michael positive ratings, (M = 11.1, SD = 2.52).
There was a significant main effect of type of plea, F(1, 407) = 4.404, p = .036, η2p =
.011, such that participants rated the student more negatively when he accepted an Alford plea (M
= 10.84, SD = 2.53), than when he accepted a traditional plea (M =11.39, SD = 2.49). A main
effect of plea decision was also obtained, F(1, 407) = 62.196, p < .001, η2p = .133, indicating that
Michael was seen in a more positive light when he rejected a deal (M = 12.02, SD = 2.197) than
when he accepted it (10.18, SD = 2.496). There was no interaction, F(1, 407) = .022, p = .882, η2p
< .001.
For the remaining individual trait ratings, see Table 32 for means and ANOVA statistics.
Remorsefulness and Blameworthiness. Overall, the student was seen as only slightly
remorseful, with a rating of 2.99 out of 5 (SD = .940). Participants perceived the student as more
remorseful when he was offered a traditional plea (M = 3.06, SD = .983) than an Alford plea (M =
2.92, SD = .891). However, this effect was just barely significant, F(1, 407) = 3.582, p = .059, η2p
= .009. Next, a significant main effect of plea decision was obtained, F(1, 407) = 40.263, p <
.001, η2p = .090, such that participants thought the student was more remorseful when he
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accepted a plea (M = 3.27, SD = .821) than when he rejected it (M = 2.72, SD = .969). The
interaction was not significant, F(1, 407) = .895, p = .345, η2p = .002.
Next, on a 1–10-point scale, participants rated the student as low on blameworthiness, (M
= 4.24, SD = 2.61). A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of plea decision, F(1,
407) = 10.774, p = .001, η2p = .026, such that participants saw the student as more blameworthy
when he accepted a deal, (M = 4.66, SD =2.78) than when he rejected it (M = 3.83, SD = 2.38).
There was no significant effect for type of plea, F(1, 407) = .441, p = .507, η2p = .001, and no
interaction, F(1, 407) = .041, p = .839, η2p < .001 (See Table 33).
Correlations. Table 34 shows that participants who perceived the student as not guilty
were also more likely to rate him favorably. In contrast, they were less likely to see the student as
remorseful when they believed he was innocent. Perceived lack of remorse was further associated
with participants being less likely to report they would make the same decision as the student.
Next, many of the stigma/perception scores were predictably correlated with each other, and also
predicted more positive views of the student’s decision.
Summary
As predicted, participants saw the cheating-accused student as less culpable when he
rejected an offer than when he accepted one. However, there were no differences between the
types of pleas. Overall, participants believed that the student had made the right decision when he
rejected a plea. In this case they were also more likely to report they would have made the same
decision, and that their personal plea decision would be to reject the plea. When the student
accepted a plea, he was seen as less competent, intelligent, confident, and honest. In contrast to
expectations, when he was offered an Alford plea, he was more subject to negative judgements
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and seen as less remorseful and more blameworthy compared to when he accepted a traditional
plea.
Study 4
Method
Participants and Design
As in the previous studies, an a priori power analyses suggested a minimum sample size
of 351 participants to detect a small to medium effect size. After oversampling to account for
participation loss, 436 adult American citizens were recruited through Prolific. Those who failed
two or more attention and/or manipulation checks were removed (n = 45), yielding a final sample
of 391 participants. As before, participants from any previous study were precluded from
participation.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 68, with the mean age of 31.4, (SD = 10.2), 189
were female, 193 male, 7 non-binary, and 2 preferred not to report their gender. The racial/ethnic
breakdown of the participants was as follows: White/European American (71.4%), Asian/Asian
American/Pacific Islander (11.8%), Latinx/Hispanic/heritage from Latin American Country
(7.4%), African American/Black (4.9%), Biracial/Multiracial (4.1%), and Native
American/American Indian/Indigenous (n = 2, .5%). Most participants reported having some
higher education; 22.6% reported having “some college”, 8% had an associate degree, 33.7% had
a college degree, 2.6% had some graduate school education, 11.6% had a master’s degree, and
3.6% had a doctoral degree.
Asked if they had ever been arrested, 13.4% reported that they had, and 39.8% reported
having a family member who had (6.2% said they did not know). Only 1.5% of participants (n =
6) reported working a legal profession (paralegal, lawyer, investigator, forensic scientist, and
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probation officer), and 16.5% had family members who did (lawyers, police officers, and
correction officers). Participants were randomly assigned into one of four conditions produced by
a 2 (Type of Plea: traditional plea deal vs Alford plea deal) x 2 (Decision: reject vs accept)
between-subjects design.
Study Materials and Procedure
The procedure in Study 4 were identical to that of Study 3, apart from the following:
Instead of reading a vignette of a male student accused of cheating in an experiment, participants
read a vignette describing a male motorist accused of involuntary manslaughter, as described in
Study 2. They read that this individual was driving home after a dinner at a friend’s house when
he hit an elderly man with his car. The pedestrian later dies, and the motorist is charged with
involuntary manslaughter. Participants then read about how the prosecutor offered the defendant
either a traditional plea deal or an Alford plea, which he either then accepted or rejected (see
Appendix E for full vignette).
As in Study 3, participants then completed a questionnaire in which they indicated
whether they believed the defendant to be guilty or innocent and rated their confidence in that
belief. Then they rated the defendant on the following dependent measures:
Additional Dependent Measures
Perceptions of the Plea Decision. Participants rated on 1–10-point scales (1) to what
degree the defendant made the right plea decision, (2) how likely it is they would have made the
same decision, (3) what decision they would personally make (accept or reject), and (4) how fair
they thought the plea offer was.
Perceptions of the Defendant. The same perception measures used in Study 3 were used.
Participants rate how intelligent, competent, and confident the defendant was on a 5-point scale.
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As before, a composite perception score was calculated by summing these three questions (α =
.875; Scherr et al., 2018). Participants also rated the defendant for how friendly, honest, and
remorseful he was. Finally, they rated how blameworthy the defendant was for his situation.
Attention and Manipulation Checks. To ensure participants were paying attention and
understood the stimulus material, the same attention and manipulation check questions used in
the previous studies were used here. The questions were as follows:
Instructional Manipulation Check. “Given that this study is examining your decisionmaking process, it is important to us that you pay attention to each instruction. In order to show
us that you are, please choose "Somewhat agree" below, and then move on to the next question.”
Manipulation Checks. Participants were asked to respond True or False to the following
question: “The plea Michael was offered required him to admit guilt and accept responsibility for
the crime.”9 As a combined attention and manipulation check, participants were asked to provide
the final sentence Michael was offered as part of the plea (6 months prison time). Participants
who failed two or more checks were ultimately removed from analyses.
Hypotheses
H1-H3 are identical to those of Study 3.
H4. As in Studies 1 and 2, I did not predict differences between Study 3 and Study 4.
Results
Guilt Perceptions
Overall, 47.3% participants believed the defendant was guilty, and 52.7% believed he was
innocent (see Table 35 for percentages across conditions). A binomial logistic regression was
conducted on the dichotomous guilt perception variable with type of plea and decision as the

9

See 1 for an explanation as to why this manipulation check was not used to exclude participants.
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predictors. In the guilt status group, guilty was the reference category, and in the type of plea
group, traditional was the reference category. The model was significant, Χ2(3) = 11.3, p = .010,
and explained 3.8% of the variance in participants’ guilt perceptions (Nagelkerke’s R2).
The main effect of plea decision was significant, b = 0.788, 95% CI [.205, 1.370], OR =
2.108, p = .008. Participants who read that the defendant accepted the plea were more likely to
believe he was guilty (55.7%) than when he rejected a plea (39.2%). The type of plea did not
significantly predict guilt perceptions, b = .204, 95% CI [-.368, .777], OR = 1.227, p = .484, nor
was there an interaction, b = -.221, 95% CI [ -1.028, .586], OR = .820, p = .592.
Overall, participants were confident in their perceptions of guilt and innocence, M = 6.02,
SD = 2.54. A two-way ANOVA with plea decision and type of plea and decision as the
independent variables and no significant effects were found (see Table 29).
Perceptions of the Plea Decision
For overall means and ANOVA statistics, see Table 36.
Right Plea Decision
Participants rated to what degree the defendant had made the right decision. Overall, they
mostly agreed the defendant had made the right decision, (M = 6.02, SD = 2.54). A main effect of
plea decision was found, F(1, 387) = 7.252, p = .007, η2p = .018. Participants who read that the
defendant accepted a deal were more likely to agree that his decision was the right one (M = 6.38,
SD = 2.43) than those who read that he rejected the offer, (M = 5.68, SD = 2.60). There was no
significant effect of plea type, F(1, 387) = .243, p = .622, η2p = .001, and no interaction, F(1, 387)
= 1.29, p = .257, η2p = .003.
Personal Plea Decision
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Asked to indicate the decision they would have made, 55.2% of participants said they
would have accepted the plea offer. Means across conditions can be found in Table 37.
A binomial logistic regression with Traditional and Accept as the reference categories
revealed a significant model, Χ2(3) = 18.9, p < .001, which explained 6.3% of the variance in
participants’ responses (Nagelkerke’s R2). Plea decision was a significant predictor of
participants’ personal plea decision, b = 0.999, 95% CI [.407, 1.591], OR = 2.716, p < .001.
Participants said they were more likely to have accepted the plea when they read about a
defendant who did the same. Type of plea did not predict guilt perceptions, b = 0.0122, 95% CI [.587, 0.612], OR = 1.012, p = .968, and there was no interaction, b = -0.234, 95% CI [-1.054,
0.586], OR = .798, p = .576
On the question of whether they would have made the same decision as the defendant, (M
= 6.29, SD = 2.71), a borderline significant main effect of plea decision was found, F(1, 387) =
26.940, p = .056, η2p = .009. Participants who read about a defendant who accepted a deal were
more likely to report they would have made the same decision, (M = 6.56, SD = 2.61), compared
to when the defendant rejected the plea offer, (M = 6.03, SD = 2.79). Once again, there was no
significant effect of plea type, F(1, 387) = .507, p = .477, η2p = .001, and no interaction, F(1, 387)
= .127, p = .895, η2p < .001.
See Table 36 for means and ANOVA statistics for the fairness of plea measure.
Defendant Perceptions
As in Study 3, participants rated on 1–5-point scales their perceptions of the defendant on
a number of characteristics (higher scores indicate more positive impressions).
Composite Score. As in Study 3, ratings of competence, intelligence, and confidence
were summed (scores ranged from 1 to 15). Overall, participants had a positive view of the
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defendant, (M = 11.42, SD = 2.33). A significant main effect of plea decision was found, F(1,
387) = 10.307, p = .001, η2p= .026, such that defendants who rejected a plea were less subject to
stigma (M = 11.04, SD = 2.39) compared to defendants who accepted a plea (M = 11.79, SD =
2.22). There was no effect of type of plea, F(1, 387) = .008, p = .929, η2p < .001, and no
interaction between variables, F(1, 387) = .060, p = .806, η2p < .001.
For the remaining individual traits, see Table 38 for means and ANOVA statistics.
Remorsefulness and Blameworthiness. Participants saw the defendant as more
remorseful when he accepted a plea (M = 3.97, SD = .897), compared to when he rejected a plea
(M = 3.37, SD = 1.09), F(1, 387) = 36.598, p < .001, η2p = .086. A significant main effect of type
of plea was also obtained, F(1, 387) = 6.345, p = .012, η2p = .016, such that participants saw the
defendant as more remorseful when he was offered a traditional plea (M = 3.78, SD = 1.05) than
an Alford plea (M = 3.55, SD = 1.03). There was no interaction of type of plea and plea decision,
F(1, 387) = .312, p = .577, η2p = .001.
Participants then rated to what degree they believed the defendant was to blame for his
situation. Across conditions, participants rated the defendant as moderately blameworthy, (M =
5.73, SD = 2.34). A two-way ANOVA revealed no significant effects (see Table 39).
Correlations. As before, Table 40 shows strong correlations between perceptions of
innocence and positive ratings of the defendant. Participants perceived the defendant in a more
positive way when they also believed he was innocent. In contrast to Study 3, remorsefulness was
positively correlated with other perceptions scores. Those who believed the defendant was
innocent were also more likely to perceived him as remorseful, which was the opposite of the
finding of Study 3. There were also several negative correlations between defendant
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blameworthiness and perception scores, such that when participants viewed the defendant
favorably, they were also likely to report he was not to blame for the situation.
Summary
Once again, participants were more likely to perceive the defendant as guilty when he
accepted a plea than when he rejected it. In contrast to Study 3, however, the defendant was seen
as having made the right decision when he accepted a plea. In this case, participants were also
more likely to report they would have made the same decision. Although Studies 3 and 4 differed
in several ways, it is possible that the severity of the offense the defendant was accused of
influenced perceptions of his plea decision. Study 4 once again found that the defendant was
perceived as less honest and remorseful when he was offered an Alford plea than a traditional
plea. This will be further addressed in the General Discussion.
Study 5
The absence of significant differences between defendants who accept traditional pleas
versus Alford pleas studies 3 and 4 may have resulted from the fact that the defendants did not
request the Alford plea, they merely accepted or rejected it. What would happen if a defendant
insisted on his innocence and then was offered an Alford plea to accommodate his insistence? A
fifth study was added to examine potential differences in perceptions of defendants who receive
an Alford plea offer initiated by the prosecutor compared to those who requested it themselves.
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions based on what plea they
were offered: (1) traditional plea, (2) Alford plea initiated by the prosecutor, and (3) Alford plea
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initiated by defendant. I conduced an a priori power analysis for one-way ANOVA and found
that 381 was an adequate sample size to be able to detect a small effect size with 80% power.
After oversampling to account for participants lost, 403 adults were recruited from
Prolific. After removing two for failing two or more attention and/or manipulation checks, the
final sample consisted of 401 participants, who were compensated with $1.68. Participants who
had experience of any of the previously presented studies were excluded.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 73, with the mean age of 32.9, (SD = 11.9); 215
were female, 180 male, and four non-binary. The racial/ethnic breakdown of the participants was
as follows: White/European American (67.5%), Asian/Asian American/Pacific Islander (10.8%),
Latinx/Hispanic/heritage from Latin American Country (9%), African American/Black (8%),
Biracial/Multiracial (4%), Native American/American Indian/Indigenous (0.5%), and Middle
Eastern/Arab/Turkish/Iranian (0.3%). As in previous studies, most participants reported having
some level of higher education with 20.7% reported “some college” education, 8.2% had an
Associate degree, 35.4% had a college degree, 4.7% had some graduate school education, 12%
had a master’s degree, and 3.7% had a doctoral degree. When asked if they had ever been
arrested, 13% of participations reported they had been, and 39.3% reported having a family
member who had been arrested (5% said they did not know). Nine participants reported working
in a legal profession (attorneys, crime victim advocate, office manager at law office), and 18.8%
had family members who did (lawyers, police officers, probation officers, and judges).
Study Materials and Procedure
Study 5 was similar in procedure to Study 4 with some minor differences. Participants
read the same vignette about Michael Anderson hitting an elderly pedestrian with his car and then
being charged with involuntary manslaughter. The difference came in the pleas that were offered.
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In addition to the traditional plea and the Alford plea, a third condition was presented in which
the defendant rejected a traditional deal, proclaiming his innocence, only to then be offered an
Alford plea (see Appendix F for full vignette). Unlike Study 4, the defendant’s plea decision was
not a manipulated variable; he accepted the plea in every condition. As in prior studies,
participants were presented with a questionnaire and asked whether they believed that the
defendant was innocent or guilty and rated their confidence in that belief. Additional dependent
measures were identical to those previously obtained.
Attention and Manipulation Checks. To ensure participants were paying attention and
understood the stimulus material, the same series of attention and manipulation check questions
used previously were asked. The questions were as follows:
Instructional Manipulation Check. “Given that this study is examining your decisionmaking process, it is important to us that you pay attention to each instruction. In order to show
us that you are, please choose "Somewhat agree" below, and then move on to the next question.”
Manipulation Checks. Participants were asked to respond True or False to the following
question: “The plea Michael was offered required him to admit guilt and accept responsibility for
the crime.”
As a combined attention and manipulation check, participants were asked to state the
sentence offered to the defendant as part of the plea (6 months prison time). Participants who
failed two or more checks were ultimately removed from the study.
Hypotheses
H1. I hypothesized that Michael would be perceived as less guilty if he accepted an
Alford plea compared to when he accepted a traditional guilty plea, based on him maintaining his
innocence.
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H2. I further predicted that the effect described above would be particularly pronounced if
Michael initiated the Alford plea.
H3. As with studies 3 and 4, I hypothesized that Michael would receive more positive
perception ratings when he accepted an Alford plea compared to when he accepted a traditional
plea, in particular if he initiated it.
Results
The current study had an exceedingly high rate of exclusions based on the Alford
manipulation check, with 65.9% of participants in the Alford-defendant initiated condition failing
the check. The manipulation check asked participants whether or not the plea offered required the
defendant to admit guilt. It is likely this added condition, in which participants were initially
offered a traditional plea followed by an Alford plea, further increased the ambiguity of the
manipulation check question. Participants may not have understood which plea the question was
referring to, as the initial plea required the defendant to admit guilt and the Alford plea did not.
Due to the potentially added ambiguity, the results based on the sample both with and without
participants who failed the check is presented for the main analysis on guilt perceptions. The
remaining dependent measures did not result in significantly different outcomes when using the
full sample and the sample who passed the manipulation check and therefore only analyses on the
full sample are reported.
Guilt Perceptions
Overall, 50.6% of 401 participants believed the defendant was guilty. A chi-square on
perceptions of guilt showed no significant difference between the conditions, Χ2(2) = 4.22, p =
.121, Cramer’s V = .103 (see Table 41). I also conducted this main analysis on the reduced
sample of 261 once all participants who failed the manipulation check were removed
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(Traditional: n = 135, Alford: n = 79, Alford initiated by defendant: n = 47). Within this sample,
a significant effect was obtained, Χ2(2) = 15.4, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .243. When the defendant
accepted a traditional plea, 57.8% of participants believed he was guilty. When he accepted an
Alford plea, this number went down to 43% (Χ2(1) = 4.34, p = .037, Cramer’s V = .142 (OR =
1.81, 95% CI [1.03, 3.17]). When the defendant initiated the Alford plea, however, only 25.5% of
participants believed he was guilty, which was significantly lower than both the traditional plea,
Χ2(1) = 14.5, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .282, (OR = 3.99, 95% CI [1.91, 8.36]), and the standard
Alford plea, Χ2(1) = 3.90, p = .048, Cramer’s V = .176 (OR = 2.20, 95% CI [.998, 4.87]; see
Figure 5).
Then I conducted the guilt perception analysis once more with only the participants who
failed the manipulation check. Since no participants from the traditional plea condition failed the
check, this was primarily a comparison between participants in the prosecutor-initiated Alford
condition and the defendant-initiated Alford condition. A chi-square revealed no significant
differences, Χ2(1) = .102, p = .750, Cramer’s V = .027, (OR = .894, 95% CI [.449, 1.78]). The
pattern amongst those participants who failed the check was different compared to those both the
full sample and those participants who passed the manipulation check (See Table 41).
Participants in the Alford initiated by defendant condition were more likely to believe the
defendant was guilty (35.7%) compared to those in the standard Alford plea condition (20.7%)
Overall, participants were generally confident in their beliefs (M = 6.98, SD = 2.08).
Using the full sample again, I submitted confidence ratings to a one-way ANOVA with the three
plea conditions as the independent variables. No significant effects were found, F(2, 398) = .734,
p = .481, η2p = .004.
Plea Decision Perceptions
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Overall, participants were moderately likely to believe the defendant had made the right
decision (M = 6.10, SD = 2.59). A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant effects, F(2, 398) =
1.75, p = .175, η2p = .009 (see Table 42).
Imagining themselves in the same position as the defendant, 56.1% of participants said
they would have accepted the plea, 43.9% said they would have rejected it. No significant
differences were found across conditions, Χ2(2) = .090, p = .956, Cramer’s V = .015 (see Table
43).
Fairness of Plea
Participants were asked to rate how fair they believed the plea offered to the defendant
was. Overall, participants’ ratings fell above the midpoint (M = 6.13, SD = 2.61). A one-way
ANOVA revealed no significant effects, F(2, 398) = .680, p = .507, η2p = .003.
Perceptions of the Defendant
Next, participants rated their perceptions of the defendant on a number of characteristics.
The composite stigma score was not significantly influenced by plea condition, F(2, 398) = 1.07,
p = .344, η2p = .005. Likewise, the was no significant impact of plea condition of the remaining
individual trait measures (competence, intelligence, confidence, friendliness, and honesty) and
defendant blameworthiness (see Table 44 for means and statistics).
On perceptions of the defendant’s remorsefulness, a significant effect was found, F(2,
398) = 8.52, p < .001, η2p = .041, such that participants perceived the defendant as more
remorseful when he accepted a traditional plea (M = 4.11, SD = 2.1), compared to when he had
accepted an Alford plea he had initiated t(389) = -4.12, p < .001, (M = 3.64, SD = 1.03). When
the defendant accepted an Alford plea initiated by the prosecutor, participants did not rate him
differently from the other two conditions (M = 3.89, SD = .918).
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Correlations. Table 45 presents correlations among dependent measures. Compared to
Studies 3 and 4, Study 5 revealed more negative correlations with guilt perceptions. For example,
those who perceived the defendant as guilty were less likely to believe the plea offer was fair, and
less likely to report they would have made the same decision. However, remorsefulness had no
significant relationship with this variable. Perceptions of remorse was instead associated with
positive perceptions overall, similar to Study 4.
Summary
Few effects were found in Study 5. But considering only those participants who passed
the Alford manipulation check which asked participants to verify whether the plea that defendant
was offered required him to admit guilt or not, I found that when the defendant initiated an
Alford plea, he was significantly less likely to be seen as guilty compared to both a traditional
plea and a plea initiated by the prosecutor. With the full sample, I further found that participants
perceived the defendant to be the least remorseful when he initiated an Alford plea, consistent
with the findings from studies 3 and 4.
General Discussion
As Alschuler’s (2003) quote at the opening implies, the Alford plea is a controversial
practice that inspires strong feelings from legal scholars (Alschuler, 2003; Conklin, 2020). Some
scholars herald Alford as a beneficial alternative for innocent individuals, giving them both the
advantage of large plea discounts and the ability to proclaim their innocence to preserve their
reputation and positive self-regard (Ronis, 2009). Others assert that the Alford plea is coercive
and unconstitutional and often bears unknown collateral consequences (Bibas, 2003). At present,
no empirical data exist to support either side of this debate. The current set of studies represent
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the first attempts to further explore the decision-making process defendants are faced with when
offered Alford pleas, and how they are perceived by observers.
Study 1 and 2: Actors
My hypotheses for studies 1 and 2 were partially supported. Consistent with common
sense and much previous research, guilty participants were significantly more likely in both
studies to accept a plea compared to innocent participants. As would be expected in light of
research on the illusion of transparency (Gilovitch & Kavitsky, 1999), these participants were
also likely to believe their guilt would be obvious to observers.
Still, in Study 1, 22.9% of innocent participants accepted a plea, while 24.6% did so in
Study 2. These numbers are consistent with previous research (Redlich et al. 2017), as well as
data from the National Registry of Exonerations. There are scholars who argue that while the
innocence problem in plea bargaining may be real, its magnitude is much too small to warrant
any significant changes to the system (Tor et al., 2010; Gazal-Ayal & Tor, 2011). However, the
current finding adds to the literature on false guilty pleas, and supports the argument that the
innocence problem is, in fact, a real problem. Although it is difficult to discern the true number of
innocent defendants pleading guilty in the field, the fact that research such as the present studies
finds that close to 1 in 4 innocent individuals are willing to plead guilty in a hypothetical vignette
context should raise concern. This result, along with previous similar findings, suggests the
number of false guilty pleas in the field are likely much higher than the current numbers show.
Next, I predicted that the Alford plea would make innocent participants more likely to
plead. However, Study 1 revealed the opposite: innocent participants offered an Alford plea were
the least likely to plead. Perhaps the offer to maintain innocence made their innocence more
salient to them, which made the decision to reject the plea easier to make. Interestingly, I found
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opposite patterns for innocent and guilty participants with regard to the Alford plea. While a
traditional plea was more appealing to innocent defendants, the opposite was true for guilty
participants who were more likely to accept an Alford plea. This pattern could be explained by
looking at self-presentation theories, specifically strategic self-presentation (Jones & Pittman,
1982). Guilty participants, who already were more likely to accept a plea, may have found the
Alford plea more appealing due to the ability to self-present in a more positive way (i.e., by
maintaining innocence).
Participants’ responses to the open-ended questions regarding the reasons for their plea
decision revealed further indication of self-presentation at work. Across studies 1 and 2, two of
the most frequently mentioned rationales referred to participants’ guilt status. More than a third
of innocent participants stated their innocence as the rationale behind their decision, whereas
more than a third of guilty participants suggested that their guilt was the reason for their plea
decision. These finding are in line with theories on self-verification (Swann et al., 1987) as
participants seem to be concerned with presenting themselves in ways that are consistent with
their self-view, as indicated by their responses.
Some participants’ elaborations further lent support to the idea of self-verification, in
particular for innocent participants. For example, one participant stated: “I rejected the offered
deal because I knew I was innocent. If I just accepted the deal I would be seen as a liar and
cheater, which I am not.” This participant clearly stated that they do not view themselves as a liar
and cheater and that accepting a plea would be a stark contrast to that self-view. Another
participant wrote “I myself know that I was not speeding and that I am innocent. My innocence
would come through in my statement. I will stick to my guns and if I have to go to prison for
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longer at least I will know that I am innocent.” This response demonstrates how important both
innocence and others’ recognition of innocence is for the participant.
Guilty participants were more likely to cite the importance of honesty and owning up to
one’s actions. One participant asserted:” I am an honest person and would feel guilty if I lied
hoping to get less time for something I know I did not do (speeding). This response could further
demonstrate a preference for self-verification as they acknowledge the self-view that they are an
honest person and much therefore act accordingly by accepting a plea.
As predicted, innocent participants who accepted an Alford plea said they were influenced
by the opportunity to maintain their innocence (to a higher degree than did guilty participants,
though very few articulated a concern with how others would view them). In fact, only Alford
participants who were innocent and who accepted this plea cited this reason. Although only a
small portion of Alford participants elaborated on this in their open-ended responses (10 in Study
1, 15 in Study 2), the ones who did spoke of how the ability to maintain innocence made the plea
decision easier to make. As one participant put it: “Additionally, being able to leave that letter in
the file saying that although I am innocent, I am pleading guilty helped ease my mind a little on if
it was the right call.” Another participant stated:” The ability to write on my record that I'm
innocent in my intentions. This would at least make me feel better when there's a way for me to
"explain" what happened when someone looks at my record. It may not make a difference when
someone is checking my record but it gives me a certain peace of mind.”
The mentions of “ease my mind” and “peace of mind” suggest the possibility that these
participants might have felt some cognitive dissonance when faced with making a plea decision,
and that the opportunity to claim innocence via an Alford plea helped reduce this dissonance.
Although it is difficult to draw conclusions from these limited comments or discern the exact
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mechanism behind these statements, future research should make efforts to tease this apart.
Future studies could combine methodologies from the plea-bargaining literature as well as from
traditional dissonance reduction literature (e.g., Steele & Lieu, 1983).
Interestingly, participants presented with an Alford plea found the decision harder to
make and reported greater pressure to make a decision, especially if they were innocent. These
findings make sense in the light of decision-making literature that discusses the competence
hypothesis (Heath & Tversky, 1991) and ambiguity aversion (Fox & Tversky, 1995). Taken
together, this research suggests that individuals find decision making more difficult and
unpleasant when they are unfamiliar with the choices and the outcomes (Keren & Gerritsen,
1999).
Previous research has shown that the Alford plea is unknown to most laypeople (Hellgren
& Kassin, 2018). A decision about this option would therefore arguably be a decision made in a
state of uncertainty, which is further supported by Study 2 findings showing that Alford
participants were less confident in their decision than those faced with a traditional plea. The
uncertainty of an Alford plea is made especially clear in contrast to a traditional plea where the
choices are fairly clear: admit guilt or fight for your innocence. The introduction of the ability to
proclaim innocence in an Alford plea likely creates uncertainty and ambiguity, making an Alford
plea decision a more difficult choice.
An additional goal of utilizing both a vignette describing the cheating paradigm and an
actual criminal charge was to compare how the stakes of the wrongdoing described influenced
participants’ decisions. In contrast to my hypotheses, there were some differences between Study
1 and 2. Although the overall plea rate was identical across the two studies, type of plea seemed
to have little influence. In Study 2, participants rated the crime as much more severe (8.6)
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compared to Study 1 (5.2). As such, this difference in the severity of the alleged offense may
have contributed to the lack of effects. Perhaps participants’ view of the crime as more severe
made them less influenced by the small differences in what the different types of pleas offered.
An additional explanation could be the participants in Study 1, who were all college students,
were able to immerse themselves in the hypothetical to a higher extent since the cheating vignette
was more self-relevant to them than a crime vignette would be to most participants in Study 2. As
a result, they may have weighed all factors of the case and the plea offer more carefully.
Study 3 and 4: Observers
As with the first two studies, my hypotheses for Study 3 and 4 were partially supported.
Consistent with my prediction and previous research, the defendant was significantly more likely
to be seen as guilty when he accepted a plea compared to when he rejected one. This result is in
line with research on perceptions of false confessors and observers’ reliance on the fundamental
attribution error (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross, 1977). If a person takes responsibility for a
crime, be it through a confession or a guilty plea, observers assume the only reason they would
do so is actual guilt. As one would expect, perceptions of guilt were associated with more
negative overall perceptions of the defendant.
Despite this consistent result across Study 3 and 4 regarding guilt perceptions,
participants’ views of the defendant’s decision differed widely between the two studies. When
the defendant rejected a plea, participants were more likely to believe that he made the right
decision and that they would make the same decision, compared to when the defendant accepted
a plea. In contrast, Study 4 participants were more likely to report that the defendant had made
the right decision and that they would make the same decision, when he accepted a plea. This is
not an unsurprising result. Clearly, the potential consequences for the defendant in Study 3
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(academic sanctions and community service), were far less serious than the consequences in
Study 4 (a criminal record and prison time). As such, it is understandable that participants in
Study 3 would perceive both the offense and consequences as relatively minor and be more likely
to believe that the defendant should fight his case. Alternatively, participants may have been
more likely to see involuntary manslaughter as morally repugnant and something for which the
defendant should take responsibility. Even when they saw the defendant as guilty due to his plea
acceptance, participants believed he was right to accept the plea offer (Study 2). Perhaps this was
due to the nature of the crime; the involuntary manslaughter case was unsurprisingly rated as
more severe (compared to the cheating), and observers may have wanted to see the defendant
owning up to his crime by accepting guilt.
Although both Study 3 and 4 revealed a significant relationship between perceptions of
guilt and remorse, the direction of the relationship was different across the two studies. In Study
3, participants who perceived the student defendant to be innocent, also viewed him as less
remorseful. This result could be explained simply by the fact that an innocent defendant has no
wrongdoing to express remorse for. However, participants in Study 4 who believed the defendant
was innocent perceived him to be more remorseful. A possible explanation for these surprising
results is that the crime committed in Study 4 (involuntary manslaughter) led to a person’s death,
regardless of whether the defendant was culpable or not. Although this does not fully explain
why innocence was associate with lower remorse, it at least elucidates why the direction of the
relationship differed between Study 3 and 4.
Interesting differences were also found between actor and observer studies based on the
difference between the cheating and crime vignettes. As noted, Study 1 and 2 yielded identical
plea acceptance rates (51.2%) even though the consequences of acceptance varied a great deal.
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But in the observer studies, participants seemed to be more influenced by the varying severity
and consequences of the plea as described above. This discrepancy suggests that actors are less
influenced by the variation in stakes than observers, a result perhaps best explained by actorobserver differences in attribution (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Nisbett et al., 1973; Saulnier &
Perlman, 1981; for a meta-analysis indicating the limits of this phenomenon, see Malle, 2006).
Essentially, participants’ report of what personal decision they would make (actor
studies) was different from the decisions they believe others should make (observer studies);
Whereas the actors’ plea decisions were ostensibly influenced by both internal factors (such as
each individual participants’ risk tolerance) and external factors (such as the participants’
evaluation of the consequences of accepting vs. rejecting a plea), observers seemed to be of the
opinion that the defendant should only consider the “objective” risks of the consequences. This
interpretation of the results aligns with the actor-observer effect—that people are more likely to
make dispositional attributes to other’s actions but external attributes to their own actions.
In the actor studies, participants may also have been more motivated to advocate for
themselves in these hypotheticals. As a result, the severity of the crime is not as much of an
influencing factor. However, from a more detached point of view, observers were more likely to
moralize and be influenced by how the severity of the wrongdoing and the consequences should
impact the defendant’s decision making. This is further supported by the fact that when
participants judged the defendant’s plea decision to be the right decision (reject in Study 3, accept
in Study 4), they were also more likely to report that their personal plea decision would have
been the same. However, in the actor studies, I did not find these discrepancies, which suggests
that the observers’ judgement of what a defendant should do does not align with what actors
actually end up doing.
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In contrast to my predictions, the Alford plea had little to no impact on observers’ guilt
perceptions. However, consistently across the three observer studies, Alford defendants were
seen in a more negative light compared to other defendants. Several legal scholars have argued
that one of the primary benefits of an Alford plea is the ability to preserve one’s reputation and
avoid negative judgement from the public (Conklin, 2020; Ronis, 2009). However, the current
studies produced consistent results showing quite the opposite. In Study 1, Alford defendants
were rated more negatively on several personality dimensions compared to other defendants. In
addition, Alford participants were seen as less remorseful than other defendants consistently
across the observer studies suggesting that they were perceived as guilty but not taking
responsibility, an indication of lack of remorse. These findings suggest that instead of
destigmatizing defendants, the Alford plea may have exacerbated a presumption of guilt This is
an important result as the Alford plea is sometimes touted as an alternative to the traditional plea
with no additional negative consequences. While the legal consequences may be the same, the
current findings suggest that public opinion, which can have consequences down the line, are
different between Alford pleas and traditional pleas.
Beyond the consistent finding that Alford defendants are seen as less remorseful than
other defendants, Study 5 revealed few significant effects. A potential reason for this could be the
high rate of participants who failed a manipulation check aimed specifically at ensuring
participants’ understanding of the ability to maintain innocence in the two Alford conditions (this
will be discussed further below). In the condition in which the defendant initiated the Alford plea,
a large number of participants failed this check.
Considering only those participants who passed this manipulation check, the findings
were consistent with my hypothesis as defendants who initiated an Alford plea were seen as
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significantly more likely to be innocent compared to the other defendants. Although this result
was based on a smaller subsample of participants, the effect size was strong (Cramer’s V = .282).
That said, the effect size obtained represents a weak association. Furthermore, seeing as this
result went against the pattern across the other studies which further added to the difficulty in
drawing any strong conclusions, future research should utilize larger sample sizes and more
robust manipulation checks to avoid this issue.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present studies explored the Alford plea and the inferences that actors and observers
draw from it. This research is limited in important ways. In part because of changes to data
collection forced by the COVID-19 pandemic, several redesigns and compromises had to be
made. For example, the original plan was to conduct the actors study using the cheating paradigm
in a lab. Videos of these live sessions would then have provided stimulus materials for observer
studies. Instead, all five studies had to move online using a hypothetical role-playing paradigm.
As described in the introduction, hypothetical vignette studies are inherently limited due to their
lack in mundane realism. For Study 1 and 3, students were recruited in an attempt to enhance
participants’ ability to immerse themselves in the hypothetical scenario, according to the research
that shows that vignettes that are self-relevant heightens the realism of the hypothetical for
participants (Hughes, 1998). Of course, this does not fully solve the issue. Future research should
utilize laboratory studies in order to enhance “experimental realism” in which the participants
have a stake in the decisions they make (see Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968). This would enable
researchers to further examine the effect of the Alford plea on decision making. However, despite
these limitations, I found false guilty plea rates equal to those in similar studies (Redlich et al.,
2017), a fact that is both interesting and disturbing. As such, future studies should explore how
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different hypothetical vignettes with varying levels of relevancy to the participants influence false
guilty plea rates.
Another limitation of the current studies was the main manipulation check and its high
failure rate. The purpose of the manipulation check was to ensure that participants understood
what the Alford plea entailed and recognized the ability to proclaim innocence as a part of the
plea. Because so many participants failed this manipulation check, it is difficult to discern what
portion of the sample that fully understood this. One issue of this manipulation check was its
ambiguity. Participants were asked to answer a true/false question regarding whether they (in
actor studies) or the defendant (in observer studies) were required to admit guilt as a part of their
plea. As the claim of innocence manipulation was at the end of the Alford vignette following a
description similar to that of a traditional plea, perhaps participants misunderstood the question
and assumed all plea required the admission of guilt.
This possibility is further supported by the findings of a follow-up study aimed at
comparing the original manipulation check with a less ambiguous question, asking if the plea
enabled them (or the defendant in observer studies) to proclaim innocence as a part of the plea. In
this study, 59% of participants failed the original manipulation check, while only about 10%
failed the improved one.
Another potentially important explanation beyond the ambiguity of the original
manipulation check questions, is that few laypeople are aware of what the Alford plea is to begin
with. As such, some participants may simply not have registered the ability to maintain innocence
as this is not familiar to them. Participant comments illustrate this, as one participant stated “I
found it hard to believe he would get an offer where he was claiming innocence but pleading
guilty. I think the court would have a hard time accepting such a plea.” This is consistent with
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previous research which has found evidence of the Alford pleas being both unfamiliar and against
common sense (Kassin & Hellgren, 2018). Thus, it may have been the ambiguity of the Alford
plea as a concept, rather than the ambiguity of the manipulation check question, that caused the
high failure rate. As such, researchers should take great care in constructing Alford manipulations
in future studies to ensure participants fully grasp the nuances of an Alford plea.
An additional limitation is that the participant samples were predominantly
White/European American which does not represent the realities of the criminal justice system. It
is widely known that people of color are greatly overrepresented and treated differently by legal
actors compared to their White counterparts (Kutateladze et al., 2014). There is also reason to
believe that people of color would look at the hypotheticals used in the current studies differently
as they could perceive their race and/or ethnicity as an additional risk factor leading to more
severe consequences. In fact, one participant cited their ethnicity as the reason for why they
accepted a plea and avoided the risk of trial. Furthermore, previous research has shown that Black
defendants are less likely to plead compared to White defendants (Lee & Richardson, 2020), but
the question remains whether the Alford plea could influence this plea rate. Because of the
limited diversity of the current samples, the findings in the presented studies have limited
generalizability to all ethnicities and races. Future research should make efforts to remedy this
limitation by utilizing more diverse samples.
Furthermore, just as students in Study 1 and 3 may have had an easier time putting
themselves in the hypothetical vignette since it was relevant to them (due to the university
setting), it would be important and interesting to use participants who have some level of
experience with the justice system in future studies. Although I asked participants if they had
ever been arrested, the rates of people who responded in the positive were too small to conduct
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any analyses or make any meaningful inferences. Future research should make efforts to sample
participants who are both more diverse in race/ethnicity and criminal justice experience. More
diverse observers in both experience and race/ethnicity may also reveal interesting results in
future research. For example, recruiting samples of legal actors (e.g., defense attorneys, appellate
judges) would likely yield result different from the current study. Furthermore, the observers’
relationship to the observed defendant could be manipulated to further explore how the Alford
plea influences perceptions.
Finally, future research should explore the unique decision-making process that takes
place when wrongfully convicted individuals are faced with the opportunity of an Alford plea.
Prosecutors often use the Alford plea a tool in cases where a wrongfully convicted individual has
been granted re-trial and they want to avoid dismissal of the case (as in the cases of Joe Buffey
and the West Memphis Three). As can be expected, many individuals who have spent years, if
not decades incarcerated, are persuaded by the offer of a quick resolution to their case and the
promise of no more prison time. On its surface, the Alford plea can seem as a viable alternative
as these individuals can state their innocence for the record. But it is important to remember that
an Alford plea is not an exoneration and bars these individuals from, among other things,
receiving compensation from the state. In addition, based on the current findings, Alford
defendants are subject to more wide-spread stigma compared to defendants accepting traditional
pleas. Seeing as individuals who get fully exonerated still face many issues both in terms of
reintegration and support in society, as well as public opinion (Clow & Leach, 2015; Kukucka &
Evolo, 2018), the current findings give further support for the notion that an Alford plea is not a
beneficial alternative and may be best avoided.
Conclusions and Implications
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The present studies represent the first empirical exploration of the elusive Alford plea.
While the five studies presented offered some answers, there are many interesting and exciting
avenues left to explore. This project represents only the first venture, and it is my hope it will
further inspire and facilitate future empirical research on this traditionally ignored topic.
Ideally, the current findings would be widely disseminated and assist with the goal of not
only informing the public of the Alford plea and its effects on observer perceptions, but also
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys who view the Alford plea as a viable alternative way
to resolve cases. A number of law reviews have critically discussed the Alford plea but with little
consensus as to its uses and disadvantages (Bibas, 2003; Diehm, 2015; Ronis, 2009). Even the
most experienced legal actors seem to underestimate the prevalence of usage, as evidenced by a
recent podcast episode in which a highly experienced federal judge was interviewed regarding the
Alford plea (Holloway, 2020). This judge explained that the Alford plea is exceedingly rare and
was surprised to learn how often the defense attorney host regularly oversees Alford pleas in his
legal practice. The true prevalence of the Alford plea is still difficult to discern due to limited
official statistics. Efforts should be made to create a national database to aid both researchers and
legal actors in better understanding the usage and pervasiveness of this plea.
Although I did not find the Alford plea to increase the rate of innocent participants
choosing to plea as predicted, the Alford plea did seem to appeal to guilty participants. Out of the
participants offered an Alford plea, 83.3% in Study 1 and 79% in Study 2 accepted it. At first
glance, these results do not seem troubling. What harm would it do if guilty individuals get to
maintain their innocence while accepting a plea? But it is important to consider unintended
consequences, such as the risk of increased negative judgement by the public.
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Just beyond the 50th anniversary of the Alford plea, there is more we need to understand
regarding the impact of this plea on both actors and observers. Further research and a better
appreciation of Alford’s mechanisms will help both future defendants and attorneys make more
informed plea decisions.
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Table 1
Demographics (counts and percentages) across conditions (Study 1).
Guilty

Innocent

Traditional

Alford

Traditional

Alford

Female

59 (28.9)

43 (23)

58 (28.4)

57 (30.5)

Male

40 (19.6)

43 (23)

41 (20.1)

531 (16.6)

Non-binary

3 (1.5)

10 (5.3)

1 (.5)

2 (1.1)

Prefer not to say

1 (.5)

0 (0)

1 (.5)

1 (.5)

19 (9.3)

17 (9.1)

19 (9.3)

9 (4.8)

12 (5.9)

8 (4.3)

12 (5.9)

11 (5.9)

1 (.5)

0 (0)

1 (.5)

0 (0)

1 (.5)

0 (0)

1 (.5)

2 (1.1)

24 (12.8)

42 (10.7)

20 (10.7)

39 (10)

47 (25.1)

95 (24.3)

42 (22.5)

87 (22.3)

Biracial/Multiracial

0 (0)

3 (1.5)

4 (2)

7 (3.7)

Other

1 (.5)

0 (0)

0 (0)

(0)

21.8 (5.11)

22.8 (7.30)

23.2 (6.19)

22.2 (4.21)

3%

4.8%

6.9%

2.1%

Gender

Race/Ethnicity
Latinx/Hispanic
Heritage
African American/Black
Native
American/Indigenous
Middle Eastern/Arab
Asian/Asian
American/Pacific
Islander
White/European
American

Age
Mean (SD)
Arrest Record
Percentage Arrested
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Table 2
Percentage of participants accepting a plea by type of plea and guilt status (Study 1)
Guilty
Innocent
Total
Traditional
73.8%
26.7%
50.5%
Alford
83.3%
16.7%
51.9%
Total
78.2%a
22.9%a
Note. Within “Total” rows, values that share a subscript letter are significantly different (p >
.001).
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Table 3
Categories for plea decision reasoning (Study 1 and 2)
Category
1.The opportunity to maintain innocence
2. The opportunity to appear innocent to others
3. I am innocent/I am not at fault
4. I was guilty/I wanted to take responsibility for my actions
5. To avoid more severe consequences/uncertainty
6. To get the process over with
7. To avoid criminal record
8. The consequences were not too bad
9. I want to argue my case/The truth will come out at trial
10. No/not enough evidence against me
11. A lawyer will help me
12. Evidence will exonerate me
13. Too much evidence against me/no evidence of my innocence
14. Too extreme/It’s just a study
15. Other
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Table 4
Examples of reasons for plea decision (Study 1 and 2)
Category
To avoid more severe
consequences/uncertainty

Study 1
Example
“I did not want to take the chances
to get a larger
sentence/punishment. The plea
was guarantee with the
punishment while the court
hearing could go either way.”

I am innocent/I am not at
fault

“I reject the offered deal because I
did not cheat. I should not be
prosecuted for something I did not
do.”

I was guilty/I wanted to
take responsibility for my
actions

“I was guilty of cheating. The
adverse impact on the research,
which was carefully thought
through, planned, and
implemented by the researchers in
advance of the study was known
to me”
“I'm not going to endure
punishment for something I didn't
do. I am willing to go to court
because I know I'm in the right
here, there's no reason for them to
actually punish me.”

Take my case to
“trial”/The truth will
come out

For Alford conditions:
Ability to maintain
innocence.

“I chose to accept because I did
provide assistance to the other
participant despite being told not
to. I accepted the deal because I
was allowed to state on record that
I was not guilty while accepting
consequences. It seemed like a fair
middle ground.”

Study 2
Example
“My reasons to accept
the deal is because
although I am innocent 6
months in jail is better
than losing the trial and
ending up with 5 years
of jail time.”
“I didn't do anything
wrong - I was sober and
driving slow! And my
life would be ruined
spending 6 months in
jail. I would hire a good
lawyer though!”
“I would sign the offered
deal because I was being
reckless. I will feel guilt
for the rest of my life but
I'd feel guiltier if I didn't
hold myself
accountable.”
“The facts of the case
deserve to be heard and
cross examined in front
of a jury of my peers. If
I'm clearly innocent, by
my own firsthand
knowledge, then a plea
should never be
accepted. That is
tantamount to admitting
guilt for something one
did not do.”
“I’m signing to take the
deal because I want a
statement of innocence
put on my record.”
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Table 5
Participants’ reasoning behind plea decision broken down by plea decision, guilt status, and type
of plea (Study 1 and 2)
Study 1
Guilty

Innocent

Traditional

Alford

Traditional

Alford

%

%

%

%

81.6

60

60

82.4

0

3.8

7.4

5.9

48.7

55

14.8

5.9

0

5

0

35.5

0

6.3

1.4

4.1

22.2

12.5

82.4

77

I was guilty

0

25

1.4

0

Opportunity to maintain

0

0

0

0

Accept
To avoid harsher
I was innocent
I was guilty
Opportunity to maintain
innocence
Reject
To avoid harsher
I was innocent

innocence

Study 2
Guilty

Innocent

Traditional

Alford

Traditional

Alford

%

%

%

%

26.6

29.1

82.6

66.7

0

0

0

0

52.6

57.5

18.5

5.9

0

7.6

0

33.3

Accept
To avoid harsher
I was innocent
I was guilty
Opportunity to maintain
innocence
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Reject
To avoid harsher

0

0

1.3

0

12.5

19

71.8

68

I was guilty

0

25

1.4

0

Opportunity to maintain

0

0

0

0

I was innocent

innocence
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Table 6
Means and ANOVA statistics for effects of type of plea and guilt status on confidence in plea
decision ratings (Study 1 and 2)
Guilty

Innocent

M (SD)

M (SD)

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

G

.489

1

.030

.001

Study 1
Type of Plea
Traditional

7.32 (2.11)

7.46 (2.20)

T

.812

1

.445

.002

Alford

7.09 (2.26)

7.27 (2.26)

GxT

.919

1

.781

< .001

G

.888

1

.346

.002

`Study 2
Type of Plea
Traditional

7.06 (2.39)

6.76 (2.48)

T

4.389*

1

.037

.011

Alford

6.48 (2.41)

6.31 (2.59)

GxT

.426

1

.792

< .001

Note. G = guilt status. T = type of plea. *p <.05
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Table 7
Percentage of participants’ anticipated guilt (vs. innocence) perceptions by observers by type of
plea and guilt status (Study 1)
Traditional
Alford

Guilty
69.7 (23.3)
75 (23.3)

Innocent
41.1 (24.1)
41 (23.5)

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
97
Table 8
Means and ANOVA statistics for anticipated guilt perceptions by observers by type of plea and
guilt status, split between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea
(Study 1)
Guilty

Innocent

M (SD)

M (SD)

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

G

34.807*

1

< .001

.151

T

1.232

1

.268

.006

GxT

.001

1

.977

< .001

G

23.199*

1

< .001

.110

T

.050

1

.824

< .001

GxT

.016

1

.900

< .001

Accept
Type of Plea
Traditional

74.34 (20.02)

52.22
(24.23)

Alford

78.38 (21.39)

56.47
(22.34)

Reject
Type of
Plea
Traditional

56.67 (27.18)

37.03
(22.86)

Alford

58.13 (25.09)

37.43
(22.46)

Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .001
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Table 9
Means (and standard deviations) for post-plea state of mind measures (Study 1)
Guilty

Innocent

Traditional

Alford

Traditional

Alford

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Difficulty

5.11 (2.67)

5.04 (2.53)

4.80 (2.77)

5.81 (2.79)

Satisfaction

6.17 (2.26)

5.75 (2.49)

6.42 (3.06)

6.43 (2.62)

Pressure

7.28 (2.78)

7.83 (2.25)

6.56 (2.98)

7.43 (2.67)
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Table 10
Means and ANOVA statistics for decision difficulty by type of plea and guilt status, split between
participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 1)
Guilty

Innocent

M (SD)

M (SD)

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

G

17.340*

1

< .001

.081

Accept
Type of Plea
Traditional

5.00 (2.53)

6.30 (1.98)

T

.731

1

.394

.004

Alford

4.90 (2.43)

7.12 (2.47)

GxT

1.192

1

.276

.006

G

1.868

1

.173

.010

Reject
Type of
Plea
Traditional

5.41 (3.08)

4.26 (2.82)

T

2.484

1

.117

.013

Alford

5.75 (2.91)

5.51 (2.79)

GxT

.811

1

.369

.004

Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .001
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Table 11
Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects of type of plea and guilt status on
satisfaction ratings (Study 1)
Guilty

Innocent

M (SD)

M (SD)

Type of Plea
Traditional

6.17 (2.26)

6.42

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

G

2.984

1

.085

.008

T

.604

1

.437

.002

GxT

.615

1

.434

.002

(3.06)
Alford

5.75 (2.49)

6.42
(2.62)

Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea.
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Table 12
Means and ANOVA statistics for decision satisfaction by type of plea and guilt status, split
between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 1)
Guilty

Innocent

M (SD)

M (SD)

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

G

5.157*

1

.024

.026

Accept
Type of Plea
Traditional

6.30 (2.26)

4.89 (2.94)

T

.781

1

.378

.004

Alford

5.49 (2.49)

4.94 (2.59)

GxT

1.01

1

.316

.005

G

.930

1

.343

.005

Reject
Type of Plea
Traditional

5.78 (2.26)

6.97 (2.93)

T

1.302

1

.255

.007

Alford

7.06 (2.14)

6.76 (2.53)

GxT

2.570

1

.111

.014

Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .05
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Table 13
Means and ANOVA statistics for decision pressure by type of plea and guilt status, split between
participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 1)
Guilty

Innocent

M (SD)

M (SD)

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

G

.133

1

.716

.001

Accept
Type of Plea
Traditional

7.51 (2.72)

6.85 (2.78)

T

3.481

1

.064

.017

Alford

7.84 (2.24)

8.18 (2.58)

GxT

1.281

1

.259

.006

G

3.849

1

.051

.003

Reject
Type of Plea
Traditional

6.63 (2.88)

6.46 (3.06)

T

.517

1

.473

.020

Alford

7.81 (2.37)

7.26 (2.67)

GxT

.146

1

703

.001

Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .051
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Table 14
Means and ANOVA statistics for effects on case evaluation measures (Study 1)
Guilty

Innocent

Trad.

Alford

Trad.

Alford

M (SD)

M

M (SD)

M

(SD)
Crime

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

(SD)

4.74

4.79

5.44

5.79

G

8.164*

1

.005

.021

(3.01)

(2.65)

(2.98)

(2.96)

T

.475

1

.491

.001

GxT

.258

1

.612

.001

Severity

Strength of
Evidence

Likelihood

5.25

6.20

3.12

3.58

G

106.01*

1

<.001 .215

(2.46)

(2.29)

(2.16)

(2.16)

T

9.33

1

.002

.024

GxT

1.09

1

.297

.003

59.4

71.2

42.2

44.7

G

58.83*

1

<.001 .132

(30.6)

(21.9)

(34.9)

(25.7)

T

5.21

1

.023

.013

GxT

3.09

1

.080

.008

of
Conviction

Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .05
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Table 15
Means and ANOVA statistics for consequences of plea decision (Study 1)
Guilty

Innocent

Trad.

Alford

Trad.

Alford

M (SD)

M

M (SD)

M

(SD)
Consequences
of rejecting

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

(SD)

7.90

7.48

5.17

6.04

G

58.36*

1

<.001

.131

(2.39)

(2.56)

(3.11)

(2.66)

T

.658

1

.408

.002

GxT

5.667*

1

.018

.011

plea

Consequences
of accepting

6.25

6.78

5.31

5.91

G

11.452*

1

<.001

.029

(2.63)

(2.51)

(2.83)

(2.60)

T

4.473*

1

.035

.024

GxT

.023

1

.887

<.001

plea

Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .001

.215**
-.122*
-.027
-.524**
-.574**
-.482**
-.157**
.169*

5. Decision Satisfaction

6. Decision Pressure

7. Crime Severity

8. Strength of Evidence

9. Likelihood of Conviction

10. Cons. of Rejecting Plea

11. Cons. of Accepting Plea

12. Influence of Alfordb

.025

3

4

5

.503**

.017
.038

.03

-.025

.105*

7

.100* .205**

.057

6

8

9

-.14

-.031

-.236** .283** -.075

.167** .167** .024

.104

.123*

10

-.13

.105

.190** .197** .276**
.179* -.222**

-.027

-.106* .508** .185** -.176** .272** .197** .471**
*
-.158** .345** .225** -.165** .326** -.052 .280** .300**

.021

.06

-.262** .199** .432** -.250**

.500** -.107* -.399**

-.503**

-.059

2

Note. a = Spearman’ s Rank Correlation was used for Plea Decision variable. * p < .05. ** p < .001. N = 391. b = N = 187.

.051

. -534**

.145*

4. Decision Difficulty

3. Anticipated Guilt Perceptions

2. Decision Confidence

1. Plea Decisiona

1

Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 1)

Table 16

.04

11
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Table 17
Percentages of participants accepting a plea by type of plea and guilt status (Study 2)
Guilty
Innocent
Total
Traditional
76.7%
22.8%
50%
Alford
79%
26.5%
50%
Total
77.8%a
24.6%a
Note. Within “Total” rows, values that share a subscript letter are significantly different (p >
.001).
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Table 18
Percentage of participants’ anticipated guilt perceptions by observers by type of plea and guilt
status (Study 2)
Traditional
Alford

Guilty
74.2 (22.1)
70.5 (21.7)

Innocent
47.6 (25.1)
45.5 (23.8)
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Table 19
Means and ANOVA statistics for anticipated guilt perceptions by observers by type of plea and
guilt status, split between participants who accepted a plea and participants who rejected a plea
(Study 2)
Guilty

Innocent

M (SD)

M (SD)

p

η2p

Effect

F

df

G

17.531*

1

.151

T

2.078

1

.010

GxT

1.349

1

.007

G

5.667*

1

.018

.028

T

.080

1

.777

< .001

GxT

1.842

1

.176

.009

Accept
Type of Plea
Traditional

82.91 (13.60)

67.83
(22.55)

Alford

75.57 (18.03)

67.04
(19.96)

Reject
Type of Plea
Traditional

45.42 (20.21)

41.67
(22.70)

Alford

51.43 (23.93)

37.73
(20.04)

Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .05
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Table 20
Means (and standard deviations) for post-plea state of mind measures (Study 2)
Guilty

Innocent

Traditional

Alford

Traditional

Alford

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Difficulty

6.43 (3.01)

6.63 (3.05)

7.11 (3.04)

7.12 (2.72)

Satisfaction

6.05 (2.65)

5.72 (2.45)

5.69 (2.96)

5.52 (2.67)

Pressure

7.23 (2.81)

7.74 (2.44)

6.62 (2.82)

7.31 (2.65)

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
110
Table 21
Means and ANOVA statistics for decision difficulty by type of plea and guilt status, split between
participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 2)
Guilty

Innocent

M (SD)

M (SD)

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

G

10.215*

1

.002

.048

Accept
Type of Plea
Traditional

6.16 (3.03)

8.48 (2.33)

T

1.126

1

.290

.005

Alford

6.44 (3.08)

7.19 (2.67)

GxT

2.702

1

.102

.013

G

.690

1

.407

.004

Reject
Type of Plea
Traditional

7.29 (2.82)

6.71 (3.12)

T

.187

1

.666

.001

Alford

7.33 (2.92)

7.09 (2.75)

GxT

.121

1

.728

.001

Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .01
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Table 22
Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects of type of plea and guilt status on
satisfaction ratings (Study 2)
Guilty

Innocent

M (SD)

M (SD)

Type of Plea
Traditional

6.05 (2.65)

5.69

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

G

1.085

1

.298

.003

T

.885

1

.348

.002

GxT

.610

1

.772

< .001

(2.96)
Alford

5.72 (2.45)

5.52
(2.67)

Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea
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Table 23
Means and ANOVA statistics for decision satisfaction by type of plea and guilt status, split
between participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 2)
Guilty

Innocent

M (SD)

M (SD)

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

G

40.179*

1

<. 001

.165

Accept
Type of Plea
Traditional

6.24 (2.68)

3.52 (2.04)

T

.511

1

.476

.002

Alford

5.81 (2.50)

3.37 (2.31)

GxT

.118

1

.732

.001

G

4.313*

1

.039

.022

Reject
Type of Plea
Traditional

5.42 (2.50)

6.33 (2.89)

T

.007

1

.932

< .001

Alford

5.38 (2.29)

6.29 (2.36)

GxT

.000

1

.996

< .001

Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .05
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Table 24
Means and ANOVA statistics for decision pressure by type of plea and guilt status, split between
participants who accepted a plea and participant who rejected a plea (Study 2)
Guilty

Innocent

M (SD)

M (SD)

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

G

9.825*

1

.002

.046

Accept
Type of Plea
Traditional

7.77 (2.77)

8.65 (2.23)

T

.722

1

.722

.001

Alford

7.20 (2.75)

8.93 (1.11)

GxT

1.031

1

.311

.005

G

.465

1

.496

.002

Reject
Type of Plea
Traditional

7.92 (2.41)

7.81 (2.56)

T

.320

1

.573

.002

Alford

7.86 (2.49)

7.39 (2.47)

GxT

.7181

1

.671

.001

Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .01

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
114
Table 25
Means and ANOVA statistics for case evaluation measures (Study 2)
Guilty
Innocent
Trad.

Alford

Trad.

Alford

M (SD)

M

M (SD)

M

(SD)
Crime

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

(SD)

8.61

8.39

8.66

8.71

G

1.005

1

.317

.004

(1.91)

(1.72)

(1.76)

(1.98)

T

.239

1

.626

.004

GxT

.519

1

.472

.001

Severity

Strength of
Evidence

Likelihood of
Conviction

6.56

6.36

3.25

2.75

G

219.43*

1

<.001

.353

(2.63)

(2.46)

(2.38)

(1.90)

T

2.274

1

.132

.006

GxT

.409

1

.523

.001

70.4

70.2

42.1

44.9

G

105.93*

1

<.001

.209

(24.1)

(22.2)

(29.1)

(25.1)

T

.0127

1

.910

<.001

GxT

.827

1

.827

<.001

Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .001
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Table 26
Means and ANOVA statistics for consequences of plea decision (Study 2)
Guilty

Innocent

Trad.

Alford

Trad.

Alford

M (SD)

M

M (SD)

M

(SD)

F

df

p

η2p

G

9.06*

1

.003

.022

(SD)

Consequences
of rejecting

Effect

7.94

8.04

7.24

7.23

T

.029

1

.865

<.001

(2.59)

(2.51)

(2.80)

(2.55)

GxT

.048

1

.827

<.001

G

17.561*

1

<.001

.042

plea

Consequences
of accepting

7.93

7.88

5.83

6.95

T

.093

1

.890

<.001

(2.17)

(2.37)

(2.71)

(2.48)

GxT

.125

1

.724

<.001

plea

Note. G = guilt status, T = type of plea. *p < .001

.024

.180*

-.138

.183*

-.006

9

10

.04

11

.145* .242** .225**

.249** .378** .679**

.229** .386**

.690**

8

Note. a = Spearman’ s Rank Correlation was used for Plea Decision variable. * p < .05. ** p < .001. N = 406. b = N = 202

-.127

-.129

12. Influence of Alfordb

.049

-.353** .207** .325** .254** -.212** .330** .076

.048

11. Cons. of Accepting Plea

-.017

.106*

-.163* .100*

.004

.044

7

-.436** -.224** .316* .282** -.267** .348** .053

.063

.638* -.113*

.058

6

10. Cons. of Rejecting Plea

.108*

.063

.073 .515** -.379**

5

-.755** -.136** .743** .033

.052

7. Crime Severity

-.326**

-.119* -.516**

4

9. Likelihood of Conviction

.053

6. Decision Pressure

.540*

.027

3

-.626**

.138**

5. Decision Satisfaction

-.598**

-.013

2

8. Strength of Evidence

.057

-.660**

.044

4. Decision Difficulty

3. Anticipated Guilt Perceptions

2. Decision Confidence

1. Plea Decisiona

1

Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 2)

Table 27
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Table 28
Percentage of participants believing defendant was guilty by type of plea and plea decision
(Study 3).
Accept
Reject
Total
Traditional
43.3%
12.1%
27%
Alford
42.5%
14.9%
29%
Total
42.9%a
13.4%a
Note. Within “Total” rows, values that share a subscript letter are significantly different (p >
.001).
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Table 29
Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects of confidence in guilt perception ratings
(Study 3 and 4)
Study 3
Accept

Reject

M (SD)

M (SD)

Type of Plea
Traditional

7.04 (1.87)

7.09

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

P

1.29

1

.257

.003

T

2.20

1

.138

.005

PxT

1.48

1

.225

.004

P

.001

1

.974

< .001

T

.810

1

.810

< .001

PxT

.632

1

.637

.001

(1.88)
Alford

6.58 (2.22)

7.11
(1.85)

Study 4
Type of Plea
Traditional

7.04 (1.82)

6.90
(1.87)

Alford

6.94 (2.13)

6.99
(2.10)

Note. P = plea decision, T = type of plea.
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Table 30
Means and ANOVA statistics for plea decision perception measures (Study 3)
Accept

Reject

Trad.

Alford

Trad.

Alford

M (SD)

M

M (SD)

M

(SD)
Right Plea
Decision

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

(SD)

5.22

5.50

7.38

5.60

P

56.549*

1

<.001

.122

(2.85)

(2.69)

(2.17)

(2.13)

T

.034

1

.854

<
.001

Same Plea
Decision

Fairness

PxT

1.80

1

.180

.004

5.00

5.45

7.75

7.75

P

80.48*

1

<.001

.165

(2.90)

(2.93)

(2.22)

(2.45)

T

.024

1

.876

<.001

PxT

2.51

1

.114

.006

5.10

4.87

4.60

4.38

Pa

3.759

1

.053

.009

(2.93)

(2.69)

(2.43)

(2.35)

T

.791

1

.375

.002

PxT

.979

1

.979

<.001

of
Plea

Note. Subscript represents a borderline significant result, p = .053. P = plea decision, T = type of
plea. *p < .05
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Table 31
Percentage of participants reporting they would personally reject (vs. accept) by type of plea and
plea decision (Study 3)
Accept
Reject
Total
Traditional
66%
78.5%
72.5%
Alford
78.5%
76.2%
67.1%
Total
62.1%a
77.4%a
Note. Within “Total” rows, values that share a subscript letter are significantly different (p >
.001).
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Table 32
Means and ANOVA statistics for perceptions of the defendant ratings (Study 3)
Accept

Reject

Trad.

Alford

Trad.

Alford

M (SD)

M

M (SD)

M

(SD)

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

(SD)

Composite

10.45

9.93

12.24

11.79

P

62.196*

1

<.001

.133

Score

(2.50)

(2.47)

(2.16)

(2.22)

T

4.404*

1

.036

.011

PxT

1.932

1

.882

.005

Competence

Intelligence

Confidence

Friendliness

Honesty

3.60

3.54

4.05

3.81

P*

14.584*

1

<.001

.035

(.947)

(.917)

(.829)

(.868)

T

3.887*

1

.049

.009

PxT

.490

1

.484

.001

3.64

3.52

3.99

3.87

P

16.21*

1

<.001

.038

(.949)

(.897)

(.852)

(.845)

T

1.88

1

.171

.005

PxT

.000

1

.996

<.001

3.16

2.88

4.21

4.11

P

133.4*

1

<.001

.247

(1.12)

(1.13)

(.833)

(.871)

Ta

3.82

1

.051

.009

PxT

.941

1

.332

.002

3.70

3.48

3.69

3.58

P

.381

1

.538

.001

(.779)

(.759)

(.806)

(.725)

T

4.657*

1

.032

.011

PxT

.459

1

.459

.001

3.58

3.19

3.73

3.78

P

14.93*

1

<.001

.023

(1.01)

(.977)

(.967)

(.955)

T

3.03

1

.083

.007

PxT

5.25*

1

.022

.035

Note. Subscript denotates borderline significant effect (p = .051). P = plea decision, T = type of
plea. * < .05.
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Table 33
Means and ANOVA statistics for measures of student defendant remorsefulness and
blameworthiness (Study 3)
Accept

Remorsefulness

Blameworthiness

Reject

Trad.

Alford

Trad.

Alford

M

M

M

M

(SD)

(SD)

(SD)

(SD)

3.40

3.15

2.76

(.399)

(.826)

(1.04)

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

2.67

P

40.26*

1

<.001

.090

(.896)

Ta

3.582

1

.059

.009

PxT

.895

1

.345

.002

4.72

4.60

3.93

3.71

P

10.774*

1

.001

.026

(3.01)

(2.56)

(2.32)

(2.45)

T

.507

1

.507

.001

PxT

.839

1

.839

<.001

Note. Subscript denotates borderline significant effect (p = .059). P = plea decision, T = type of
plea. * < .05.

.464** .073

4. Personal Plea Deca
-.085

3

4

.276** .237** .335** .145* .271** -.129** .478** .561** .463** .584** .418**
-.147** -.078
-.598** -.115*

12. Honesty

13. Remorsefulness

14. Blameworthiness

.054

-.011

.474**

.003

.029

-.116* -.036 .146*

0.05

12

13

.614** -.206** -.159** -.025 -.143** .025 -.256** .156**

.02

.395** .524** 323** .477**

-.143** .851** .868** .838**

.512** .551**

Note. a = Spearman’ s Rank Correlation was used for dichotomous variables. * p < .05. ** p < .001. N = 411.

.095

-.091 -.165** -.098* .145**

.069

-.046 .260** .119*

11. Friendliness
-.032

.280** .232** .350** .138* .371**

-.025

-.159** .719**

10. Composite Stigma

.064

-.027

.224** .184** .432** 0.081 .428**

11

9. Confidence

10

.256** .224* .224** .127* .259**

9

8. Intelligence

8

.262** .187* .200** .140** .232**

.206**

7

7. Competence
-.083

6

-.453** -.079 .194** -.474** .103*

5

6. Fairness of Plea

.034 .260** .784** -.055

-.048 .241**

3. Right Decision

5. Same Decision

.063

2

2. Guilt Perception
Confidence

1. Guilt Perceptiona

1

Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 3)

Table 34
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Table 35
Percentage of participants believing defendant was guilty by type of plea and plea decision
(Study 4)
Accept
Reject
Total
Traditional
58.4%
39%
48.1%
Alford
53.4%
39.4%
46.5%
Total
55.7%a
39.2%a
Note. Within “Total” rows, values that share a subscript letter are significantly different (p >
.001).
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Table 36
Means and ANOVA statistics for plea decision perception ratings (Study 4)
Accept

Reject

Trad.

Alford

Trad.

Alford

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

(SD)
Right Plea
Decision

Same Plea
Decision

Fairness of
Plea

6.16

6.57

5.76

5.60

P

7.252*

1

.007

.007

(2.43)

(2.43)

(2.59)

(2.61)

T

.243

1

.622

.001

PxT

1.29

1

.257

.003

6.47

6.63

5.91

6.14

Pa

26.940

1

.056

.009

(2.54)

(2.68)

(2.83)

(2.77)

T

.507

1

.477

.001

PxT

.895

1

.895

< .001

6.30

6.14

5.96

6.22

P

.484

1

.487

.009

(2.18)

(2.93)

(2.72)

(2.50)

T

.001

1

.975

.001

PxT

.363

1

.547

.001

Note. Subscription represents a borderline significant result, p = .056. G = guilt status, T = type
of plea. *p < .05
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Table 37
Percentage of participants reporting they would personally accept (vs. reject) by type of plea and
plea decision (Study 4)
Accept
Reject
Total
Traditional
66.3%
42%
53.4%
Alford
66%
47.5%
56.9%
Total
66.1%a
22.6%a
Note. Within “Total” rows, values that share a subscript letter are significantly different (p >
.001).
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Table 38
Means and ANOVA statistics for perceptions of the defendant ratings (Study 4)
Accept

Composite

Competence

Intelligence

Confidence

Friendliness

Honesty

Reject

Trad.

Alford

Trad.

Alford

M

M

M

M

(SD)

(SD)

(SD)

(SD)

11.1

11

11.8

(2.35)

(2.43)

(2.21)

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

11.9

P

10.307*

1

.001

.026

(2.24)

T

.008

1

.929

< .001

PxT

.806

1

.806

< .001

3.90

3.81

3.94

3.89

P

.399

1

.528

.001

(.93)

(.97)

(1.03)

(.94)

T

.539

1

.463

.001

PxT

.831

1

.831

< .001

3.82

3.84

3.85

3.85

P

.813

1

.813

< .001

(.912)

(.872)

(.957)

(.904)

T

.858

1

.858

< .001

PxT

.932

1

.932

< .001

3.34

3.37

3.96

4.08

P

51.05*

1

<.001

.117

(.988)

(1.07)

(.803)

(.804)

T

.668

1

.414

.002

PxT

.668

1

.643

.001

3.76

3.77

3.97

3.86

P

3.09

1

.079

.001

(.779)

(.759)

(.806)

(.725)

T

.412

1

.521

.008

PxT

.485

1

.499

.001

4.15

4.14

3.87

3.82

P

9.22*

1

.003

.023

(.847)

(.940)

(1.05)

(.937)

T

.073

1

.788

<.001

PxT

.027

1

.870

<.001

Note. P = plea decision, T = type of plea. * < .05.
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Table 39
Means and ANOVA statistics for defendant remorsefulness and blameworthiness (Study 4)
Accept

Reject

Trad.

Alford

Trad.

Alford

M (SD)

M

M (SD)

M

(SD)
Remorsefulness

Blameworthiness

Effect

F

df

p

η2p

(SD)

4.13

3.83

3.47

3.27

P

36.598*

1

<.001

.086

(.828)

(.933)

(1.12)

(1.05)

T

6.345*

1

.012

.016

PxT

.577

1

.577

.001

6.13

5.57

5.58

5.68

P

.905

1

.342

.086

(2.23)

(2.26)

(2.31)

(2.22)

T

.964

1

.327

.002

PxT

1.932

1

.165

.005

Note. P = plea decision, T = type of plea. *p < .001

.179** .100* .298** .111** .294** -.179** .551** .616** .274** .583** .515**
.133* .114* .230*
-.625** .005

13. Remorsefulness

14. Blameworthiness

.222** -.199** .427** .452** .118** .402* .434** .664**

12

13

Note. a = Spearman’ s Rank Correlation was used for dichotomous variables. * p < .05. ** p < .001. N = 391

.011 -.479** -.014 .523** -.283** -.301** -.058 -.259** -.213** -.315** -.243**

.098

.366* .440**

-.041 .504** .559** .477** .626**

.029

12. Honesty

.139*

.129*

.105* .148** .136** .126*

.035

11. Friendliness

.086

.170** .175** .199** .152** .215** -.088 .845** .869** .742**

.151*

10. Composite Stigma

11

.031

10

9. Confidence

9

.198** .151** .262** .154** .242** -.122** .712**

8

8. Intelligence

7

.181** .129* .146** .160** .160** -.127*

6

7. Competence

.008

-.007 -.520** .022

.011 .208** .727**

5. Same Decision

5

-.507** -.003

.606** .111*

4. Personal Plea Dec.

4

6. Fairness of Plea

.041

3. Right Decision
.045

3

.081
.163*

2

2. Guilt Perception
Confidence

1. Guilt Perceptiona

1

Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 4)

Table 40
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Table 41
Percentage of participants believing defendant was guilty by plea condition (Study 5).
With full sample

With only those who
passed
57.8%a
43%a
25.5%a

With only those who
failed
0%
20.7%
35.7%

Traditional
57.8%
Alford
47.7%
Alford initiated by
46.3%
defendant
Note. Values that share a subscript letter are significantly different (p > .05).
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Table 42
Means and ANOVA statistics for nonsignificant effects on plea decision perception ratings (Study
5).
Traditional

Alford

Alford
initiated by
defendant

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

F

df

p

η2p

Right Plea Decision

6.12 (2.60)

5.80 (2.62)

6.39 (2.52)

1.75

1

.175

.009

Same Plea Decision

6.35 (2.73)

6.02 (2.69)

6.54 (2.66)

1.24

1

.291

.006

Fairness of Plea

6.35 (2.61)

6.04 (2.58)

6.01 (2.66)

.680

1

.507

.003
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Table 43
Counts and percentage of participants who would personally accept a plea, by plea condition
(Study 5)
Type of Plea
Traditional
Alford
Alford initiated by defendant

Count (%)
77 (57%)
74 (56.1%)
74 (55.2%)
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Table 44
Means and ANOVA statistics for effects on perceptions of the defendant ratings (Study 5)

Composite Score

Competence

Intelligence

Confidence

Friendliness

Honesty

Remorsefulness

Blameworthiness

Traditional

Alford

Alford*

F

df

p

η2p

10.96 (2.1)

10.98

11.32

1.071

2

.344

.005

(2.2)

(2.46)

3.89

4.01

1.26

2

.258

.006

(.893)

(.901)

3.85

3.96

.824

2

.440

.004

(.842)

(.905)

3.23

3.24

.385

2

.680

.002

(.987)

(1.11)

3.91

3.90

.754

2

.471

.004

(.805)

(.980)

4.07

3.95

1.36

2

.259

.007

(.840)

(.912)

3.89

3.64

8.52*

2

<.001

.041

(.918)

(1.03)

5.59

5.49

.920

2

.406

005

(2.41)

(2.36)

3.85 (.921)

3.84 (.818)

3.27 (.958)

3.79 (.907)

4.11 (.769)

4.11 (.843)

5.87 (2.49)

Note. *Alford initiated by defendant. ** p< .001.

.015 .720**

-.53** .115* .524** -.432** .417** .488** -.185** -.08

14. Blameworthiness

0

-.034

.021

.065

11

12

.093

13

-.062 -.149* -.099* -.02

.034 .256** .294** .083 .251** .384** .449**

.016 .424** .489** .283** .481** .537**

Note. a = Spearman’ s Rank Correlation was used for dichotomous variables. * p < .05. ** p < .001. N = 401

.117*

-.034

-.034

10

-.074 .494** .551** .328** .553**

13. Remorsefulness

.084

9

.031 .829** 867** .759**

.052 .212**

.009

.105*

12. Honesty

.045

-.095

.120* .156** -.026

.104*

11. Friendliness

.096

.063

8

.237** -.236** .226** .140* .350** .447**

-.043

7

.011

-.176** .051

0.07

-.095

6

10. Composite Stigma Score

9. Confidence

.118*

.053

8. Intelligence

-.05

.178** .072

7. Competence
.074

-.461** .125* .615** -.413** .464**

6. Fairness of Plea
-.072

-.454** .170** .783** -.752**

5. Same Decision

5

.534** -.104* -.665**

4

4. Personal Plea Decisiona

3

-.533** .211**

2

3. Right Decision

2. Guilt Perception Confidence -.030

1. Guilt Perceptiona

1

Correlation matrix for all dependent variables (Study 5)

Table 45
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Figure 1
Interaction effect of type of plea and guilt status on percentages of accepted plea (Study 1)
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Figure 2
Interaction effect of type of plea and guilt status on participants’ rating of the difficulty to make a
plea decision (Study 1)

Difficulty to make plea decision
10
9

Decision Difficulty

8
7
6
Guilty

5

Innocent

4
3
2
1
0
Traditional

Alford

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
137
Figure 3
Interaction effect of type of plea and guilt status on the degree to which consequences of rejecting
the plea influenced participants’ plea decision (Study 1)
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Figure 4
Interaction effect of type of plea and plea decision on defendant honesty ratings (Study 3)
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Figure 5
Percentages of guilty perceptions by plea condition (smaller sample) (Study 5)
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Appendix A
Questions Study 1 & 2
1. Imagine yourself in this situation. Would you sign the guilty plea offered by the
[experimenter/prosecutor]? (circle one)

Yes

No

2. How confident are you in this decision to accept or reject the plea offer?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Very

3. How long was the sentence in the final deal you were offered by the experimenter (in months)?
________________________________________________________________
4. Please state the reasons for your decision to sign or reject the offered deal.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

5. Did you cheat on the experimental task by helping the other student?

Yes

No

6. The plea I was offered required that I admit guilt and take responsibility for the cheating.

True

False

I don’t know

7. Given that this study is examining your decision-making process, it is important to us that you
pay attention to each instruction. In order to show us that you are, please choose "Somewhat
agree" below, and then move on to the next question.
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Strongly
agree

Somewhat
agree

Agree

Neither agree Somewhat
nor disagree disagree

Strongly
disagree

Disagree

8. Out of 100 outside observers who watch the [experimenter’s accusation/ police and
prosecutor’s accusation] + your decision to accept or reject the plea offer, how many would
believe that you [cheated/are guilty]? (circle one)
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

9

10

9. How difficult would be this decision to accept or reject the plea offer?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

A lot

10. How satisfied would you be with this decision to accept or reject the plea offer?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

A lot

9

10

A lot

11. How much pressure would you have felt to accept the plea offer?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

12. In your opinion, how serious was the wrongdoing (the cheating/involuntary manslaughter)
you were accused of?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Very

13. In your opinion, how strong was the evidence that you cheated in this experiment?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Very

14. As far as you can tell, if you were to appear before the Academic Integrity Board, what is the
likelihood you would be found guilty of cheating?
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

15. To what extent was your decision influenced by what would happen if you rejected the plea
offer (being tried by the academic integrity board)?
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Not at all
great extent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

To a

16. To what extent was your decision influenced by what would happen if you accepted the plea
offer (the hours of community service)?
Not at all
great extent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

To a

17. To what extent was your decision to accept the plea offer influenced by the opportunity to
state for the record that you were innocent? (only in Alford plea condition)
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

A lot
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Appendix B
STUDY 2 - Vignette
I. SET UP
It’s summer and you are invited to an early dinner with two friends from college at their house.
You haven’t seen them for several months, and you are excited to spend some time with them.

You get into your car to drive over and arrive early in the evening. Your friends have prepared a
great meal, from appetizers to dessert, and you have a fun night together catching up, with great
conversations and games.

You have to get up early the next morning, so you don’t drink any alcohol and you make it a point
to leave before it’s totally dark out.
After agreeing to meet up again soon, you say your goodbyes, get into your car, and drive off.
II. THE “CRIME”
You are tired and eager to get home. As you turn right on a sharp corner you feel a loud thump.
immediately you get out of the car and see that you have hit an old man. He is sprawled on the
street and unconscious.
A. GUILTY
Imagine yourself in that situation. You were driving a lot faster than the speed limit—and you knew
it. If you had been driving slower, you may well have seen the pedestrian and avoided hitting him.
OR
B. INNOCENT
Imagine yourself in that situation. You were driving at or below the speed limit—and you knew it.
You did nothing wrong. But the pedestrian appeared out of nowhere, so you had no chance to stop
and avoid hitting him.
You call 911 and within five minutes the police and an ambulance arrive at the scene. The
ambulance takes the man to the hospital. At this point, the police ask if you would be willing to go
with them to the station: “We just want to get a statement from you.” You agree and they put you
in the back of the patrol car.

III. ACCUSATION
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Once you arrive, you are left alone in an interview room for fifteen minutes. At that point, a police
officer returns and says:
“We were just informed that the man you hit died on his way to the hospital. The medical examiner
tells us that his injuries were caused by a high-impact collision.
It is clear to us that you were speeding if not worse. This is a serious matter. We spoke to the
prosecutor. She is planning to charge you with involuntary manslaughter.
The law defines involuntary manslaughter as the unintended killing of a person by acting in a
reckless or negligent manner. This crime carries a sentence of up to five years in prison.
This means you will go to trial. If the prosecution convinces the jury that you were careless or
reckless, you will be found guilty and sentenced for up to five years in prison. If the prosecution
fails to convince the jury, you walk free.”

IV. PLEA OFFER
Free on bail, you call a public defender to advise you. He comes back and reports that “The
prosecutor has offered you a deal: She will reduce your total sentence if you plead guilty to the
offense of involuntary manslaughter.” You hesitate and shake your head. At this point, your
attorney contacts the prosecutor again, who offers this alternative and final offer:
A. GUILTY PLEA
“If you plead guilty,” you will be required to 6 months in a county prison. You will not need to go
to trial. The guilty plea will go on your record but once you’ve served the time, you’re done.
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” you will be charged with involuntary manslaughter and tried
within the next several weeks. If you are found guilty, the judge will determine what larger
punishment is appropriate (3-5 years in prison). If you are acquitted, you walk free.
OR
B. ALFORD PLEA
“If you plead guilty,” you will be required to serve 6 months in a county prison. You will not need
to go to trial. The guilty plea will go on your record but once you’ve served the time, you’re done.
Then he adds: “The prosecutor has agreed that you could also handwrite on the agreement that
while you accept the plea and its terms, you are, in fact, innocent—not careless, reckless, or
otherwise impaired. You would still serve the 6 months in prison, but the statement of your
innocence would also go on your record.”
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” you will be charged with involuntary manslaughter and tried
within the next several weeks. If you are found guilty, the judge will determine what larger
punishment is appropriate (3-5 years). If you are acquitted, you walk free.
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Appendix C
STUDY 3 - Vignette
I. SET UP
Michael Anderson attends a public university and has signed up for a study, for course credit, titled
“Individual and Group Problem Solving.”
He schedules an appointment and when he arrives at the waiting area of a psychology laboratory,
he is met by a female experimenter and a fellow student, someone he doesn’t know.
Michael and the other student are taken to a room inside, furnished with two tables and two chairs,
and the experimenter explains that they will complete a series of questions modeled after the TV
show Family Feud. They will be asked to answer some questions individually, some as a team. For
the joint task, Michael and the other student are told to work together and discuss the categories;
for the individual part, they are told to not talk to each other and solve the task on their own.
The study seems straightforward. The experimenter hands Michael and the other student each an
“individual” question for Round 1, leaves the room, then returns when the time is up. Then she
hands them each the “group” question for Round 2, and leaves. This time Michael and the other
student discuss and work together to come up with answers. The experimenter then returns when
the time is up. These first couple of rounds pass uneventfully.

II. THE “CRIME”
The session proceeds through Rounds 3 and 4. But then the experimenter returns and says: “We
have a problem. It looks like you cheated by working together on the second individual problem
set.” At that point, the Experimenter removes the other student from the room and says to Michael,
“I need to talk to both of you and then I need to check with my supervisor.”
Michael waits alone in the room for fifteen minutes. At that point, the experimenter returns and
says:
“It’s clear to me now that you cheated, that you helped each other on an individual problem. I knew
I heard voices during Round 3. Plus, the odds of two people independently coming up with exactly
the same unlikely answers is like less than one percent.
I talked to my supervisor, the principal investigator of this research. He is very upset. This is just
the kind of thing that can invalidate the study and make it difficult to get funding in the future.
As far as he is concerned, this act of cheating violates the university’s honor code. He wants to take
you to the Academic Integrity Board (AIB) for a hearing. It’s like a trial. We will present our
evidence, you’ll have an opportunity to state your case, and the Board will render a verdict
(historically they convict about half the students who appear). I’ll be honest: This is serious stuff.”
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III. PLEA OFFER
Then the experimenter says to Michael: “I think I talked my supervisor down. If you are willing to
plead guilty by signing and dating this short form I wrote up, you won’t have to appear for a trial
before the AIB.”
A. GUILTY PLEA
“If you plead guilty,” Michael is told, he would be required to admit that he cheated and agree to
perform forty hours of community service at the university. He will take full responsibility for the
cheating and the data loss it caused. In exchange, the professor won’t file charges. Michael is told
that the plea will go on the university’s internal record but once he has served the time, he’s done.
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” the experimenter tells Michael, he will be scheduled for a
hearing at the university within the next few weeks. The AIB will then render a verdict. If they find
him guilty, they will determine what larger punishment is appropriate.
OR
B. ALFORD PLEA
“If you plead guilty,” Michael is told, it means he agrees to perform forty hours of community
service at the university. In exchange, the professor won’t file charges against him. Michael is told
that the plea will go on the university’s internal record but once Michael has served the time, he’s
done.
Then the experimenter tells Michael: “If you want, you can also handwrite a personal statement on
the agreement stating that while you accept the plea and its terms, you are in fact innocent and did
not cheat. That statement would become part of the file. This means you would not have to take
responsibility or admit guilt for cheating.”
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” the experimenter tells Michael, he will be scheduled for a
hearing at the university within the next few weeks. The AIB will then render a verdict. If they find
him guilty, they will determine what larger punishment is appropriate.”

IV. DECISION
Michael considered the experimenter’s offer to plead guilty vs. plead not guilty and go to trial.
After giving it some thought, he decided to PLEAD GUILTY according to the terms of the
agreement he was offered.
After giving it some thought, he decided to PLEAD NOT GUILTY and go to trial instead.
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Appendix D
Questions Study 3 & 4
1. Based on what you have read, do you believe that Michael is guilty or not guilty of
[cheating/involuntary manslaughter?] (circle one)
Guilty

Not Guilty

2. How confident are you in this opinion?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Very

3. How long was the "sentence" in the final deal Michael was offered by the experimenter (in
hours of community service)?
_____________________________________________________________________________

4. The plea Michael was offered required that he admit guilt and take responsibility for the
cheating.

True

I don’t know

False

5. To what extent do you think that Michael made the right plea decision?
Not at all
extent

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 To a great

6. What decision do you think you would make if you were in Michael’s situation? (choose one)
Accept the plea

Reject the plea

6. How likely is it that you would have made the same decision if you were in Michael’s
situation?
Not at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Very
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7. Given that this study is examining your decision-making process, it is important to us that you
pay attention to each instruction. In order to show us that you are, please choose "Somewhat
agree" below, and then move on to the next question.
Somewhat
agree

Strongly agree Agree

Neither agree
nor disagree

Somewhat
disagree

Disagree

8. How fair do you think the plea offer was?
Not at all fair 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

9

10

10

Very fair

9. To what extent is Michael to blame for the situation he is in?
Not at all 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Fully to blame

10. Please rate to what degree you agree/disagree with the following statements regarding your
impression of the defendant Michael Anderson.
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Somewhat
Disagree
(2)

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree
(3)

Somewhat Strongly
Agree (4) Agree
(5)

Michael is
competent.

o

o

o

o

o

Michael is
intelligent.

o

o

o

o

o

Michael is
confident.

o

o

o

o

o

Michael is
remorseful

o

o

o

o

o

Strongly
disagree

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
149
Appendix E
STUDY 4 - Vignette
I. SET UP
Michael Anderson was invited to an early dinner with two friends from college at their house. He
hadn’t seen them in several months and was excited to spend some time with them.
He got into his car and drove over early in the evening. His friends had prepared a great meal,
from appetizers to dessert. They had a fun night together catching up, with great conversations
and games.
Michael has to get up early the next morning, so he didn’t drink any alcohol and made it a point
to leave before it was totally dark out.
After agreeing to meet up again soon, he said his goodbyes, got into his car, and drove off.
II. THE “CRIME”
Michael was tired and eager to get home. As he turned right on a sharp corner, he felt a loud thump.
Immediately he got out of the car and saw that he had hit an old man. The man is sprawled on the
street and unconscious.
Michael called 911 and within five minutes the police and an ambulance arrived at the scene. The
ambulance takes the man to the hospital. At that point, the police asked Michael if he would be
willing to go with them to the station: “We just want to get a statement from you.” Michael agreed
and was put in the back of the patrol car.
Once he arrived, Michael was left alone in an interview room for fifteen minutes. At that point, a
police officer returned and said:
“We were just informed that the man you hit died on his way to the hospital. The medical examiner
tells us that his injuries were caused by a high-impact collision.
It is clear to us that you were speeding if not worse. This is a serious matter. We spoke to the
prosecutor. She is planning to charge you with involuntary manslaughter.
The law defines involuntary manslaughter as the unintended killing of a person by acting in a
reckless or negligent manner. This crime carries a sentence of up to five years in prison.
This means you will go to trial. If the prosecution convinces the jury that you were careless or
reckless, you will be found guilty and sentenced for up to five years in prison. If the prosecution
fails to convince the jury, you walk free.”

III. PLEA OFFER
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Free on bail, Michael calls a public defender to advise him. The attorney comes back and reports
that “The prosecutor has offered you a deal, Michael: She will reduce your total sentence if you
plead guilty to the offense of involuntary manslaughter.”
A. GUILTY PLEA
“If you plead guilty,” Michael is told, he would be required to admit guilt and 6 months in a county
prison. He will take full responsibility for the crime and the damage he caused. In exchange for
admitting guilt, he would not need to go to trial. The guilty plea will go on his record but once he
has served the time, he’s done.
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” the attorney tells Michael, he will be charged with involuntary
manslaughter and tried within the next several weeks. If he is found guilty, the judge will determine
what larger punishment is appropriate (3 to 5 years in prison). If he is acquitted, Michael is told,
he walks free.
OR
B. ALFORD PLEA
“If you plead guilty,” Michael is told, he would be required to serve 6 months in county prison. He
would not need to go to trial. The guilty plea will go on his record but once he has served the time,
he’s done.
Then he adds: “The prosecutor has agreed that you could also handwrite on the agreement that
while you accept the plea and its terms, you are, in fact, innocent—not careless, reckless, or
otherwise impaired. You would still serve the 6 months in prison, but the statement of your
innocence would also go on your record. This means you would not have to take responsibility or
admit guilt for the crime.”
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” the attorney tells Michael, he will be charged with involuntary
manslaughter and tried within the next several weeks. If he is found guilty, the judge will determine
what larger punishment is appropriate (3 to 5 years in prison). If he is acquitted, Michael is told,
he walks free.

IV. DECISION
Michael considered the experimenter’s offer to plead guilty vs. plead not guilty and go to trial.
After giving it some thought, he decided to PLEAD GUILTY according to the terms of the
agreement he was offered.
After giving it some thought, he decided to PLEAD NOT GUILTY and go to trial instead.
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Appendix F
STUDY 5 - Vignette
I. SET UP
Michael Anderson was invited to an early dinner with two friends from college at their house. He
hadn’t seen them in several months and was excited to spend some time with them.
He got into his car and drove over early in the evening. His friends had prepared a great meal,
from appetizers to dessert. They had a fun night together catching up, with great conversations
and games.
Michael has to get up early the next morning, so he didn’t drink any alcohol and made it a point
to leave before it was totally dark out.
After agreeing to meet up again soon, he said his goodbyes, got into his car, and drove off.
II. THE “CRIME”
Michael was tired and eager to get home. As he turned right on a sharp corner, he felt a loud thump.
Immediately he got out of the car and saw that he had hit an old man. The man is sprawled on the
street and unconscious.
Michael called 911 and within five minutes the police and an ambulance arrived at the scene. The
ambulance takes the man to the hospital. At that point, the police asked Michael if he would be
willing to go with them to the station: “We just want to get a statement from you.” Michael agreed
and was put in the back of the patrol car.
Once he arrived, Michael was left alone in an interview room for fifteen minutes. At that point, a
police officer returned and said:
“We were just informed that the man you hit died on his way to the hospital. The medical examiner
tells us that his injuries were caused by a high-impact collision.
It is clear to us that you were speeding if not worse. This is a serious matter. We spoke to the
prosecutor. She is planning to charge you with involuntary manslaughter.
The law defines involuntary manslaughter as the unintended killing of a person by acting in a
reckless or negligent manner. This crime carries a sentence of up to five years in prison.
This means you will go to trial. If the prosecution convinces the jury that you were careless or
reckless, you will be found guilty and sentenced for up to five years in prison. If the prosecution
fails to convince the jury, you walk free.”

III. PLEA OFFER
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Free on bail, Michael calls a public defender to advise him. The attorney comes back and reports
that “The prosecutor has offered you a deal, Michael: She will reduce your total sentence if you
plead guilty to the offense of involuntary manslaughter.”
A. GUILTY PLEA
“If you plead guilty,” Michael is told, he would be required to admit guilt and 6 months in a county
prison. He will take full responsibility for the crime and the damage he caused. In exchange for
admitting guilt, he would not need to go to trial. The guilty plea will go on his record but once he
has served the time, he’s done.
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” the attorney tells Michael, he will be charged with involuntary
manslaughter and tried within the next several weeks. If he is found guilty, the judge will determine
what larger punishment is appropriate (3 to 5 years in prison). If he is acquitted, Michael is told,
he walks free.
OR
B. ALFORD PLEA
“If you plead guilty,” Michael is told, he would be required to serve 6 months in county prison. He
would not need to go to trial. The guilty plea will go on his record but once he has served the time,
he’s done.
Then he adds: “The prosecutor has agreed that you could also handwrite on the agreement that
while you accept the plea and its terms, you are, in fact, innocent—not careless, reckless, or
otherwise impaired. You would still serve the 6 months in prison, but the statement of your
innocence would also go on your record. This means you would not have to take responsibility or
admit guilt for the crime.”
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” the attorney tells Michael, he will be charged with involuntary
manslaughter and tried within the next several weeks. If he is found guilty, the judge will determine
what larger punishment is appropriate (3 to 5 years in prison). If he is acquitted, Michael is told,
he walks free.
OR
C. ALFORD PLEA INITATED BY DEFENDANT
“If you plead guilty,” Michael is told, he would be required to admit guilt and serve 6 months in a
county prison. He will take full responsibility for the crime and the damage he caused. In
exchange for admitting guilt, he would not need to go to trial. The guilty plea will go on his
record but once he has served the time, he’s done.
“If you do not accept the plea offer,” the attorney tells Michael, he will be charged with
involuntary manslaughter and tried within the next several weeks. If he is found guilty, the judge
will determine what larger punishment is appropriate (3 to 5 years in prison). If he is acquitted,
Michael is told, he walks free.
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Michael hesitates. He tells his lawyer that he does not want to take the plea because he is
innocent. He says he didn’t commit this crime he is accused of.
Michael’s attorney speaks to the prosecutor again. She returns and says: “The prosecutor has
agreed that you could handwrite on the agreement that while you accept the plea and its terms,
you are, in fact, innocent—not careless, reckless, or otherwise impaired. You would still serve the
6 months in prison, but the statement of your innocence would also go on your record.
IV. DECISION
Michael considered the experimenter’s offer to plead guilty vs. plead not guilty and go to trial.
After giving it some thought, he decided to PLEAD GUILTY according to the terms of the
agreement he was offered.
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Redlich, A. D., & Özdoğru, A. A. (2009). Alford pleas in the age of innocence. Behavioral
Sciences & the Law, 27(3), 467–488. doi:10.1002/bsl.876
Ronis, J. E. (2009). The pragmatic plea: Expanding use of the Alford Plea to promote traditionally
conflicting interests of the criminal justice system. Temple Law Review, 82, 1389-1417.
Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution
process. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 10, 173–220.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08) 60357-3
Russano, M. B., Meissner, C. A., Narchet, F. M., & Kassin, S. M. (2005). Investigating true and
false confessions within a novel experimental paradigm. Psychological Science, 16(6), 481486. doi: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01560.x.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
165
Saltzburg, S. A, & Capra, D. J. (2004). American criminal procedure: Cases and commentary. (7th
Ed.). West Publishing Co.
Saulnier, K., & Perlman, D. (1981). The Actor-Observer Bias is Alive and Well in Prison.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 7(4), 559–564. doi:10.1177/014616728174006
Sassenberg, K., & Ditrich, L. (2019). Research in social psychology changed between 2011 and
2016: Larger sample sizes, more self-report measures, and more online studies. Advances in
Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 2(2), 107–114.
doi:10.1177/2515245919838781
Schlenker, B. R. (1975). Self-presentation: Managing the impression of consistency when reality
interferes with self-enhancement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32(6),
1030. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.32.6.1030
Scherr, K. C., Normile, C. J., Luna, S., Redlich, A. D., Lawrence, M., & Catlin, M. (2020). False
admissions of guilt associated with wrongful convictions undermine people’s perceptions of
exonerees. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. Advance Online Publication
doi:10.1037/law0000238
Scherr, K. C., Normile, C. J., & Putney, H. (2018). Perpetually stigmatized: False confessions
prompt underlying mechanisms that motivate negative perceptions of exonerees.
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 24, 341–352. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/law0000163
Scherr, K. C., Alberts, K. M., Franks, A. S., & Hawkins, I. (2016). Overcoming innocents’ naiveté:
Pre-interrogation decision-making among innocent suspects. Behavioral Sciences and the
Law, 34, 564–579. doi: 10.1002/bsl.2247
Schneider, S. (2013). When innocent defendants falsely confess: Analyzing the ramifications of
entering Alford pleas in the context of the burgeoning innocence movement. Journal of

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
166
Criminal Law & Criminology, 103, 279-308.
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol103/iss1/6
Shimizu, M., & Pelham, B. W. (2004). The unconscious cost of good fortune: Implicit and explicit
self-esteem, positive life events, and health. Health Psychology, 23(1), 101–105.
doi:10.1037/0278-6133.23.1.101
Shipley, C. J. (1987). The Alford plea: A necessary but unpredictable tool for the criminal
defendant. Iowa Law Review, 72, 1063–1089.
State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 842 A.2d 567. (2004)
State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 579 N.W.2d 698, (1998)
Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. In L.
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (pp. 261–302). Academic
Press.
Steele, C. M., & Liu, T. J. (1983). Dissonance processes as self-affirmation. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 45(1), 5–19. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.5
Swann Jr., W. B. (2012). Self-verification theory. In P. Van Lang, A. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins
(Eds.), Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology (pp. 23–42). Sage.
Swann, W. B., Griffin, J. J., Predmore, S. C., & Gaines, B. (1987). The cognitive–affective
crossfire: When self-consistency confronts self-enhancement. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 52(5), 881–889. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.52.5.881
Swann, W. B., & Hill, C. A. (1982). When our identities are mistaken: Reaffirming selfconceptions through social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
43(1), 59–66. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.43.1.59

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
167
Tor, A., Gazal-Ayal, O., & Garcia, S. M. (2010). Fairness and the Willingness to Accept Plea
Bargain Offers. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 7(1), 97–116. doi:10.1111/j.17401461.2009.01171.x
United States Sentencing Commission (2017). Figure C. in U.S. Sentencing Commission
Sourcebook. Retrieved from https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2017/2017SB_Full.pdf
Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., & Ciarocco, N. J. (2005). Self-regulation and self-presentation:
Regulatory resource depletion impairs impression management and effortful selfpresentation depletes regulatory resources. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
88, 632-657. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.88.4.632
Vota, K. (2011). The truth behind Echols v. State: How an Alford guilty plea saved the West
Memphis Three. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 45, 1003.
Walburn, S. E. (1998). Should the Military Adopt an Alford-Type Guilty Plea. Air Force Law
Review, 44, 119.
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942).
Walton, D. (2019). When expert opinion evidence goes wrong. Artificial Intelligence and Law,
27(4), 369–401. doi:10.1007/s10506-019-09249-w
Ward, B. H. (2003). A plea best not taken: Why criminal defendants should avoid the Alford Plea.
Missouri Law Review, 68, 913.
Welty, J. (2010, April 13). Alford Pleas. [Blog post]. Retrieved from:
https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/alford-pleas/

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
168
White, K. (2016, October 11). Joseph Buffey agrees to plea deal, freed after 15 years in prison.
Charleston Gazette-Mail. Retrieved from: http://www.wdtv.com/content/news/Chargesdismissed-against-Joseph-Buffey--396651991.html
White, W. S. (2003). Miranda’s waning protections: Police interrogation practices after
Dickerson. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Wilford, M. M., & Wells, G. L. (2018). Bluffed by the dealer: Distinguishing false pleas from false
confessions. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 24(2), 158–170. doi:10.1037/law0000165
Wilford, M. M., Wells, G. L., & Frazier, A. (2020). Plea-Bargaining Law: The impact of
innocence, trial penalty, and conviction probability on plea outcomes. American Journal of
Criminal Justice, 1-22. doi:10.1007/s12103-020-09564-y
Williams, K. D., Cheung, C. K. T., & Choi, W. (2000). Cyberostracism: Effects of being ignored
over the Internet. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(5), 748–762.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.5.748
Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2003). Affective Forecasting. Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, 35, 345–411. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(03)01006-2. ISBN 9780120152353.
Wood, L. A., & MacMartin, C. (2007). Constructing remorse. Journal of Language and Social
Psychology, 26(4), 343–362. doi:10.1177/0261927x07306979
Wolf Harlow, C. (2000). Defense counsel in criminal cases. Bureau of Justice Statistics Special
Report. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.
Zottoli, T. M., Daftary-Kapur, T., Winters, G. M., & Hogan, C. (2016). Plea discounts, time
pressures, and false-guilty pleas in youth and adults who pleaded guilty to felonies in New
York City. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 22, 250 –259.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/law0000095

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ALLURE OF ALFORD
169
Zottoli, T. M., Daftary‐Kapur, T., Edkins, V. A., Redlich, A. D., King, C. M., Dervan, L. E., &
Tahan, E. (2019). State of the States: A survey of statutory law, regulations and court rules
pertaining to guilty pleas across the United States. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 37(4),
388–434. doi:10.1002/bsl.2413

